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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs*** ***POST COUP REPORTING***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

### POST COUP REPORTING

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### 'Present Threat' of 'Left-Wing Coup' Seen

914B0375B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 29 Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Vladislavlev, deputy president of the Science and Industry Union, by D. Sabov; place and date not given: "We Have Lived To See Monday. Let Us Get Past It Now..."]

[Text] [Sabov] On that Monday, 19 August, you confirmed at a press conference following Shevardnadze: The Political Council of the Movement for Democratic Reforms came to the conclusion as early as Friday 16 August that there was a threat of "an anticonstitutional coup." What did you proceed from: the intuition of Eduard Amvrosiyevich once again, or information that was leaked?

[Vladislavlev] As I see it, the threat was palpable. For example, I knew that as early as last winter Tizyakov had embarked on visiting the largest enterprises with presentations which actually boiled down to the appeal "To arms!"

Finally, about 10 days before the putsch I was present at the first meeting of the State Council for Economic Reform, which the former prime minister began with the following words: "All the measures that need to be taken in order to overcome the crisis run into the nonsensical Union treaty." Pavlov went on to say: "As far as I am concerned, I have been mindful since childhood of the fact that the state may operate efficiently only when proceeding from the Constitution, and not some scraps of paper on which someone comes to an agreement with someone else..."

Since the prime minister said this to the representatives of 15 republics with the president absent, this meant that he was not afraid, and that somebody stood behind him. I immediately went to two highly placed individuals and demanded that they get in touch with Gorbachev and immediately summon him to Moscow. Alas, Yanayev was the first of these two people...

Of course, there were other signals too. Putting them together, we came to the conclusion which was set forth in an appeal of the Political Council of the Movement for Democratic Reforms, and even authorized Deputy Minasbekyan to issue on Saturday 17 August a warning on our behalf on a Moscow TV channel (which, incidentally, he did). Who could have known then that everything was planned for Monday...

[Sabov] What kind of man is Tizyakov?

[Vladislavlev] In general, he is a figure known to us. He is the director of a large military plant, a neighbor and personal friend of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. Incidentally, this Association of State Industrial Enterprises, Transportation, and Communications was Ryzhkov's idea. The former prime minister counted very much on support from the captains of industry in the military-industrial complex.

However, at present the Soviet military-industrial complex is far from homogeneous. Lots of people who work in the complex, including general directors of major enterprises, understand better than our economists that the future belongs to an economy based on entrepreneurship rather than diktat. Tizyakov's attacks on our Science and Industry Union for acknowledging various forms of property and our coming out in favor of eliminating party committees at enterprises merely caused him to lose comrades-in-arms.

[Sabov] How would you describe the array of forces in the military-industrial complex as of now?

[Vladislavlev] It is the same as in society. We have won a tremendous victory, but the terrible system that counteracts perestroika has extensive defenses and is literally rooted in the ground. The headquarters of the proponents of restoration—the Central Committee of the party—has been eliminated, but the people are alive. Frequently there are no other cadres, for example, in the case of large enterprises.

All of this has directly to do with the military-industrial complex. Yes, this is the flower of our industry, but its effectiveness is equal to zero. So far, conversion has been a profanation, but all of us got an earful of ultimatums! I remember how deeply Gorbachev was shocked by the conference of directors which Tizyakov called in December. It appears to me that our union still failed to convince the president that these people did not speak for all of industry, and that there was no need to be afraid of them.

Incidentally, I am convinced that this blackmail also was an integral part of the preparatory work...

[Sabov] How would you word the ideology of this putsch? In what manner is it important to counteract it?

[Vladislavlev] The main document which the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] has left for posterity (I mean its "Appeal to the Soviet People") follows the best traditions of shameless party demagoguery. It does not contain Bolshevik vocabulary (it is too obsolete). There is even a reference to private property ("in the sphere of services"), but the appeal is permeated through and through with the Bolshevik spirit. There can be no doubts as to who compiled it and why...

Something else is important. The present time is no less critical than that during the three days of the coup. From now on the most horrible present threat in the country is that of a left-wing coup, which is fraught with the same explosion of civic passions as a right-wing coup. Nobody has abolished the crisis yet, and if we do not cast aside all resentments and counteract it by means of a unified democratic front, everything may be repeated. We may rest assured about the future of our children only if an alliance between Yeltsin and Gorbachev is reborn, and if

Akayev, Nazarbayev, and other national leaders who have proven their adherence to democracy stand side by side with them.

At present, the Russian authorities are responsible for too many things. I agree with the decision to suspend the activities of the party, but I am concerned about what is going to happen to the Union now that the functions of the center are actually shifting to Russia. Of course, there can no longer be the former dictatorial center. However, simply destroying the center in a country in which everything is super-monopolized would mean eliminating an opportunity for all the republics to overcome the crisis quickly and effectively...

Our society is afflicted by such diseases that there is simply no easy, painless way to cure them. I would ask you not to believe those who promise to pile all the shelves with plenty of foodstuffs right away. I would very much like to ask our economic scientists, who in the course of their polemics frequently discuss improbable schedules and programs, to spare our public. It has been lied to for 70 years; let us get it accustomed to the truth...

### Gorbachev TSN's 'Man of the Week'

*LD0809215191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Sep 91*

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [T.Mitkova, newsreader] We have received the data of a poll carried out by Moscow sociologists from the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion. On 7 September, Muscovites were asked the question: would you like Gorbachev to be the President of the new Union or not? 38 percent replied yes; 43 percent said no.

The events of the last week give grounds to speak of Gorbachev as a President acting realistically, who has managed to assess level-headedly the Union's prospects and to reject obsolete dogmas. We believe that Gorbachev is "Man of the Week." Yevgeniy Kiselev will now try to prove this.

[Kiselev] It is a difficult choice, to name the politician who performed most outstandingly last week. Who is he? Nazarbayev, who opened the Congress with the sensational ten-plus-one statement? Yeltsin, who expanded even further the limits of his power and influence? Yavlinskiy, who seems finally to have changed from a powerless economic advisor into a leader with real power? Sobchak, whom Congress deputies, according to sociologists, have called the most promising politician of the forthcoming decade? Landsbergis, the most irreconcilable of the rebellious Baltic leaders, who exulted most of all over the acquisition of independence? No. We have made another choice which will probably stun many. In our view, the "Man of the Week" was Gorbachev.

On the eve of the Congress it was clear that for the President this week would be the most difficult and crucial of his whole political career. He was threatened

with having to resign. Betrayed by virtually all the people in his closest entourage and having experienced the collapse of many of his ideals, bitter insight from the betrayal of some, the cowardice of others and the uselessness of others, which even taken separately could have broken any major politician, Gorbachev came to the Congress without losing his equanimity for a minute and full of determination to put up a fight, having announced the previous day that he would not resign of his own accord. And when the debates began at the Congress, Gorbachev, as though hypnotizing the hall, did not allow the issue of his resignation to be discussed at the Congress at all.

However, this is not the main thing. It has become common to speak of Gorbachev as a genius of political compromise. People far more rarely recall his astonishing capacity, when pushed to the very edge, to change course sharply. It was precisely this that we observed once again last week, in all its brilliance. With unprecedented determination, Gorbachev surrendered all his positions which previously seemed so unshakeable: the idea of a federation; his previous desire to keep the Baltic states in the Union; and he did not even reject with indignation Sobchak's appeal for Lenin to be re-buried, as he would have done before.

But the most astonishing thing was that, while displaying first miracles of shrewdness, then persistence bordering on obstinacy, Gorbachev moved toward renunciation of everything he has accumulated all these years, namely of his former power. After all, the main documents of the Congress, which Gorbachev strove so hard to get adopted, figuratively speaking, have transformed him from the omnipotent ruler of an enormous empire into the constitutional monarch of a commonwealth of nations. There was a moment when it seemed that everything was collapsing, but it was Gorbachev who held the Congress in his hands:

[Begin Gorbachev recording from the Congress] We have already been debating this for three or four days. We need to move on. Either we are able to adopt the decision or we aren't, and that'll be the end of it. We have two options: either we adopt the decision and we take the coordinated path that we want, or we do not and we'll look for different answers. [end recording]

[Kiselev] And so, Gorbachev has lost his former power. But having paid this price he remains President of the Union, so far for the transition period. Will he retain this post when and if the Union Treaty is signed? I think he will, for the republics will need none other than Gorbachev, with his international prestige, enormous personal ties with Western leaders, with his ability to exhort, to reconcile, and to reduce to a common denominator the interests of widely differing political forces, of which there will be more than enough within the new Union. And furthermore, the republics will need Gorbachev to balance the influence of a new center, the role of which, evidently, will inevitably transfer to the leadership of

Russia, with its enormous economic resources which virtually none of the republics can do without.

So, last week, Gorbachev survived as a politician and for this reason has won the right to be regarded as the main hero of those unforgettable seven days. Yevgeniy Kiselev, Vesti of Russian Television, especially for TSN.

### **Gorbachev Comments on Coup Impact**

*AU1009204691 Vienna ORF Television Network  
in German 2000 GMT 10 Sep 91*

[Interview with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev by Christian Schueller at CSCE conference in Moscow on 10 September—recorded; Gorbachev statements in Russian with superimposed German translation]

[Text]

[Schueller] Mikhail Sergeyevich, one has the impression that today you have fully realized for the first time how important the events in August were for Europe.

[Gorbachev, laughing] No, I realized it far earlier, and this also determined my speeches at the People's Congress and the atmosphere during the first meeting with the chiefs of the republics.

No, what I wanted to express today is the close intertwinement of the two things, the internal development in the Soviet Union and the new international surroundings. Both were necessary to frustrate the coup.

### **Paper Hints Gorbachev 'Possibly Guilty of Negligence'**

*LD0909140691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 1200 GMT 9 Sep 91*

[Text] Representatives of the prosecution and defense of the leaders of the August coup think that the USSR president could go from being a witness in that affair to being one of the accused.

He is possibly guilty of negligence in the selection of cadres and thereby of a crime provided for by Article 172 of the RSFSR Criminal Code which envisages a term in custody of two to three years or dismissal from one's post. The independent newspaper KOMMERSANT makes this prediction.

### **USSR Politicians' Comments to Western Media Cited**

*PM0609110591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
5 Sep 91 Union Edition pp 1,3*

[M. Yusin report: "Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and Others Clarify Their Positions"]

[Text] It is not only speeches from important platforms that help to clarify the positions of our leading politicians but also the interviews that they have given to the foreign mass media recently.

In a conversation with a CNN correspondent, Boris Yeltsin stated that he now "trusts Gorbachev almost fully" and that the Soviet president has one last chance to remain in power—by strengthening the alliance with the democratic movement and with Russia after recognizing the independence of all the remaining republics. Yeltsin advocated ending underground nuclear tests and the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. He also stated that 14 and perhaps all 15 of the former Soviet republics will sign the agreement on economic cooperation.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has given an interview to AFP. In his words, the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will be recognized by a special decision of the State Council—the new organ of power in which the presidents of the 10 republics and the Union will take part.

Estonian Deputy Tiit Made told the same agency that as soon as the Congress ends, Gorbachev will sign a decree recognizing the independence of the Baltic states. In his words, Gorbachev announced this himself at a meeting with Estonian representatives. In his decree the USSR President intends to declare the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which resulted in the Baltic's annexation, unlawful. In Made's view, Gorbachev and his advisers decided to resort to such a decree because there is no complete confidence that the Congress, well known for its conservative nature, will manage to muster the two-thirds of the votes necessary for adopting a resolution on the secession of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Foreign news agencies cite brief assessments of the first two days of the Congress' work obtained from people's deputies by correspondents in recesses between sessions. Galina Starovoytova has stated that the new state formation must rise from the ruins of the old empire. "If the Congress does not grasp the new political realities the relevant decisions will be taken by Gorbachev and Yeltsin will support him." In her opinion, Gorbachev will be the first and last USSR President; in the future he will have to play mainly a coordinating role between the republics.

Yuriy Afansyev has said that the Congress has only two paths—it can "retire with dignity" by supporting the statement of Gorbachev and the republic leaders, or it can "die in shame," rejecting the "10+1" formula. Afansyev believes that in the present transitional period, Gorbachev is needed to ensure stability and calm in the country. In the future he could take the post of chairman of the "consultative political council of the Euro-Asian community."

This report has been prepared from materials from AFP, REUTERS, and AP.

**Pankin Supports Creation of CSCE 'Observer'***LD0609114191 Belgrade TANJUG in English  
1015 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Text] Belgrade, Sep 6 (TANJUG)—Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Pankin (60) told the Belgrade daily POLITIKA that he supported the creation of the institution of an observer or reporter of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) who could be sent to any country at the insistence of other countries.

"Respecting the legislature of every country, the CSCE's observers would express their own views on this or that conflict," said Pankin, who was appointed head of the Soviet diplomacy after the failed coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"It must be said that it is now clear: the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, which had been spoken about in our country and behind which many concealed themselves in all periods in time in order not to allow democratic changes in their own country, should not be an absolute ... if we are building a common European home, then let us consult with our neighbours, from time to time ask them to help us in our conflicts, and pay them visits," Pankin opined.

Speaking about the new togetherness in the Soviet Union, Pankin said "however flexible the link between the center and the republics, fundamental strategic questions of relations with the outside world should still be coordinated. The global problems in that sphere will be in the hands of the central foreign-policy department. At the same time, an increased share of the bilateral relations with foreign countries will be in the hands of the republics."

Pankin, a career diplomat who until recently was the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia and was among the first to condemn the putsch against Gorbachev, said that the "putschists notably included the heads of those departments which stalled many operations ... the people who carried out an unconstitutional coup impeded our policy in a 'constitutional manner,' demanding endless harmonization, ratifications of solutions, discussions—so that glaringly obvious problems which should have been settled on the spot often stood completely still."

**Presidential Press Secretary on Pankin Appointment***PM0909164591 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE  
in English (Undated)*

[Unattributed interview with Presidential Press Secretary Vitali Ignatenko; date, place not given: "Integrity And Efficiency. Boris Pankin Appointed USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs. Presidential Press Secretary Vitaliy Ignatenko's NOVOSTI Interview"]

[Text] [Correspondent] What, do you think, made Gorbachev choose Pankin, until recently Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia?

[Ignatenko] The integrity and efficiency Mr. Pankin displayed at every job. I know him well—we worked for the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA youth daily together in the 60s and the 70s. He climbed from reporter on probation to editor-in-chief. I became his deputy then, and learned him as a man of firm principles, too good for the time he lived in. Now, during the August coup, he did what I expected of him. He was a true Soviet citizen of democratic convictions and an excellent ambassador. All honest people in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union admired him. Now, the public must know about his conduct.

[Correspondent] Do you think the Soviet foreign policy will change with his appointment?

[Ignatenko] Boris Pankin's a man of profound originality, and I think he'll give this originality to his new office. He has something to rely on—the vast intellectual potential of the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs. Now, I think, it will lose its official atmosphere and obedience.

[Correspondent] Do you think he learned the lessons of those three grim days?

[Ignatenko] I'm sure he did—as diplomat and minister. He's sure to pay attention to attitudes to the putsch as displayed by Soviet diplomats abroad, who had pledged loyalty to the USSR president. As to the cardinal lines of Soviet foreign policy, as determined by the president, they will remain the same.

**Presidential Adviser Primakov Praises Reform Decision***OW0509184291 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1600 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Adviser to USSR President Evgeniy Primakov says that by passing a resolution and a law on the reform of the Union structures, the congress of people's deputies took an optimum decision.

According to Mr. Primakov, these documents link the recognition of republics' sovereignty to the need for a single economic and military space. Mr. Primakov predicts that in future the integration of the independent Union republics will be reinforced.

**Gorbachev Aide Shakhnazarov Interviewed***PM1009113791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
7 Sep 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Interview with USSR presidential aide Georgiy Shakhnazarov by L. Yermakova "immediately after the end of the Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies

in the hall of the Kremlin Place of Congresses"; first paragraph is an introduction: "The Main Thing Now Is To Prevent an Explosion"]

[Text] Straight after the conclusion of the Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies, USSR presidential aide G.Kh. Shakhnazarov answered questions in the hall of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses "hot on the trail" of an event that has caused many disputes and contradictory assessments in the Kremlin itself and beyond its walls.

[Yermakova] During the Congress, reproaches were repeatedly made about the unconstitutional nature of its procedure and the fact that M.S. Gorbachev "led it like a conservative..."

[Shakhnazarov] The main result of the Congress lies in what we have achieved. And we have achieved very progressive solutions in all spheres, solutions which powerfully push society forward. Of course, there are forms that have been forced upon us like, for example, the State Council. As for the way the Congress should be led, I can assure you: Had anyone else been in Gorbachev's place—Nazarbayev or Yeltsin—they would have led the sessions in exactly the same way because this Congress had to proceed according to exactly that scenario. The very logic of events sometimes dictates the manner of implementing the measure. A coup was carried out which brought the country to the brink of bloodshed. And then to sit there for weeks, starting discussions, hearing various opinions? That is not what is needed. And society, I think, was geared to what was reasonable, and expected that the deputies would quickly adopt radical decisions. And that is what happened. So, when giving various opinions, we need to be guided by the essence of the matter. Ultimately, the main point was that everything proceeded within the framework of the Constitution and the ballot. The deputies had sufficient wisdom and responsibility.

[Yermakova] What is the basis for this certainty that the Congress decisions are correct? After all, we called all of them historic, leading us onto a new path.

[Shakhnazarov] Yes, we often repeated these words. But in this case, when the uncontrollable reaction of the Union's disintegration began, we had to save what there was, so that people did not perish under the debris, so that the harvest would be gathered, so that we would not freeze in winter, and in order to preserve science and culture—these are the things that the Congress and the republic leaders were ultimately busy doing. And it is hard to doubt this.

[Yermakova] Do you think, not as a deputy or as a presidential aide, but simply as a citizen, that we have finally found a way out?

[Shakhnazarov] Interim decisions have been adopted, but there are no others at this moment. In principle, I supported the idea of concluding the Union Treaty that was scheduled for 20 August. Even then we could not be

completely sure that this structure would be wholly viable. But nevertheless it provided a breathing space so that the republics could live their lives a bit, deal with their own affairs autonomously, and work out for themselves the spheres where they should cooperate. Many people are now shouting "Independence!" And look at what is happening in some republics. Therefore, I repeat, we need time to let the republics feel for themselves the need to unite. This concerns culture, currency, and other more serious aspects. Of course there may be cases when they will not come back, like the Baltics. But I hope that even they will participate in an economic agreement, and that they will stay close to the Union on a cultural level. For example, R. Pauls and L. Vaikula need an audience that knows and loves them. Many of us are tied not by 70 years or the 50 postwar years, but by 250 years. The main thing now is to prevent an explosion and bloodshed. We must calm down. I think that everything will gradually fall into place.

[Yermakova] The putsch showed the mistakes that were made in the selection of the president's entourage.

[Shakhnazarov] There were all kinds of people in his entourage—conservatives and very progressive people alike. And there was a time when both kinds sat simultaneously on the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

[Yermakova] Can we hope that Shevardnadze and other democrats will return to Gorbachev in the end?

[Shakhnazarov] Shevardnadze has already practically returned despite the fact that he rejected the job. After all the issue at stake is not the post. As for Yakovlev, Gorbachev consults and invites him every day. Incidentally, he has not broken off ties with them, and that includes Shatalin and Petrakov. And then Chernyayev and I were close to Mikhail Sergeyevich. And we have to bear in mind that as president he was forced to listen to the opinions of various circles, but his main mistake was that he did not replace the people who occupied the posts connected with security on time.

[Yermakova] Will the CPSU be reborn?

[Shakhnazarov] I do not think that it ever will in its previous form, but we must have a strong left-wing party—this is in our country's traditions. I personally support the idea of a social-democratic party.

[Yermakova] What is your reaction to the proposal of burying Lenin?

[Shakhnazarov] The people who are saying that this ought to be done in a Christian way and according to the will of Vladimir Ilich himself are being logical. But I fear that now is not the right time to do this: There are popular traditions which have even grown into a sacred object. And we must not be hasty, just as we must not be hasty with the renaming of Leningrad. In principle this is a correct idea, but we must at least spare the feelings of the veterans who defended Leningrad.



[Yermakova] What is your forecast of the country's life in the next six months?

[Shakhnazarov] Evidently this will be a very difficult period. Especially economically. A further drop in production is being predicted. But all the same I have the impression that some gleam of hope has appeared. The outburst of the democratic movement following the failure of the coup gave people a chance to believe that there is nevertheless something to fight for and work for. All of us in this dramatic segment of history have begun to realize that the most important thing is nevertheless the people's spiritual life. As a participant in the war, I recall that people worked miracles then because of the idea of saving the motherland. And if we again have an idea and faith that we have something to fight for, then we will find our feet again. In my opinion, such an idea is beginning to appear.

#### **Shevardnadze, Ryzhkov on Current Soviet Developments**

*AU0709135091 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Sep 91 pp 1,5*

[Interviews with Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov by Jiri Doubrava in Moscow; date not given: "Two Who Will Return"]

[Text] One can see extraordinary things at the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies session. For example, Aleksandr Yakovlev, the former chief presidential adviser and—at the same time—the "architect of perestroika," coming into the foyer with his arm around the shoulder of another "used-to-be," Former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov. They were rivals just under a year ago and, thanks to Yakovlev, Ryzhkov had to give up his post in favor of Pavlov, who is currently languishing in jail.

More Soviet politicians who gave up their posts in past months are preparing to come back. The first in line is Former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Our special correspondent spoke with him in the Kremlin.

[Doubrava] Can this congress resolve anything?

[Shevardnadze] I think it can, but only if the deputies accept the proposal by Kazakh President Nazarbayev for immediate steps toward stability. Otherwise, it cannot resolve anything.

[Doubrava] This proposal, agreed upon by representatives of two thirds of the current Soviet republics, also mentions independence for the Baltic states.

[Shevardnadze] I think an economic agreement will be reached with them. This is in their interest.

[Doubrava] It also mentions the conservative forces' attempt to get rid of Gorbachev.

[Shevardnadze] I do not think this should have happened. The country would then have been left without a president, and the extraordinary congress has no right to elect a new one.

[Doubrava] Who wrote Nazarbayev's proposal? He or other republican representatives?

[Shevardnadze] As far as I know, it was written by everyone who took part in the talks from Sunday to Monday [1-2 September]. It was very actively supported by Yeltsin, for example. They all understood in the end that the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union would have been a catastrophe.

[Doubrava] What about you? Will you accept a government post if you are offered one?

[Shevardnadze] I do not know. I have enough work of my own at the moment.

(According to lobby reports, Eduard Shevardnadze has been offered the post of coordinator of Soviet foreign policy, a post that would, in fact, place him above new Foreign Minister Boris Pankin—author's note)

[Doubrava] Another person one can meet in the foyer of the Kremlin's Congress Palace is Former Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

What would you do now if you were again entrusted with the post of prime minister?

[Ryzhkov] I would try to conclude economic agreements among the individual republics as soon as possible so that we could get on with normal life. That is the main thing. Of course, this is a view through the eyes of a prime minister, who must look at everything from a mainly economic point of view. Important political moves are made by others. In my opinion, economic agreements will eventually have to be reached among all the current 15 republics, including the Baltic republics. Of course, I mean the former republics; some of them are already in fact states.

[Doubrava] Nikolay Ryzhkov, like Eduard Shevardnadze, refused to say if he would eventually accept a government post. This means that this possibility cannot be discounted.

#### **Latsis Notes Changes Facing Gorbachev**

*914B0347A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Article by Otto Latsis: "Gorbachev Has Returned to a Different Country. Does He Understand This?"]

[Text] During M. Gorbachev's news conference on 22 August many television viewers were fretting with annoyance and pity. They were annoyed at Mikhail Sergeyevich and felt sorry for him. He was not on top of things at that time, and most likely it could not have been otherwise. There is a limit to what human beings

can take. Some details from what he said struck home at once—about the fact, for example, that the besieged refused to take food from the outside world. They did right: The gang was capable of anything, and the conspirators' failure had, after all, immediately placed their hides in jeopardy.

But there is another detail which is more important: how obtrusively the question of communications has arisen. And that is why Gorbachev understood everything right away when he saw that the communications had been cut and that is why he demanded as the first order of business the restoration of communications. Given communications, he, the president, and his word move forces untold. When they are lacking, he is an ordinary man, in no way distinguished from the person whom the racketeer and kidnapper or investigator and executioner blackmail in the torture chamber. But the duty weighing on him those three days was the duty of president, yet his powers were only those of an ordinary man. And it was an ordinary man who, together with the people, held the front in the Crimea.

It was on this that the conspirators, who measured the human stature of those around them by their own stature, were counting. We cannot understand what these nonentities were counting on, yet the answer is obvious: the nothingness of others. They did not doubt that Gorbachev would break immediately and that they would right away have in their hands an edict from the president and that the people would submit to it.

Let us consider one further point: He was shaken by the betrayal of his most trusted aides: Plekhanov, Boldin. He was tormented by fears for his nearest and dearest. And he stood firm, did not allow the front to be breached, did not allow the defenders of the White House to strike from the rear. On a human level, how can we fail to understand, how can we not appreciate the strength of mind! Alas, politics is a cruel business, and he who has embarked on it cannot always count on human conditions. He wanted, away from his incarceration, to go to the people as soon as possible, to share with them, to "exchange," as he likes to say. As a politician, he did not have the right. In the first hours of freedom he was not ready for conversation, nor could he have been. He did not possess the information. He spoke on the basis of knowledge that was of infinite antiquity—of three days before. He had returned to a country which was unfamiliar to him—it was with good reason that the television reporter who greeted him at Vnukovo misspoke, welcoming him to "Soviet soil." In three days the country had lived years and become so different that it was necessary to sort out what was what all over again—the president could not have spoken to the country in any other way.

Time is pressing, and discussion of what was wholly unsatisfactory in the responses at the news conference cannot be put off.

First, the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and other direct actors: Boldin and Plekhanov, and also all who perpetrated direct violence against the people will be of interest to future legal proceedings. But for political conclusions and actions, pride of place is taken by those who undertook the political preparation and organization. In the event of victory they were counting on obtaining the greatest dividends, in the event of defeat, on being insured against trial. These principals were not, of course, such artless nonentities as Rubiks. The main political organizers of the conspiracy, who had for several months been engaged for all to see in ideological and political preparation of the coup, were Lukyanov and Prokofyev. Mikhail Sergeyevich named them, but did not make a real, urgently necessary political evaluation.

Also jarring to the ear was the old, yesterday's language of talk about the party at the news conference. Talking this way was possible prior to the August state of emergency: the draft program, the idea of socialism, which has existed for ages and will continue to exist for ages. All this is true, but now is not the time for regular lectures. At this very time new nonentities have been breaking windows in Staraya Square. Where were they three days ago? It would have done no harm to show public anger in that square on the nineteenth (not by breaking windows, of course). But the public anger at that time was at the barricades of Presnya—where the White House is located.

And we are not, in fact, talking about hooligans, come to that. The breaking of windows is simply a detail. But an important one. It helps us better understand what a difficult position the communists and the party rank and file are in at this moment. They now need other words—not about the idea of socialism, to which it goes without saying they have always been true. They need to be told what to do now. No one, I believe, has the complete answer to this question today, but it is necessary first and foremost to evaluate the situation accurately. It needs to be said plainly that there is no party. There are communists, there are masses of honest, intelligent and reliable people, but there is no party. Nor has there been since, victorious in the revolution and civil war, it declared itself the sole party in the country. Since then it has not been a party but a machinery of state. Specifically, a machinery of stagnation in recent years.

There is no party, nor are there any other political forces organized on a country-wide scale—of this also we were painfully aware at the time of the state of emergency. A party needs to be created, and millions of people could participate in this, but only individuals, politicians known to the people, can begin this. Therefore, one further point which struck a false note at the news conference: The wrong tone in the response to questions about Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. With whom will you be creating a party, Mikhail Sergeyevich—with Shenin?

And should the president be involved in the creation of a party? A general secretary should, perhaps, relieve the

president of these concerns, rather. We already know of Nazarbayev's statement. It is not the only one. Yesterday, immediately following the news conference, a group of Central Committee members handed the general secretary's staff a letter containing minimum urgent proposals. The essence of them: That a Central Committee plenum be urgently convened so that the Central Committee might resign en masse. That instructions be given for the preparation of a congress whose task would be the ideological and organizational self-determination of the party. It should be primarily a political party, one of a number of others. It will, of course, be a party which is guided by the idea of socialism, although how we understand this idea will still have to be clarified. Everything else will be decided by the communists themselves. They need only be given this opportunity. We need this to remove from them the burden of responsibility for what had little to do with the party's rank and file: The actions or inaction of the leaders. The Central Committee is obliged to itself pronounce on its responsibility, and at once.

#### Presidential Council Member Interviewed

91ES1064A Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA (REVISTA Supplement) in Spanish 28 Aug 91 pp 2-3

[Report by Rafael Poch detailing statements made to him by Veniamin Yarin, a member of the Presidential Council, in the corridors of the Supreme Soviet on 27 August: "I Was Afraid He Was Armed"]

[Text] Gennadiy Yanayev, the leader of the coup d'etat in the USSR, was arrested in his Kremlin office last Wednesday by a blue-collar worker, Veniamin Yarin, a colleague of Gorbachev. Some hours before, thousands of young people were known to have risked their lives in Moscow by erecting and standing watch at barricades throughout a tense night next to the Russian Parliament. The following morning the coup plotters were also known to have traveled to the Crimea "to explain themselves" to the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, whom they had kept confined for almost four days.

What is not known, however, is what took place in between the two events: between the night when tensions were highest and the day that ended with Gorbachev's release. What took place was, in fact, Yanayev's arrest. The man who arrested him, Veniamin Yarin, yesterday recounted the episode in the corridors of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

To tell the truth, it all began in the line to the kiosk in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This journalist was waiting patiently to hear the day's news. Soviet deputies were in front of and behind him.

"Hey, how are you? These are some days we are living through!" said one deputy warmly to the man who had just walked up.

"Tell me about it. On Wednesday I had to arrest Yanayev personally."

"What?"

The man who had just walked up was Veniamin Yarin, a member of the Presidential Council, a metalworker who has spent 30 years in a rolling mill. Shortly after I overheard this conversation, Yarin explained his extraordinary deed to LA VANGUARDIA. "On the 20th we met in the Kremlin office of Yevgeniy Primakov (a Gorbachev adviser); there was Primakov, myself, and other members of the president's (Gorbachev's) team: Vadim Bakatin (the current head of the KGB), Arkadiy Volskiy, and Vadim Madvedov. We drafted a communique in which we condemned the coup as counterrevolutionary and against the people and we warned them that they dare not take the president's life. We were very careful about the wording, because we knew that the president's granddaughter was at his residence in the Crimea, and we were afraid that they might do anything..."

(Yevgeniy Primakov's office is along the same corridor as those of the former prime minister of the USSR, Valentin Pavlov, and the former vice president of the USSR, Gennadiy Yanayev.) "The same corridor," Yarin said, "housed two opposing powers."

"I am a worker," he continued. "All my life I have worked in a rolling mill. The only thing that motivated me at that moment was loyalty to the president, because I always told him that I would be with him to the end..."

"We contacted the commander of the guard in the Kremlin, Major General Gennadiy Bashkin. He told us right away that he would be on our side and he obeyed our orders, along with the entire guard. We shut the Kremlin (on the outside its doors were being watched by tanks following orders from Defense Minister Marshal Dimitriy Yazov, one of the coup plotters) and took control of the place.

"But besides the guard there were Yanayev's bodyguards. I spoke frankly with them, after his arrest, in Russian, very plainly: 'God forbid there should be an attack from the outside to free Yanayev, because he will be the first to die, and we will fight to the end.'"

[Poch] But how did you arrest Yanayev?

[Yarin] I went to his office in the company of Valentin Korosyov's aide (Korosyov is a member of Gorbachev's team). The door to the reception room was open, and I introduced myself to his secretary, who walked over to the door of his office to announce me. She only had time to say 'Yarin' because I walked right in. He got up in shirt sleeves from his chair, on the back of which he had hung his jacket, and strode out from behind the desk to greet me. He extended his hand to me. It revolted me, but I shook his hand anyway and then pulled him forcefully towards me and away from where his jacket was; I was afraid that he had some sort of weapon in it.

I placed myself between him and the jacket and told him what I thought of him, that he was under arrest, and that his movements would be restricted to the four walls of his office. He tried to justify his actions, saying that they had forced him to do it, that he could have been arrested if he had refused. I replied that I was not authorized to speak with him and that I was waiting for Gorbachev to arrive.

[Poch] How did he look?

[Yarin] You could tell from his eyes that he was very frightened. I was very nervous too, and in fact Primakov and Korosyov had to calm me down.

[Poch] A meeting was reportedly then held in his office.

[Yarin] Yes, but I do not know what kind. We did not let ourselves be seen around there anymore (the situation in the Kremlin was under their control, and when night fell, the office of the former Soviet vice president was shut, with a guard stationed in the reception room).

I went to wake him up in the morning. He had locked himself in the bedroom next to his office. We were afraid that he had hanged himself, that he had committed suicide...

#### **Aleksandr Yakovlev Discusses Coup, Aftermath**

*LD0609221191 Prague Federal 1 Television Network  
in Slovak 2005 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev by unidentified correspondents; Yakovlev and correspondents in Russian fading to Slovak translation—recorded]

[Text]

[Correspondent] What role, in your view, will be preserved for the Union center if the Soviet Union becomes a confederation?

[Yakovlev] I think that a confederation already exists here. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to define the role of the center more precisely in the future as every Republic so far has a different idea of the state set-up. One is in favor of a federation, the other in favor of a confederation, yet another prefers to be just an associate member, and yet another is in favor of economic agreements. This means that the spectrum will be a wide one.

[Correspondent] Do you think that Gorbachev could have come with his Ten plus One initiative even without a coup, or was the unsuccessful coup in this sense a decisive moment?

[Yakovlev] Under normal conditions this process would take a long time. A possible counterrevolution, which I spoke of for a long time, should have taken, in my view a gradual and slow form—not such a sudden military coup. Nevertheless, they decided to take this extremely adventurous step.

As far as a long-term prognosis is concerned, I envisaged that those involved with the putsch would be out of breath in any case as they did not concentrate on tackling the most pressing tasks and did not take into account people's attitudes. They really did not act to principle.

[Correspondent] Will the military-industrial complex and its representatives be able to directly influence the process of democratization?

[Yakovlev] As of now, only with difficulty.

[Correspondent] Is anybody capable of preventing them from doing so, for example your Movement for Democratic Reform?

[Yakovlev] Yes, we are going to do so. We are going to insist on a consistent conversion. I do remember that when the Presidential Council was assessing the project of conversion I said then that the issue was not a conversion plan but of further militarisation. This will not pass anymore.

[Correspondent] How does Russia influence development in the country now? Both in the positive and negative sense?

[Yakovlev] In the positive sense, in the way that Russia took upon itself the whole burden of resistance against the putschists, against the junta. It was a positive step that changed people's thinking and mood. If it is at all possible to talk about negative influence then maybe only in connection with the mood in the republics which now fear some sort of renaissance of monarchist or sociomonarchist tendencies and streams. I think, though, that this will disappear.

[Correspondent] Is there a chance that the forces that actively supported the attempted coup might now unite with the supporters of a gradual, slow reversal of the reform process?

[Yakovlev] There probably will be some agreements, but I do not think that they would be of any major significance. I am afraid of something else. The putsch did not start on 19 August. It began a long time ago. In fact already in 1985 in the form of resistance and sabotage. After the 28th Congress it stepped up its activity even more. In a very intensive way, though not yet in a military one. At the moment I am afraid that practically nothing has changed in many places in the country. Everything proceeds in its old way. That is the greatest danger that some time ago was embodied in the regional committees of the Party. Now it is represented by the management of enterprises and collective and state farms. The continuation of the old system—that is the obstacle on the way toward democratic changes.

**Former Politburo Member Semenova on Coup**

914B0376A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with G. Semenova, former member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by Irina Vereykina; place and date not given: "We Deluded Ourselves Until the Last Days"]

[Text] [Vereykina] Galina Vladimirovna, how did you learn about the coup d'état?

[Semenova] On the night of Sunday 18-19 August I flew to Alma-Ata to a congress of women's organizations of Kazakhstan. I learned about what had happened early in the morning, and I was alarmed primarily as a mother. My son is approximately as old as those who died at the barricades in Moscow on 21 August. I had known nothing about the conspiracy in the making. A similar onslaught by reactionaries was gradually planned after the 28th party congress, when the struggle between the conservatives and the reformists within the party intensified. A split in the party has always been obvious. Following the April plenum I asked Gorbachev to relieve me of work in the Politburo. He rejected my request, attaching great hopes for improving the condition of the party to the adoption of a new CPSU Program. The general secretary made tremendous efforts to preserve the party, and hoped to renew it, primarily through the departure of old cadres from the leading party organs.

[Vereykina] To your mind, how could it happen that the conspiracy was led by the people closest to Gorbachev? Had there really been no specific alarm signals in the behavior and pronouncements of the future ringleaders of the junta—members of the supreme party leadership?

[Semenova] We may say that Gorbachev's statement concerning his resignation at the April plenum was one of the signs of alarm.

[Vereykina] What prevented Gorbachev's removal from the post of general secretary at the time?

[Semenova] People who would not have allowed Gorbachev to be removed constituted a majority at the April plenum, and this is why the participants in the plenum who stood behind the future coupists did not insist on it.

[Vereykina] If so, why did we not hear a clear-cut evaluation of the situation by people of like mind with the general secretary and members of the Politburo during the days of the military coup?

[Semenova] Unfortunately, the lack of dispatch and the cumbersome nature of the entire party apparatus were displayed yet again. Each functionary of the apparatus has lost the skill of taking independent steps without "coordination." I tried in vain to contact the Central Committee Secretariat from Alma-Ata on 19 August. Not a single phone number responded—everybody was at a meeting of the Secretariat. I decided to fly to

Moscow. On 20 August the large composition of the Secretariat gathered: I flew in, Luchinskiy, Gerenko, and others returned from leave, and Ivashko left the hospital. Protracted coordination of the draft Politburo statement with republic secretaries over the phone began. The text of a draft statement was circulated immediately. The statement was neutral in nature. A final text of the statement in question was not adopted by the Secretariat and the Politburo after all in view of contradictory proposals from the participants in the meeting. All of them agreed on their desire to prevent a coup in the party. The main evaluations of events contained in the proposed statement were as follows: insubordination to the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency], an appeal to party organizations to remain calm, and an appeal not to become involved in conflict situations. One of the first demands the meeting made of the GKChP was to meet with Gorbachev, which was immediately rejected. Incidentally, when it became known that Ivashko would fly to the Crimea to see Gorbachev, the GKChP refused to have a physician assigned to accompany him.

[Vereykina] What is your view of the statement by M.S. Gorbachev on the dissolution of the CPSU Central Committee and measures associated with it? What are you going to do now, being actually unemployed as of today?

[Semenova] I wholeheartedly support this statement. With great joy I will consider myself free, and will resume work as a journalist. Incidentally, the collective of the magazine KRESTYANKA was one of the very first in its time to appoint its editor in chief (myself) through elections.

[Vereykina] Having been one of the leaders of the Communist Party until the last days, how do you see the future of this party?

[Semenova] I attach hopes to the party headed by Rutskoy. As a CPSU member, I believe that not one of its former leaders should hold key positions in the new party. It should be headed by people who immediately and unreservedly rebuffed the coupists, those who were at the barricades in Moscow. I support a call to create an organizational committee of a new party of left-wing forces, and I am prepared to help it, if called upon, as a consultant and assistant. As I see it, Volskiy, Stolyarov, Oleynik, Latsis, Bekenin, Mikhaylov, Degtyarev, Babichev and others should serve on this organizational committee, together with members of the committee for working out a new CPSU Program. The good deeds and highly moral impulses of the people should not be wasted.

[Vereykina] Please tell us what the relationship was between the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and the RKP [Russian Communist Party].

[Semenova] The relationship with Polozkov was always "strained." The RKP was estranged from the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and clearly disapproved

of many of its new members. Kuptsov was an interesting person who enjoyed authority among the deputies. I must note that the new people who joined the leadership of the CPSU were broad-minded and well-educated figures. At times, they told me humorously about the life of the former Politburo members. Unfortunately, we were still unable to reverse the unfriendly attitude toward many members of the Communist Party in the perception of the people. The party deluded itself until its very last days.

[Vereykina] What has changed in your life since you became a member of the supreme political leadership of the country?

[Semenova] I still live in the same apartment I was given when I worked for KRESTYANKA. To be sure, this is a "Central Committee" house. However, my family of three occupies a two-room apartment. My official car was the same one I had at the editorial office. My salary remained the same as at my previous job, whereas the work increased by a factor of two. I may say that I did not become a political leader, did not settle into this new role.

[Vereykina] What segment of work were you entrusted with in the Politburo?

[Semenova] I chaired the commission for women's affairs. At the same time I was a member of the relevant USSR Supreme Soviet committee with a view to simultaneously carrying on and implementing this segment of work within the government. My staff consisted of only five people. We succeeded in getting very important, fundamental documents, which were helpful to Soviet women, adopted and published: "On Main Avenues for the Women's Movement," "On Social Protection for the Family," and so on. We succeeded in creating women's centers at local party organs and sociopolitical centers, for example, in Altay Kray and Ivanovo. We sent a letter to M.S. Gorbachev in which the project of setting up the family newspaper OCHAG was outlined. It was planned to make this publication separate from the party press, because I have always believed that human interests, particularly those of women, take precedence over all political interests and problems. I hope that the current reorganization of the CPSU will not bring our good and useful endeavors to a halt or kill them.

[Vereykina] Going back once again to the tragic days of the reactionary coup, how would you evaluate the personal "contribution" of the members of the supreme party leadership to the organization of resistance to the coupists, or to tacit complicity with the junta? After all, all the members of the junta were your party comrades.

[Semenova] I took part in a party meeting of the employees of our commission at which I accepted a rebuke addressed to the entire Secretariat for remaining silent at the decisive moment, when a split in the party had clearly taken shape. We had to appeal to the communists in any form: Go to the squares, speak on the radio. Unfortunately, neither I personally nor any one of

us did this. Of course, I would not have called on women to throw themselves in the path of tanks, but resistance to the coupists had to be organized immediately. I believe that a plenum of the party or an organizational committee for creating a new party structure will decide the fate of the CPSU. I see my mission in continuing to fight for the rights of women.

#### Instead of a Commentary

As our correspondent in Alma-Ata reported, at 1700 on 19 August, after all the documents of the junta had already been repeatedly "reeled off" over the airwaves of the Union, G. Semenova was indeed speaking before a working conference of the congress of women's organizations of Kazakhstan. However, she did not comment on the coup d'etat, stating that "one needs to be in Moscow in order evaluate the events."

Well, sometimes we are enlightened too late... However, as far as the "good endeavors and deeds" cared for by the party secretary in charge of the fate of women are concerned, allow me to have my doubts. As recently as half a year ago G. Semenova implemented the following policy: Women should not make their political choices on their own—the party should control their minds and dictate their political sympathies (which directly contradicts her own words in the above interview: "The interests of women take precedence over all political interests and problems."). To this end, positions for party organizers for women were created not only in the CPSU Central Committee but also in rayon committees. A special women's fund was planned which would encourage the activities of women who entirely subscribe to the platform of the Communist Party. What was this if not an effort to subjugate women and poison them with the party ideology of obedience? Incidentally, we may now state that they have accomplished this task to some degree: Not a single women's organization "led" by the Communist Party offered a sober assessment of this venture. All of them were silent and awaited commands from the Central Committee. They did not go to the people to explain to women that the dictatorship of the junta would inexorably affect their future, would put their husbands and children at risk, and would leave some orphaned. Where were you, women's councils? Actually, this is very much like the position of your leader...

#### Bessmertnykh Explains Actions During Coup

914B0370A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by Igor Titov: "The Night Visit of the Former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Bessmertnykh to the Putsch Headquarters Cost Him More Than His Job"]

[Text] Although we have no wish whatsoever to defend the character of the former USSR foreign affairs minister, still let us give him a chance to speak. We want the details

**of the murderous plot: When we have enough of them, they will enable us to draw a comparison—the midwife of truth.**

Our meeting took place quite by chance: On Tuesday I was driving past the building where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center is housed and I caught sight of A. Bessmertnykh, surrounded—as it later turned out—by a group of Japanese journalists. I went up and engaged him in conversation.

Here is what we heard.

On 18 August when he was resting on the “estate” of his Belorussian colleagues 140 kilometers from Minsk, the minister received a telephone call from V. Kryuchkov and was told to come to Moscow immediately “to discuss important issues.” Thinking that the phone call was related to the appearance of an explosive situation in some corner of the world, A. Bessmertnykh was sure that he would return to resume his vacation in a day or two. And he told his wife this.

When he flew into Moscow late in the evening of that same day, he set out for the Kremlin, where he arrived after midnight. There he met with Soviet leaders and ministers, “excluding, naturally, M. Gorbachev.” V. Kryuchkov took A. Bessmertnykh into a separate room where he informed him of the “grave illness” of M. Gorbachev. He briefly related the essence of what had taken place and suggested that he join the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. The minister, according to his own words, refused—quite diplomatically, one must assume. The KGB chief insisted, but to no avail. Then A. Bessmertnykh entered the room where the ministers had already been discussing the situation for from five to seven hours. As he asserts, his speech to them amounted basically to a prediction of the reaction of the world community: the termination of aid, economic sanctions, possibly a blockade. After presenting his position, A. Bessmertnykh went home.

Until noon on 19 August (Monday) A. Bessmertnykh, as he asserts, still had doubts: Perhaps the president was really ill. When he met with G. Yanayev in the Kremlin, he asked him if there were any documents confirming M. Gorbachev’s illness. When he heard in response “something unintelligible,” the leader of the diplomatic department, in his words, “smelled a rat.”

I venture to assume that if G. Yanayev had mumbled the same thing about the president’s health as he did at the evening press conference, the seasoned diplomat would certainly have guessed: The GKChP would not last long and Gorbachev would return to Moscow soon. I know the instructions the minister gave in the morning, but he himself said that after his conversation with G. Yanayev, he called in his deputies and gave them orders not to follow the instructions of the GKChP.

When he guessed the situation, A. Bessmertnykh sent a telegram to the Soviet ambassadors in which he called for them to abide by the foreign political policy of the

constitutional organs of power. Incidentally, my colleague on the editorial staff Aleksandr Nadzharov, who was on assignment in Syria during the putsch, says that he himself saw in the hands of Soviet emissary Igor Melikhov a telegram with those instructions signed by the minister.

After a certain amount of time, when he found that the KGB was sending the ambassadors its own guidelines, A. Bessmertnykh said that he sent our foreign representatives circular letters in which he demanded that they obey only the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Apparently many ambassadors were faced with a difficult dilemma: to follow the course of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the KGB. “Those who were in their right minds were able to figure things out and made the proper choice,” the former leader of the foreign political department told me.

Information about how our ambassadors acted and what information they sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will clarify how many “normal” minds there were in the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### **Bessmertnykh on Actions During Coup**

*91UF1146A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 6 Sep 91 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with A. Bessmertnykh, former USSR foreign minister, by I. Titov; place and date not given: “A. Bessmertnykh Was Fed Under the Control of the KGB: But How Was the Entire Logic of His Conduct Controlled?”]

[Text] Just one month ago this interview never seemed possible to me: It is very difficult to get hold of the highest leaders, and they are not very willing to converse with journalists. That is understandable: The newspapers do not want banalities, and revelations may have very negative repercussions.

For these very reasons I supposed that a conversation with A. Bessmertnykh after his dismissal would be very candid, inasmuch as that is possible for a career diplomat. I was not mistaken.

[Titov] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I have several questions for you. Naturally everyone is interested in the details of those three days that “turned the world upside down.” As we already know, you made an urgent trip from Belorussia to the Kremlin on 18 August at Kryuchkov’s request. He proposed that you join the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. You refused. Describe that situation in detail.

[Bessmertnykh] After my refusal in the private conversation with V. Kryuchkov, we entered the room where the conspirators were. Kryuchkov immediately made a telephone call and said, “Bessmertnykh has refused.”

They were all sitting at a table upon which lay papers. It seemed to me that those present were already tired out from discussions.

[Titov] What did you feel at that moment? After all, the "illness" of the president, the state of emergency—these attributes of the plot should have prompted you to thoughts about the criminal nature of that assembly...

[Bessmertnykh] I did not have such thoughts. The only thing I could not understand was why a state of emergency was necessary. Why had Yanayev taken such a step in conjunction with an illness of the president?

These days when I analyze the events of that night I think I know why I had no feeling of alarm. The presence of Boldin and Plekhanov created the illusion that everything was normal. These people were responsible for the protection of Gorbachev and the operations of his staff. Whenever they took part in important meetings, everyone always knew that they were functioning in the name of the president.

[Titov] What instructions did you receive from the GKChP on 19 August?

[Bessmertnykh] None.

[Titov] In the morning, before the meeting with Yanayev, did you give your employees any instructions?

[Bessmertnykh] Just one: To study and follow everything. And to report to me.

[Titov] And so, at about 1400 you met with Yanayev in the Kremlin and found out that there were no reports about Gorbachev's health. Why did you not ask the leaders of the coup about Gorbachev's health on the night of 19 August?

[Bessmertnykh] I simply did not have any doubts. But on Monday there was a stream of information from the GKChP and not a word about facts confirming the illness of the president. Everything became clear at that point. I immediately called a meeting of the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was a small circle of people—we feared that information about our conversation would reach the GKChP.

[Titov] Was that possible?

[Bessmertnykh] Quite possible. There are "informers" everywhere. Anyway, we agreed not to carry out the orders of the GKChP. And the leaders were to follow this line within their administrations. Then I sent our ambassadors a circular:

(From circular letter No. 7487 dated 19 August: "In your operations you are to be guided by the fact that the foreign policy course of the USSR remains as it has been defined by the constitutional organs... In this difficult situation the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to function in accordance with the policies which

are determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the presidential power, and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.")

There is not even any mention in it of the GKChP. Any genuine diplomat would have immediately understood what we wished to say by this.

[Titov] Did you send this telegram before Yeltsin's declaration or after?

[Bessmertnykh] I do not know when the declaration was made. They brought me a Xerox copy and put into a folder marked "work to be done at home." By that time the telegram had already been sent out.

[Titov] As I learned from newspaper articles, the GKChP sent out "documents" to the embassies of the USSR with binding instructions from Kvitsinskiy to deliver them to the governments of the foreign countries as well as a telegram signed by Kvitsinskiy demanding that any questions which arise be answered on the basis of these "documents." How do you explain this?

[Bessmertnykh] On the night of the 19th I fell ill. It was not a cold, as some of the newspapers have written. It was a severe attack of gallstones. But I continued to work at my dacha. On 20 August I sent the ambassadors a telegram containing the following: "The foreign political course of the USSR is that which has been defined by the president of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to operate within the framework of this political course. As before, we continue the practice of receiving instructions from the center which then move through the channels of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The execution of any other instructions must always be coordinated with the leadership of the ministry."

[Titov] You were not at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Bessmertnykh] I dictated the telegram by telephone. They sent it off. And after that they brought me the original at the dacha and I signed it.

[Titov] When was that?

[Bessmertnykh] During the day. They also brought to my dacha a message by the GKChP prepared at the KGB condemning the statement of G. Bush. I wrote my resolution on it: I opposed it. And so it was not published.

[Titov] Let us return to the telegrams of Kvitsinskiy. Did he get in touch with you and ask your advice?

[Bessmertnykh] No. He did not call me concerning these questions and did not speak of it. How could I give my consent to these telegrams when on that same day (20 August) I was taking the two steps—which I already told you about—blocking the actions of the GKChP?

[Titov] Does that mean that Kvitsinskiy "circumvented" you?



[Bessmertnykh] He was, as they say, "in charge." He is the first deputy and during an illness of the minister he officially leads the ministry. I do not think that he sent out anything. He is a very clever man. I warned my assistant Ivanov that there were to be no commentaries to the TASS reports and especially no representations to the governments. In my telegrams everything was clear: Only the constitutional organs of power and the president of the USSR. Of course it could have been stated more clearly. But who knows, perhaps under conditions of martial law someone was reading our telegrams and someone would inform. Do you understand?

[Titov] Yes. And I recall your second telegram. As you yourself said, it should have cut off the influence of the KGB over the ambassadors. What kind of influence was there on the employees of Soviet foreign missions?

[Bessmertnykh] There has been information that the KGB, through its intelligence people operating abroad, made attempts to exert influence on the ambassadors. There were dispatches in which the ambassadors were told: Go out there, visit them, tell them... This was an extraordinary situation; under normal conditions such a thing does not happen. The intelligence personnel there cannot compel an ambassador to go anywhere. The ambassador—formally and officially—is the leading official of the embassy. The role of the representatives of the KGB is an impressive one not because of any written communiques they generate but because they engage not only in intelligence but also counterintelligence. And for the small collectives which make up the embassies this is a considerable factor. They constantly feel the unsleeping eye of counterintelligence and it often happens that much depends on the human qualities of those people who must defend the state interests.

But in any case the influence of the KGB was felt most of all in the enormous stream of their own information to the leadership of the country. Sometimes the president telephoned me and said: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, this is alarming information. See what kind of mood they are in, for example, in country "X." I often responded that this information only reflects the mood of individual circles or of the government or the administration or society. And I can give you as much information as you wish. Indeed it is possible to take one side of the information, cut out everything which balances it, put it on the table of the president, and thus receive a terrifying picture of how the officials of country "X" wish to destroy and break up our country, etc. This is the main danger of influence over the president. Now that there are wise people in the leadership of the KGB many questions which constantly disturbed us, ambassadors and ministers, may finally be discussed openly and reasonable solutions may be sought.

[Titov] Did you personally sense any pressure during the putsch?

[Bessmertnykh] No. But after the conversation I understood that they would be dismissing me soon. My wife

and I were frightened for our little son Arseniy and decided not to take him out of the house. We decided to refuse to eat...

[Titov] Did you declare a hunger strike?

[Bessmertnykh] The problem was that, like Gorbachev and like the members of the Security Council, I received food that was specially checked by the services of the KGB. It was a funny similarity, but we, like those who were in Foros, did not put a single gram of that food into our mouths. Anything was possible...

[Titov] That means that you too were under a state of siege.

[Bessmertnykh] There were unpleasant events. For example, on 19 August a certain employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into my office and recommended that I take down the portrait of Gorbachev. I did not do it. But then on the day when Moscow was burying the three boys who died, that same man telephoned and advised me not to go out onto the street—he said that crowd would tear me apart. He said that as though he had not asked me to take down the portrait of Gorbachev but I had instead asked him. Somewhat earlier there were telephone calls, but now they do not call—they are afraid. That is not simply unpleasant—it is terrifying.

[Titov] Let us talk about something else. What position, in your opinion, will the world community, and the United States in particular, take in relation to our country and its future?

[Bessmertnykh] I believe that it is in its interests not for the USSR to break up decisively but instead for us to preserve our statehood. It does not need a dissolved Union. An enormous zone of instability will appear which may pull down Europe and destroy the balance in Asia.

[Titov] Should one expect that in such an event the West will not wish to recognize those states that declare their withdrawal from the Soviet Union?

[Bessmertnykh] No, it will recognize them and is already recognizing them, but a declaration of sovereignty should not designate—in their opinion, I believe—the end of relations within the framework of the Union. The West has an interest in our preserving a united security zone and a united economic zone.

[Titov] But what will happen now to economic aid to the Union? It seems to me that while one restraining factor has disappeared—the possibility of the restoration of totalitarianism—another has appeared—the danger of sliding into chaos. The "Group of Seven" will not undertake large-scale investment in such a case.

[Bessmertnykh] Quite true. For now we will most likely see emergency forms of aid functioning. In other words short-term types as a result of the emergency situation.

Perhaps they will more actively develop support for the creation of a stabilization fund for convertibility of the ruble.

But the flow of investment capital into the country will not get started until we set the situation right.

[Titov] I wish to ask you a last question—concerning Soviet- Japanese relations. What kinds of adjustments will recent events introduce to the problem of territory?

[Bessmertnykh] These events will apparently have an influence. My point of view is that we should not hurry but that we should not draw things out endlessly either. There are formulas by which Soviet-Japanese relations should progress. But it is an issue that must be decided. If we wish peaceful relations with Japan, this cannot be avoided. It is important not to create the impression that we are selling the islands or simply giving them away under the influence of the extraordinary circumstances.

[Titov] And what about recognition of our obligations in accordance with the Joint Statement of 1956?

[Bessmertnykh] They can be examined as a variant.

[Titov] Thank you for the interesting conversation. I wish you an interesting new assignment.

#### Investigation Into Coup Attempt Continues

OW0609141191 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1220 GMT 6 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Valentin Stepankov, the Russian Prosecutor General, told a press conference in Moscow Friday that 14 people have been arrested on charges of high treason. The same accusation was brought against Anatoliy Lukyanov Thursday. Under the Russian Penal Code, they may face a punishment from 10-year imprisonment to death penalty.

Stepankov said that the investigation may be finished within two or three months. After that the cases will be submitted to the Russian Federation Supreme Court.

The accused men are held in tightly guarded prison No.4.

Stepankov says all of them have advocates who can attend interrogations.

Chairman of the Russian KGB Viktor Ivanenko told the press conference that by order of Chairman Vadim Bakatin, the USSR KGB has also launched an investigation. In the words of Ivanenko, before the coup "Kryuchkov and his supporters violated not only laws, but also the regulations of the KGB itself", in particular, with the purpose of gathering information about the Russian leadership.

#### Stepashin on Kryuchkov's Role in Coup

OW0909172391 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1530 GMT 9 Sep 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] RSFSR People's Deputy Sergey Stepashyn, the head of the state commission investigating the activity of the USSR State Security Committee (KGB), has told IF's [INTERFAX's] reporter that the KGB's ex-chief Vladimir Kryuchkov "was more than a participant in the August 19-21 coup d'etat in the USSR; he was one of its organizers." Mr. Kryuchkov initiated and chaired the secret meetings of the would-be putschists on August 8 and 18, Mr. Stepashin said.

According to him, the state commission will forward some of the materials collected during the investigation to the RSFSR Procurator General, for him to bring legal charges against a group of KGB ex-leaders.

#### Kvitsinskiy Cited on Foreign Ministry Role During Coup

PM1009113591 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian 24 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy by Sergey Volovets; date and place of interview not stated: "An Order Is an Order? Interview with USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy on the Foreign Ministry's Work During the Failed Rebellion"]

[Text] [Volovets] Such events face state employees and whole departments with a question: Where is the border between loyalty to an order from higher-ranking bosses and one's own conscience? How do you decide such a question for yourself? Or more sharply: Where does collaborationism begin?

[Kvitsinskiy] A very complex question. Legally and in the sense of its official duty the Foreign Ministry exists to implement union foreign policy, which is formed by the president, the cabinet of ministers, and the parliament. And indeed it will be a poor apparatus—diplomatic, military, or what you will—which is not a reliable executor of these structures' decisions. That is the main duty of the apparatus worker and every official. Of course, he cannot check them at every specific moment for constitutionality or unconstitutionality.

[Volovets] Even in the situation which formed as of Monday morning?

[Kvitsinskiy] Within a day or even less the situation inevitably began to give rise to questions: What was happening and was it all legal?

On that ill-starred Monday I was telephoned from work and told that the minister had returned from vacation and I was expected. He gathered us all together, we consulted over what was happening. It was said that

there were a number of documents, that there were instructions from the vice president, who was acting as president in connection with the president's illness, and that the documents had to be brought to the notice of our embassies. The instruction was fulfilled as though it had been any instruction from Gorbachev, Yanayev, or Pavlov. It could not but be fulfilled. It went through automatically. That was official obedience.

But the next day we began to have doubts and we switched to the tactic of having no contact with the State Committee for the State of Emergency. We had instructions from our minister not to accept any orders from them and not to take part in the committee's activity.

[Volovets] The rebels' documents were passed on with your instructions for compulsory dissemination abroad...

[Kvitsinskiy] Yes, that was the instruction of the vice president acting as president. But you know if they had contained any secrets or news... But there were no secrets, it was all published.

[Volovets] You instructed the ambassadors to present the rebels' documents to the governments of foreign countries. Does it not seem to you that the very fact of this instruction signifies the Foreign Ministry's call to recognize the structures whose documents were presented by an official representative of our country?

[Kvitsinskiy] There was no request there. And whether to recognize them or not was up to the relevant state. But I repeat again that at the time everything looked like the action of a government compelled to this action because of the president's illness: perhaps a heart attack, perhaps a stroke, perhaps something else.

[Volovets] On 19 August a telegram with your signature reached the embassies issuing the instruction: "In explaining internal political processes, be guided by official materials," that is by the plotters' documents. What did you have in mind in demanding ambassadors be guided by them?

[Kvitsinskiy] That they would explain the situation in the country and use the arguments set out in these documents.

[Volovets] And does it not seem to you that here there is also an element of cooperation with the illegal authorities?

[Kvitsinskiy] I repeat to you that at the moment when those who had seized power published these documents it was not clear to most of us that they had seized power. But it was clear that there was a vice president, a prime minister, a KGB chairman, and a defense minister. They were the core of power, so to speak. If they said it was so then would you say it was not?

### 'Soyuz' Attitude to Coup Examined

914B0354B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 91  
Union Edition p 2

[Article by N. Andreyev: "The Failure of the Second Front of 'Soyuzniks'"]

[Text] "Finally!"—that was the reaction from V. Alksnis when early on the morning of 19 August he found out about the events in Moscow. Yes, they had done the deed for which he and his colleagues in the Soyuz deputy group had been fighting indefatigably. Everyone knew about their desired goal. Therefore, naturally, at the session that was opened a number of deputies accused Soyuz leaders of participating in the coup. And, naturally, V. Alksnis, Ye. Kogan, Yu. Blokhin, and N. Petrushenko denied their participation on the side of the putschists.

It is not a matter of whether or not they were among the putschists. Although, as the boys from "Vzglyad" say, Ye. Kogan, spoke on the radio station Nadezhda with unrestrained praise for the GKChP [State Committee on the State of Emergency]. Yu. Blokhin was the inspiration for active statements in support of the self-styled committee in the Dnestr area. All V. Alksnis did was volunteer to be an intermediary between the GKChP and Yeltsin. N. Petrushenko, according to eyewitness accounts, on Kalininskiy Prospekt saved the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union V. Zhirinovskiy, who was intensely booed by citizens because of his support for the GKChP. I will not take it upon myself to judge which of these actions of Soyuz leaders indicate participation in the coup. One thing is clear: They are guilty of creating an atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance in the society and they were constantly intimidating people with the threat of an imminent dictatorship by the democrats. Before giving concrete evidence of this, we must recall who the Soyuz deputy group in the country's Supreme Soviet were.

They conducted themselves like some kind of teachers in the parliament. The tone of their speeches was that of an ultimatum. At the end of last year the "Soyuzniks" organized a large-scale witch hunt against A.N. Yakovlev, V. Bakatin, and E. Shevardnadze. And when they retired, the "Soyuzniks" counted it as one of their victories. For their next attack they chose a larger figure—the USSR president. I do not know of any other deputy group that would treat him with such arrogance. I do not know of any other deputy group which would be allowed to do this. Another thing is also striking: M. Gorbachev's imperturbability. Recall an outstanding fact: In his customary categorical tone V. Alksnis gave the president 30 days, after which the Soyuz group threatened to take measures.

No other deputy group in the country met with the president so frequently. And at these meetings, judging from reports from the "Soyuzniks," they felt that they were in charge. This is what the weekly POLITIKA (the Soyuz press organ) writes about one of these meetings:

"Attention (of the USSR president—N.A.) was also drawn to the inadmissibility of influence on presidential policy by people who had compromised themselves through their incompetence and short-sightedness such as V.V. Bakatin, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev... The opinion was expressed that regardless of what good measures they had in mind for conducting reforms in the economy, politics, and the military—it was all useless until the proper conditions were created, right down to the application of emergency measures."

Here they are—these "emergency measures." V. Alksnis, Ye. Kogan, A. Chekhoyev, N. Petrushenko, and Yu. Blokhin spoke rapturously about the introduction of the state of emergency. In numerous interviews they played out various scenarios. Now it would be useful to give a couple of quotations. Here are the thoughts of V. Alksnis: "Gorbachev is doomed specifically because he is not in a position to apply force... In the last instance the truth of politics is power. And frequently the one to win is the one who is simply ready to apply force... And I do not rule out the possibility that in our country, when things become too bad, the army will have its say... And some colonel in command of a district or division could become a national hero who will save the state from collapse... For the army is the last ditch. And if it does not manage to stop the destructive processes there will be a national catastrophe... The army will not support Yeltsin... And if the country is on the verge of destruction, we will fight for it, and this is the viewpoint of the majority of the officer corps." Ye. Kogan: "...Until we, excuse me, get rid of that president and his team, everything else will be merely a game." N. Petrushenko warns the democrats: "These people are playing with fire, they are sitting on a powder keg! We know how the rally milieu ended up—'gallows in front of buildings, bonfires of human bodies...'"

I recall how at the First Soyuz Congress during the speech by A. Lukyanov, who was frightening the audience by talking about the terrors of democratization, shouts rang out in the hall: "So hand out our weapons!" Most likely the "Soyuzniks" really did not participate in the conspiracy. Even in spite of the fact that they expressed presumptions that the group had been created with the help of the KGB. There is no documentary evidence of this, although the ideological similarity is obvious. It is no accident that N. Leonov, a representative of the KGB, spoke at the congress of the Soyuz association and said: "The Soyuz deputy group proclaimed its goal as defending the historical heritage of our ancestors. The majority of my colleagues and I along with them support without reservation this noble cause—defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—under a single banner." Thunderous applause broke out after this.

Today the "Soyuzniks" tone is considerably more subdued. Yu. Blokhin even stated that he supports B. Yeltsin. Although the leaders of Soyuz still defend the

viewpoint that it was necessary to declare a state of emergency, only it should have been done constitutionally.

And the last thing. Whether for better or worse, the Supreme Soviet has developed and adopted laws. Many of them were urgently needed. I can name 13 deputies who take the development of the laws seriously and responsibly, who sit for days in committees and commissions. The "Soyuzniks" have adopted a different tactic: The majority of them are on neither committees nor commissions; either they are too lazy to work out legal formulations or they simply do not know what they are. But at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet they fly over like "hawks" (to use V. Alksnis' expression) and subject the draft laws to strict ideological analysis—this is the first thing, and the second thing is whether they correspond to the interests of the military-industrial complex. Moreover, V. Alksnis and his friends pronounce their sentences with arrogant superficiality. And these sentences are not bogged down with either common sense or with a striving for social benefit. They do not burden themselves with proof or facts; the main thing for them is to shout loudly, and give condescending lectures to others, and in such a way that they all "stand at attention." And it all ultimately boils down to the loud phrase, the audacious ultimatum, which contributes very little to the cause of social accord. And this was actually shown by the events of 19-21 August.

#### KGB 'Alpha' Brigade Commander Interviewed

91SV0052A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 5

[Interviews with former commander of the Alpha group, KGB Major General Victor Karpukhin, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondents Dmitriy Belovetskiy and Sergey Boguslavskiy, and with Alpha subunit commander Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Golovatov and deputy commander Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Goncharov by Yuri Shchekochikhin: "They Refused To Storm the White House"]

[Text]

#### The Alpha Group Leadership Gave Their First Interviews to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA

On 10 July, a month and a half before the putsch, in the article "The Lithuanian Card," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was the first one to tell about the role of the KGB's Alpha group in the tragic events that horrible January in Vilnius. Just as the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments], which had been originally created only for the purpose of combating organized crime, the task of Alpha (subunit A of the Seventh Directorate of the USSR KGB) was to combat first of all—and only!—terror and terrorism. But, as had happened with OMON, our politicians started using Alpha for their blood-stained affairs, which they called politics. Their politics. For the purpose of preserving their power.

I remember how we received a call after the newspaper publication; we were told that Alpha rank-and file—and not only rank-and-file—members are tired of being a card in this soiled pack. This information came to us directly from Alpha.

During these three horrible days the defenders of the White House were waiting for Alpha to show up. The name of the previously supersecret KGB subunit repeatedly was mentioned loudly, openly, sometimes even on the White House radio.

Alpha never came. After Russian President Boris Yeltsin's appearance on Russian television, we know why.

Saturday, 24 August, 1400

Interview with the commander of the A brigade (until 24 August of this year), KGB Major General Victor Karpukhin, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondents Dmitry Belovetskiy and Sergey Boguslavskiy.

[Question] Victor Fedorovich, did you know that a coup was in the works?

[Karpukhin] No, I did not. The first time I heard about what happened was on the radio, early in the morning on 19 August. I was summoned by the KGB leadership and received an order from Kryuchkov personally to deploy my subunit in order to arrest Yeltsin and deliver him to one of the specially equipped places in Zavidovo.

[Question] Were you not surprised by such strange order?

[Karpukhin] I am a soldier; my business is not to wonder—it is to fight. I was only told that Gorbachev was gravely ill and could not run the country, a state of emergency had been imposed, and it was necessary to neutralize the destructive forces.

[Question] Did you have an order to kill Yeltsin?

[Karpukhin] No. Only to arrest and isolate him.

[Question] How did the events develop from there on?

[Karpukhin] We immediately arrived on site. Posted observers right away. I knew Yeltsin's every step; I was registering his every movement. We could have arrested him at any moment. Yeltsin's protection is not good.

[Question] Why did you not arrest him?

[Karpukhin] I will tell you frankly: The country needs order, but I knew from the very beginning that these people would not be able to run the state. There are no strong personalities among these eight. They are not capable of anything individually; they had only dared to take this step as a "band." Therefore, I did everything to do nothing.

[Question] How did you manage to do that?

[Karpukhin] From there on, my contact with the KGB leadership was only through a radio telephone. They

tormented me, made me report to them on our actions almost by the minute. I kept explaining that it was not a good idea to go for an arrest in the dacha enclave, that there could be witnesses and innocent victims. Although you have to understand that my boys are so well trained that nobody would have noticed anything. My vehicles were positioned around the entire enclave; we blocked all the roads; but we still allowed two Russian Government ZILs to get out.

[Question] Did Kryuchkov guess that you simply did not want to comply with orders?

[Karpukhin] Probably. The entire KGB leadership knew that they could not bypass me to issue the order. The members of my subunit carry out only my orders. By removing me, they would immediately "mess up" the coup. We were the only force they could lean on.

[Question] Were you supposed to storm the White House?

[Karpukhin] Yes. On the evening of 19 August, a closed meeting took place in the USSR Ministry of Defense. It was conducted by General Ochalov; Moiseyev and Akhromeyev were present, and Yazov dropped in several times. I was given an order to spearhead the coup. The following units were operationally subordinated to me: a division of OMSDON [Separate Special Purpose-Motorized Rifle Division], Moscow OMON, and special subunits of the three directorates of the KGB—15,000 people in all.

[Question] Were you current on the events taking place around the White House?

[Karpukhin] Of course. Operational visual recording was being conducted. Our agents were among the defenders and inside the Russian parliament all the time. Together, General Lebed and I surveyed all the barricades. Frankly, they were "toy" barricades; they could be taken by a small force.

[Question] What was your battle plan?

[Karpukhin] At 0300 OMON units clear the square—disperse the crowds using gas and water cannons. Our subunits then make their move. From the ground and the air, using helicopters, grenade launchers, and other special equipment... We take over the building.

My boys are practically invulnerable. All of this would have taken about 15 minutes... In this situation, all depended on me. Thank God, I could not bring myself to do it. It would have been a massacre, a bloodbath. I refused.

[Question] Who else participated in the meeting?

[Karpukhin] Bosov, Korsak, Grachev, and other generals. I wanted to consult with somebody, but I knew that then I simply could not leave this place. Russian KGB Chairman Ivanenko called me. He said: "Victor, do not get into this business." I told him I had no intention to.

At the base, I gathered all of ours and said: "This is madness... We will not take part in it. I do not believe any one of these eight." I was insisting on a meeting with Kryuchkov. He did not receive me. Then I asked to give him a message through his deputy that I refused to storm, cannot slaughter innocent people. Neither any of my people nor units under my command took part in the coup. And we were the only ones who could do it. Now for some reason I am becoming an outsider...

[Question] What do you mean?

[Karpukhin] Bakatin did not receive me, although I went with Shebarshin to see him in the Kremlin. I was removed from the unit command... For what? For not allowing bloodshed to take place? For not capturing the White House? Because I could. Nobody would have stopped us. My subunit possesses an immense might. We should be subordinated only to the president of the country. We are a frightening weapon. I always said that we should not be used for political purposes. Our task is to combat terrorism. We freed hostages, and recaptured the Sukhumi prison when it was overtaken by brutal criminals... We also combat terrorism in the air. It is only when the "amateurs" from OMON got into it—as it was in the Ovechkin case—that there were human casualties.

Now I am sitting at home for the second day... My boys are calling me and saying: If they put you into Butyrka, we will demolish it to the last brick...

I am a healthy guy... I have gone into direct attacks against machine guns 26 times; I fought in Afghanistan, was awarded a title of Hero... and this night I was taking a heart medication...

I am not afraid... I will survive: I can be a driver or a metal worker... But it hurts... I am not looking for pity and am not trying to vindicate myself in anybody's eyes.

All I want is for the people to know that I am an honest man.

#### Monday, 26 August, 1330

Interview with Alpha subunit commander (since 25 August of this year), Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Golovatonov and deputy commander Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Goncharov by Yuri Shchekochikhin.

[Shchekochikhin] When did you learn that a putsch is being prepared?

[Goncharov] On Sunday the 18th, two Alpha squads had been raised on an emergency with this, to put it mildly, formulation of the task: to fly to the Transcaucasus to free soldiers taken hostage.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, someone deceived you?

[Goncharov] Yes... This was only an excuse to call up all the members of the special subunit. The full complement was called up afterwards.

[Shchekochikhin] What about you—how did you learn about it?

[Golovatonov] At that time I was deputy commander. I had the day off from the 18th to 19th. I was called back to work on the 19th by 1500.

[Shchekochikhin] How did you learn about the events, and how did you feel when you learned what had happened?

[Golovatonov] At first I did not believe, but then the radio started to broadcast at certain intervals Decree No.1, Decree No.2, and Decree No.3, and I realized that a military coup had taken place. I did not have any doubts that it was illegitimate. As it turned out later, I was not alone in thinking that way.

[Shchekochikhin] Sergey Aleksandrovich, you were the first one to arrive at work. What did you find?

[Goncharov] On the morning of the 19th our commander was constantly at the State Security Committee, apparently receiving some directives from the leadership in regard to using us directly in the preparation of the operation at the White House.

[Shchekochikhin] When did you learn that you were slated to storm the White House?

[Goncharov] At 1730.

[Shchekochikhin] What about you, Mikhail Vasilyevich?

[Golovatonov] Yes, we were called to Karpukhin's office simultaneously and were informed of our task. The assault was planned for 0300. The assault on the White House.

[Shchekochikhin] What was your first reaction?

[Goncharov] I can quote verbatim the commander's words when we asked whose order it was. "The government order"—he repeated it twice: "the government order." No specific names or even the GKChP [State Committee on the State of Emergency] were mentioned. Only—the government order.

[Shchekochikhin] I can imagine you standing in that office, listening to this order, and understanding what it was about!

[Goncharov] This we understood right away, as soon as we received the order. We already felt that something terrible was being planned and that they wanted to do all of it by our hands. Not only we, the subunit commanders, sensed the illegality of this order, but also all members, from junior officer to commander.

[Shchekochikhin] Who was the first to refuse to carry out orders—you or your subordinates?

[Goncharov] Mikhail Vasilyevich and I nudged each other, looked at each other, and said: We are not going to

carry out this order. After that, we dismissed our subordinate officers and told them: Gather all personnel of your squads, inform each member of the order, and ask the opinion of each member—from the newcomers to old hands—what should be done in this situation.

[Shchekochikhin] It seems to me, this happened at Alpha for the first time?

[Goncharov] Yes. Literally a few minutes passed. We all gathered in the commander's office. Mikhail Vasilyevich and I got every commander to stand up and asked first his personal opinion: Will he carry out this order? All squad commanders said without hesitation that this order is illegal and anticonstitutional, and the entire personnel declared (I want to repeat these words as they were, verbatim, once again): "We are not going there to kill people." Golovatonov and I replied: We are not going to lead you there, either. After that, the people understood that they would not be making an operational sortie. Mikhail Vasilyevich ordered them to disarm but to stay at work, not to leave the territory of our base.

[Shchekochikhin] Tell me, is there another similar group in the USSR that could have attacked you for your refusal to obey orders?

[Goncharov] I can tell you from my experience that nobody, except large military formations, is able to oppose our group.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, the junta found itself without its main hands? Let us assume you followed the order—how long would it take to overtake the White House?

[Goncharov] We could take over the White House in 15 to 30 minutes, but—it is frightening even to talk about it—what kind of losses there would have been on the side of the defenders.

[Golovatonov] I can add that we would have entered the building, of course, but we would not have left. Not because all of us would perish, but because it would have been impossible to leave. And see everything we had done.

[Shchekochikhin] How did the negotiations with you start, who conducted them and how did they proceed?

[Golovatonov] Negotiations? In what sense?

[Shchekochikhin] Well, to force you to comply?

[Golovatonov] There was pressure from the leadership to the last moment: It needs to be stormed. Most interesting, though: Even when one of the officers stopped by our office—we were conducting a meeting there—and told us that EKHO MOSKVY radio station reported that the assault is set for 0300 and home guard brigades are being formed, we still did not receive the "as you were" command.

[Shchekochikhin] Tell me: We learned—or perhaps these were just rumors—that you had been moved closer to the White House...

[Golovatonov] I can state with full responsibility: All of us remained at the base; not one vehicle, not one armed person went outside the base perimeter from 19 August to 22 August.

[Shchekochikhin] Has anybody from the KGB top leadership tried to put pressure on you? Kryuchkov personally? Or Grushko?

[Goncharov] On me, at least—nobody.

[Shchekochikhin] And what about you, Mikhail Vasilyevich?

[Golovatonov] No member of the committee leadership came to the subunit.

[Shchekochikhin] Tell me, in the past, did you have a concern that Alpha—a group for combating terrorism—was forced to participate in political games? I refer to the events in the Baltics, among others.

[Goncharov] We are military people, and everybody who has served in the army knows what an order means. Now we all understood that there is such a thing as illegal and anticonstitutional orders. The members of the special subunit refused to carry out these orders. We realized that we were taking a considerable risk, that Mikhail Vasilyevich and I could be dismissed and court-martialed, or, even worse, that our group could be disbanded. This did not keep our guys from standing firm to the end.

[Shchekochikhin] Mikhail Vasilyevich, I am now surprised to hear something else: that not only the Alpha group, but many of the KGB officers took rather coldly the orders of their boss Kryuchkov. James Carni, American journalist from TIME magazine, told me that when he was interviewing a tank crew in the center of Moscow on 19 (!) August, a man came over to him, introduced himself as a state security officer, showed his identification, and said: "Do not think that all of us, KGB officers, support what is happening today." What is the explanation? That Kryuchkov is unpopular as a leader?

[Goncharov] It seems to us that in the coup that had taken place in our country nobody asked the opinion of KGB officers. They are used to issuing commands and use our hands to do things for them without being interested in what we think about them and their doings.

[Golovatonov] I can add that rank-and-file officers and their moods were not part of the putschists calculations.

[Shchekochikhin] What if the military started to storm the White House: Would Alpha group go help its defenders? Did you discuss this among yourselves that night?

[Golovatov] Somehow, we were certain that without us, force would not be used.

[Goncharov] Our special subunit, in putschists' calculations, was the force that would break the defenders' resistance and find Russian President Boris Yeltsin—it is frightening to say what was proposed for us to do.

[Shchekochikhin] What was proposed for you to do?

[Goncharov] Apparently to capture—that is the best outcome—Boris Nikolayevich. But now this time is behind us, and we believe that, frankly speaking, we simply did not start a civil war. We realized our assault meant a collapse of the Union, a collapse of the entire country—perhaps, in the eyes of the entire world.

[Shchekochikhin] Did you have any specific directives? Or just a general task? Did you have the White House floor plan?

[Golovatov] We only knew where Yeltsin's reception room was; we were informed that it was on the fifth floor, that he was there surrounded by personal bodyguards, and that he was ready to lead the defense of the White House and repeal the attackers. It is assumed that we can get our bearings in any situation in a matter of two or three minutes, and start carrying out the combat task.

### MVD General's Rejection of Coup Questioned

91US0763A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by Viktor Dzhanibekyan: "General Myrikov, Tell the Truth!"]

[Text] The ink has still not dried on those newspapers reporting on a press conference conducted at the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies where militia officials, and General N. Myrikov in particular, spoke of their loyalty to the constitutional system, repudiating any participation in cooperation with those effecting the putsch. They were believed, but with difficulty.

Thus, for example, responding to the question of journalists as to how he wound up among the deputies of the Moscow commandant during the days of the putsch, General Myrikov explained that he was confirmed to this position without his knowledge by the not unknown Colonel General Kalinin, that he did not participate in the putsch and did not assist the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] conspirators.

We reported on this in our 27 August newspaper.

But it turns out General Myrikov did not speak the truth. Here are the facts which confirm his active participation within the conspirators' camp, whose actions on the very first day have been characterized by RSFSR President

B.N. Yeltsin as anticonstitutional and criminal. We all knew about this, but the head of the Moscow militia, it turns out, did not know.

Fact number one. During the days of the putsch, Myrikov dispatched a telegram to subunits in which he informed his subordinates that Colonel General Kalinin had entrusted to him the execution of responsibilities as Moscow deputy commandant. Fact number two. In a telephone message sent to all rayon internal affairs directorates at 2310 on 20 August, General Myrikov specifically enumerated five points which were to be unswervingly executed by militia personnel.

From an explanation by Militia Lieutenant Colonel V. Kornukhov, head of the Kuybyshev Rayon Internal Affairs Directorate of the city of Moscow, given to the Moscow City Soviet Commission on Investigation of the Anticonstitutional Actions of Responsible Officials During the Putsch: "On the evening of 20 August, Comrade N.S. Myrikov read us the order of the Moscow city commandant and asked us to organize its execution..."

I will cite a third fact. Our publication was informed of this by readers who work for the militia. When cadets of the Orlov Militia School were making their way through to Moscow, coming to the aid of the besieged RSFSR House of Soviets, attempts were made to arrest them on order of Pugo and General Myrikov—first along the 23-km Simferopol Highway, and then on the Moscow Ring Road. The official executing the order is specifically named as well—Streletskiy, a section chief at the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department.

And so, Comrade General, it is vain that you now attire yourself in the toga of defenders of freedom and the Constitution. It seems you have tarnished your uniform all the same, and it would be more honorable to have made a different decision, a more courageous one than the one you made in organizing your press conference.

### MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Views Coup Aftermath

PM1009100791 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No. 34, 24 Aug 91 p 1

[Comment by Len Karpinskiy and Yegor Yakovlev: "Us and Them"]

[Text] From dawn on Monday through Wednesday evening it was revealed with the utmost clarity who we were and who they were.

We are the people, who have been tormented and brought to the limit, but who have not betrayed ourselves.

They are the power-seekers who want to rule us and are prepared to drive tanks over people's bodies to do so.

We can resist them. And win.



They are capable only of betrayal, of an undistinguished coup, of attracting dullards like themselves.

Away with demagoguery, sobbing over former services, and diplomatic subtleties—it is all clear. Let us repeat the words of Aleksandr Galich: "We shall recall by name all those who raised a hand."

But nor should we overlook those who have been trying so busily to attach themselves to the victorious people since Wednesday evening and night. There are minutes when there is nothing left but the voice of your own conscience. Those who have no such voice, who worship only force, are conscienceless and dangerous people: They can never be trusted in anything.

We do not believe Anatoliy Lukyanov. On Wednesday, when the fate of the putsch had been decided, he tried to persuade one of us that he would never betray the man with whom he had been linked all his life. He was referring to the kidnaped president about whom over the past three days he had not found the courage to say a word, when the world was lost in speculation over whether Gorbachev was alive or had already been killed.

We do not trust USSR General Prosecutor Nikolay Trubin: He kept quiet while violence was being done to the law. Yet when the law triumphed he suddenly roused himself—it turns out a prosecutor is called on to defend the law.

We despise Leonid Kravchenko. Yesterday his minions demanded that we crawl before the plotters. Today, without taking breath, they are accusing those to whom they had striven to give themselves.

We do not want to be ruled by people with no conscience. And we shall never give our hands to them.

Actually, this is not only a moral compulsion. It is the instinct of self-preservation. New putschists will hatch from today's accomplices of the plotters.

And we shall not start to deceive ourselves: Personal retribution alone will be too little. For a little over six years we have been marking time with anguish, because we are being stifled by the living corpse of the totalitarian system. But now we can understand well what incantations involving "the socialist choice" and "a solicitous attitude toward existing structures" mean and where they lead. We shall convict Yazov and some generals. But shall we preserve the monstrous system of our military? Kryuchkov will hear his sentence. But are we to leave the criminal structure of state security which long ago became DANGEROUS TO THE STATE? Pavlov and Tiyazkov will disappear. But will the state industrial monopoly flourish? Starodubtsev will cease to be. But will the antipeasant collective and state farm system still stifle us with hunger?

No, dear compatriots. This time we have overcome the internal occupier, but the evil must be eradicated to the end. It is a question of our responsibility and yours. To history.

### Russian Deputy Advocates Union of Sovereign States

AU0709135591 Berlin *BERLINER ZEITUNG*  
in German 4 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Parliament, by Manfred Quiring: "Complete Independence Does Not Exist Anywhere"]

[Text]

[Quiring] Representatives of republics and the president of the union proposed to establish new leadership bodies of the union for a transition period. Is this the end of the Supreme Soviet as the union parliament?

[Lukin] I also prefer the parliamentary variant in the transition period. The Supreme Soviet should be preserved and, notwithstanding restricted functions, be able to exercise democratic control over the organs to be newly created. I advocate a changed structure of the Supreme Soviet on the basis of recommendations from the parliaments of the republics. If all use common sense, this will be a generally acceptable solution.

[Quiring] How do the numerous independence declarations of the republics influence this process?

[Lukin] Their independence is already a fact. Now we have to proclaim our own and to recognize that of the republics, which we have so far refused to do. However, common sense must also prevail here. There are several stages of independence and mutual dependence. Therefore, one must agree on the future form of cooperation between the independent republics on the territory of the union.

[Quiring] What kind of union will this be, in your opinion?

[Lukin] A union of sovereign states with certain joint functions, of course, with a comprehensive economic agreement, but also with a political agreement, though on a smaller scale. Every economic agreement must be supported by political steps, so that it can function. In addition, a military agreement, above all in the strategic field, is essential. This is important for all, even for the independent Baltics.

[Quiring] How do you see President Gorbachev's future? Has the time for new direct elections come?

[Lukin] It is not the task of the new structures that are planned for a transition period to decide whether new elections to the office of union president will take place. I have my doubts about the necessity of direct elections of the union president by the people.

[Quiring] Why?

[Lukin] I personally would not object. However, there are two reasons not to do it. First: It is currently simply impossible in practice because some republics, for

example, Ukraine, would reject it. Secondly, it is also technically impossible. A majority in the population of the union, as well as of the republics will be required. Even in the case of Yeltsin, who is extraordinarily popular in Russia, it cannot be guaranteed that the majority of the republics would vote for him, particularly after the discussion on the borders, not to speak of Gorbachev or other politicians. Therefore, it seems to be more reasonable to elect the union president by means of a mechanism that should be developed by the republics in the union committee.

### **Sobchak Stresses Constitutional Secession**

*LD0509202391 Moscow TASS in English 1208 GMT  
5 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow September 5 TASS—It will be far from pleasant to make out visas to visit relatives in the Ukraine, Moldova or Uzbekistan, Leningrad mayor and people's deputy of the USSR Anatoliy Sobchak believes. The establishment of republican customs barriers, he believes, is the first step to destroy freedom and democracy in the country. It is the first real violation of human rights.

"Hence, before speaking about the independence of republics," Anatoliy Sobchak said in a TASS interview, "we must clearly specify the meaning of this term.

"Let them secede if they wish, but everything must be done constitutionally. The congress should not overlook the fact that most republics, which have proclaimed their independence, refused to honour the constitution and laws of the union on their territories. Recognising the political reality, we must now confirm that we are ushering in a transitional period and setting up provisional structures of power. They will exist until a new union treaty is signed, until a new constitution is endorsed and new elections held.

"If we close the congress without passing such decisions, we will be applauded by all the plotters and their accomplices, who have delivered angry speeches from the congress rostrum. We will give reason for the putschists to rejoice. They will think not everything is lost for them. They will think they will eventually be released and everything will return to the usual rut. Then, they think, we will show these democrats what's what."

### **Yeltsin Adviser Interviewed on Coup, Aftermath**

*PM0909165191 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE  
in English (Undated)*

[Undated London interview with Russian Presidential adviser Dmitriy Volkogonov by Dmitriy Ardamatskiy; first paragraph is introduction: "We Must Be Vigilant, for the Reactionaries May Seek To Take Revenge"]

[Text] One of the more influential leaders of the Russian Democratic Movement and advisor to the Russian Federation President, Dmitriy Volkogonov, was far away

from Moscow during the abortive coup attempt—at the Oxford clinic where he was operated on. On the first day of the putsch he sent a telegram to Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament.

[Ardamatskiy] What was the telegram about?

[Volkogonov] I beseeched Yeltsin to muster all people's forces to stand up to the conspirators. That was the only chance, because Russia has no army or national guards—nothing of this kind. I wrote that if the army were to be addressed and told the whole truth, it would never fight its own people. In my message to the military I said: "May not the Soviet soldiers disgrace themselves by raising their hand against their own fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters (excl)"

Of course our armed forces are rather heterogeneous. At the very top the generals are inextricably bound up with the nomenklatura, and very few of them think democratically, at the lower and average level, the situation is different. Young officers and those of average age, being in a very difficult social situation, see that they are simply being used as an instrument for achieving somebody's imperial ambitions.

[Ardamatskiy] What would have been the implications of a successful coup?

[Volkogonov] It was clear to me that if the junta, using the power in their hands, should get what it wanted, then the country would be plunged into the dark era of neo-Stalinism, with inevitable purges and persecutions and relapse into cold war. If democratic forces were to stand their ground, then the whole skeleton of the CPSU as well as the bastions of the conspirators would collapse. This reminds me that a little over a year ago I told the 28th congress of the CPSU that if the Communist Party did not give up its utopian communist ideas, it would suffer the fate of the east european communist parties. There was an uproar and I had to leave the rostrum. Now the party is reaping what it has sown.

When historians look at the events of those days in a few decades, I think they will regard them as something more than a mere defeat of a thermidor. In effect, that was a history-making watershed.

It was clear to everyone that the threat of a conservative backlash was growing, that a coup was brewing. There were many signs which pointed that way, including the ominous cliquish "Statement of 12" in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya on July 23.

Today it is perfectly clear that the statement came as an ideological and propagandistic preparation for the coup. Those twelve persons are also to blame, they are accomplices and must answer to the tribunal of history. By the same token, Lukyanov, who appeared to have kept a low profile, should be also called to book, as he is now said to have orchestrated the whole coup. It is Lukyanov who knows people in the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the armed forces better than anyone else. When he headed

what was then called the Administrative Department of the CPSU Central Committee, all appointments and personnel movement were within his province, for instance, the appointment of heads of regional outfits of the KGB and the Interior Ministry—from division commanders upwards. He screened all people in high office.

[Ardamatskiy] How do you see the role of Mikhail Gorbachev in the development of the crisis situation as a whole?

[Volkogonov] At this point, I would not like to make predictions and less so conjectures, but my impression is that Gorbachev had long been under pressure to agree to a coup. But then, at the most critical moment he refused to sign the statement. Yet, characteristically, he had long hesitated. He has a chance to exonerate himself before history, although he has badly discredited himself, if only by the fact that all chief conspirators were his appointees.

And again. I was horrified and stunned when I heard Moiseyev had been appointed defence minister. It may be difficult to be more reactionary than Yazov, yet Moiseyev is. Fortunately, Boris Yeltsin stepped in and now we have Shaposhnikov as defence minister. I do not know the man well. I know Lobov better. Lobov is a general well-versed in his field and favours democratic trends. This is a good choice.

[Ardamatskiy] What do you think of Gorbachev's resignation as General Secretary?

[Volkogonov] he resigned because he was cornered. That was the only thing for him to do if he was to stay afloat. I also think that all the latest developments connected with the CPSU come as the last "no" to the communist utopi[Volkogonov] A year ago the party still had a chance to remodel itself along democratic lines, but no longer. [as published]

[Ardamatskiy] You do not believe that the Rutskey-led Democratic Party of Russian Communists has a future, do you?

[Volkogonov] The words "communism" or "communist" by themselves mean continued commitment to utopian ideas, so it has no future. I will stress again that communism is a utopian concept. I could not give up hope for a long time and stayed on, but a few months ago i quit without publicity. The draft of a new Communist Party programme is, in the final analysis, the same communist utopia, an attempt to survive.

[Ardamatskiy] What do you think are the basic challenges before Soviet society today?

[Volkogonov] So much has happened lately, it's hard to digest all at once. Still, i want to say this.

First. There should be no revenge-seeking, the victors must not be allowed to make short work of the vanquished. Of course, odious persons—who are many—need to be removed from power as soon as possible, yet

undemocratic approaches must be avoided by all means. The thing is that the democratic forces should keep their moral high ground.

Second. There should be no overdramatising the fact that many republics are now seeking independence. That centrifugal trends prevail at this juncture is only natural. But it is my firm belief that centripetal processes will begin some time too, for no one republic will be able to survive and live normally without economic ties. The order of the day is to foster sound, just and fair economic relations to mutual benefit. That's one thing. Devising their format will be the next task.

Third. People need to know that, even though democracy has prevailed, they must not abandon themselves to euphoria. Answer: After all, no one will feed us and no one will iron out our problems for us. [sentence as published] Each and everyone of us ought to do their duty honestly and, of course, remain sufficiently vigilant, for the reactionaries may well decide to seek revenge.

[Ardamatskiy] So you do not rule out the possibility of attempts to take revenge, do you?

[Volkogonov] I am positive that this possibility exists. This being so, the important thing now is to take control of the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry, and the KGB. The top brass there must be changed completely. The ones to replace it may be young officers of lower ranks, but they must be committed to democratic principles. This country has enough clever, capable, and competent people.

### RSFSR Prosecutor on Coup Investigation

PM1009095591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Sep 91  
Single Edition p 2

[Interview with RSFSR General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov by correspondent L. Pyatiletova; no place or date of interview given; first two paragraphs are an introduction: "RSFSR General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov: 'I Will Do Anything To Prevent Tyranny'"]

[Text] They were threatening time itself. Threatening to turn back the history of our state and the peoples in it. But the opposite happened. Just as a rock that is accidentally moved can cause an avalanche in the mountains, the coup accelerated the processes which have undergone a long gestation period in the country. The ideological blinders, as a result of which perestroika had been on the slide, apparently hopelessly, for a long time, fell from thousands of people's eyes during those three days.

We will continue to return to those August days for a long time yet, because too many questions remain unanswered. We certainly look forward to hearing what the law enforcement organs have to say. RSFSR General

Prosecutor V. Stepankov talked with PRAVDA's correspondent about the way the investigation into the case of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] is progressing.

[Pyatiletova] Valentin Georgiyevich, you have already had many meetings with the detainees. People who made both our newborn democracy and all of us hostages of their adventure. What was their motive? Lust for power? An inability to abandon an idea that had fallen into disrepute?

[Stepankov] None of those under investigation has talked of the putsch as a means of satisfying his own ambitions. According to them, they reckoned that the new Union Treaty was disastrous, that the crisis in the economy, in the social sphere, and in politics was so profound that the most extraordinary measures were required, which the president had not dared take. But words alone are not enough for an investigation, a combination of evidence is needed. So we will only be able to make our final judgment on the motives behind the coup when the full investigation has been made. We have only been at it for 10 days, and another two or three months of work lie ahead.

[Pyatiletova] But perhaps they really were convinced that the country was sliding toward catastrophe and their pronouncements on the approaching danger were not being taken on board only because public opinion was not ready? In that case, was there any other way to change, apart from a coup?

[Stepankov] There was one alternative—our parliamentary structures, the struggle at the upcoming USSR presidential elections, and all that was envisaged if the Union Treaty had been concluded. They are accused not of introducing a state of emergency—this can be done constitutionally—but of opting for violence.

[Pyatiletova] And this is what the coup participants are charged with?

[Stepankov] Yes. All the detainees, apart from Lukyanov, who was arrested later than the others, are charged in accordance with article 64 of the USSR Criminal Code. That is, treason, which is a conspiracy aimed at seizing power. The punishment in this case is severe: 10-15 years' imprisonment or death.

[Pyatiletova] Has the charge been admitted?

[Stepankov] So far completely by only one of the detainees, with sincere repentance. Another three admit part of the charge, but the interrogation is not over yet.

[Pyatiletova] But what about the series of suicides: Pugo, Akhromeyev, Kruchina? What made these people condemn themselves without waiting to be tried?

[Stepankov] I will say just one thing for the moment. When our people went to arrest Pugo there was a great deal of evidence that he had been ready to take that step. Akhromeyev and Kruchina were going to be questioned,

but they had not yet been informed of that. So the investigators do not feel responsible for pushing them over the edge in any way. The investigation will show whether they were involved in the coup. I do not want to discredit them unjustly.

[Pyatiletova] Is it true that Akhromeyev's grave was opened up the other day?

[Stepankov] Yes, but it has nothing to do with the case. Apparently, the grave of Colonel General Sredin, buried alongside him on the same day at Troyekurovskoye Cemetery, was also opened up, more than likely desecrated by people involved in acquiring military decorations and selling them abroad.

[Pyatiletova] Valentin Georgiyevich, as prosecutor in Khabarovsk Kray—one of the well-known "GULAG Archipelago" regions—you were involved in the rehabilitation of victims of Stalin's repression. Now fate has placed you at the epicenter of events, on an objective assessment of which the fate of a multitude of our fellow citizens also depends. Doesn't the awareness of this responsibility weigh heavily on you?

[Stepankov] I always remember the fateful role played by the law enforcement organs in those terrible years. It was they who artificially created the criminal cases, which it is difficult even to call cases. Confessions were extracted from people by torture at detention centers. The materials obtained by those methods served as grounds for organs far removed from the court and from the law to pass sentence on them.

We no longer have the conditions here that might lead to mass violations of human rights. At the same time, with all the responsibility invested in me by the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, I can say that I will do anything to prevent tyranny. It was to that end that a single group of 75 highly skilled investigators from the union and Russian Prosecutor's Offices was set up to take charge of the case, headed by RSFSR Deputy General Prosecutor Yevgeniy Lidov. I oversee the legality of the investigation, including the custody of the detainees.

[Pyatiletova] But nonjudicial bodies nonetheless have been revived! There is no end of commissions and committees in the country voluntarily seeking out people involved in the coup. Moreover, they appear to be seeking to bring the entire population within the range of their activities, urging them to provide "information," as has also happened here in the past.

[Stepankov] It is those chosen by the people who have the right to conduct a deputies' investigation—they have this right under the Law on the Status of Deputies. The danger is that deputies' commissions are trying to assume powers that are not given to them by the law. Hence their efforts to interfere in the activity of many organizations, including Prosecutor's Office organs, and even demand that it account for itself. We will not allow this. We will collaborate with the commission set up as a

result of the USSR Supreme Soviet decisions and with the state commission formed in accordance with the USSR president's decree to investigate the KGB's activities—but within the law.

Instructions have also been given to Prosecutor's Office organs in the provinces to resolutely stop any commission or any committee that gets it into its head to decide the extent of someone's guilt. The "informers" need not bother—we do not intend to use their "information."

[Pyatiletova] Public opinion has been stirred up by rumors of mass arrests. A figure has even been named: 750 people are already in custody. Is that so?

[Stepankov] No, it is not. In the country as a whole—in all republics, krais, and oblasts—there are 20 instances of criminal proceedings having been instituted. No one has been arrested in connection with them. Some 14 people have been arrested in connection with our case. They include, apart from the "seven" of the eight who signed the statements by the SCSE members, CPSU Central Committee Secretary Shenin, presidential service apparatus chief Boldin, Ground Forces Commander in Chief Varennikov, chief of presidential guard Plekhanov, his deputy Generalov, USSR KGB First Deputy Chairman Grushko, and USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov. Have all the "chief heroes" of the conspiracy come under the investigation's scrutiny? It is difficult to say for certain.

[Pyatiletova] Will there be a public trial once the investigation is over?

[Stepankov] The court dealing with the case will decide whether to examine it openly, to broadcast the proceedings on television, or to hold them behind closed doors. I think its decision will be dictated by what level of state secrets, protected by the law, we have arrived at by the end of the investigation.

But whatever it is I am sure that our society must have adequate information on the course of the inquiry into the circumstances of the coup. It is not only democratic, but I believe it will also help defuse the incandescent atmosphere we are living in at the moment. I would point out that my staff are looking out for items on this topic and are even collecting cuttings. During a recent meeting Yanayev, for example, said that he bore a grudge against one newspaper which wrote that he had been intoxicated when arrested. At the upcoming 6 September press conference I will be forced to deny this.

[Pyatiletova] Valentin Georgiyevich, what surprises have there been for you during the investigation?

[Stepankov] The fact that people in power, deprived of the aura of power, are just like ordinary mortals.

### Russian Security Chief Interviewed on Coup Events

*LD0909025891 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Interview with Colonel General Konstantin Kobets, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers State Committee for Defense and Security, by correspondent Mark Urban in Moscow on 6 September; from the "Newsnight" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted on events leading up to President Boris Yeltsin's election] [Urban] Boris Yeltsin was so concerned about the increasing outspokenness of hardliners that he succeeded in having the elections for the presidency of Russia brought forward. As soon as he defeated his rivals at the polls, he appointed security advisers, and almost as soon as he had done that, he gave them sensitive instructions.

[Kobets] A month before, the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, warned me that we had to be ready for anything. So, energetically, and without telling anybody, a small circle of us—that is, our defense committee—started making plans in case there was a coup and the parliament building was besieged. Our forecast was right. We understood things correctly. That's why we were able to endure those difficult hours in a pretty well organized manner. [passage omitted on interviews with various military personnel]

[Urban] General Kobets was so confident that his defenses would hold, so much so that he went to his president with an extraordinary request.

[Kobets] I told Yeltsin, quite plainly, in the presence of [Ivan] Silayev and [Gennadiy] Burbulis, that I only had one thing to ask: that I would lead the squad that would carry out the court's sentence on the leaders of the coup; that is, that I should be in charge of the squad which would be ordered to shoot them.

### Positive Aspects of Union Outlined

*914B0377B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Sep 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Article by Otto Latsis: "It Was on Rochdelskaya Street"]

[Text] As the smoke following the battle with the junta clears, the outlines of the semi-destroyed house in which we all live are emerging. At least three immediate problems show through, each of which could bring trouble of catastrophic proportions.

The first is continued price liberalization. Unless this is done in one form or another, the peasants will not sell the grain which they have, no matter how many townspeople we send for the harvesting. The present prices of their products are hardly capable of inspiring either the miners or the oilmen, on whom the cities' survival of the

winter depends. But price liberalization is a painful social problem. Reliable protection of the vulnerable strata of the populace is needed. The present inflation must not be allowed to grow here into hyperinflation, whereby the producers lose the desire to sell anything for money. The task is immense, but the later it is tackled, the harder it will be.

The second: measures of strict fuel and energy economies for the coming months. Organizational measures of economies, while limited by nature, nonetheless also have an advantage: They operate rapidly. Even if they add to our resources only two to three percent, just as long as they do so immediately. These percentage points could prove our salvation.

The third and most dangerous problem is the Union treaty. It is time to put an end to the arguments about definitions: federation, confederation, or something other. The boundaries between one and the other in real life are brittle and conditional. There is hardly any appreciable difference in the day-to-day reality, social position, and political rights of inhabitants of the Swiss Confederation, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the unitary French Republic, say. On the other hand, the USSR, a federation according to the letter of the constitution, has always in reality been a unitary state.

And what if we were to recognize, for example, a confederation, as N. Nazarbayev has proposed? Nothing bad would happen. In any event, our actions would be determined by objective circumstances, which no policy can cancel. There is the strategic defense potential—dividing it up would be impossible or, in any event, mortally dangerous for the entire country and for all mankind. There are systems of pipelines and the USSR's Common Power System. Breaking them up into parts would mean destroying them, and no one wants this. The common railroad network could be divided up, but this would be stupid, everyone would be a loser. There is the sizable potential of the nuclear electric power stations. The majority of republics could not provide for their operation and safety outside of a common organization. Each and every republic is interested in an economic treaty which ensures not only a common market but also closer interaction. There is the strong potential of basic research, which could be supported independently by only Russia, perhaps—but the product of this potential is needed by everyone. Finally, together with the republics' own foreign policy a common foreign policy of the Union is needed—for the sake of the fulfillment of international commitments assumed earlier, in the interests of our and international security, and so forth. What name we give the union created for the performance of these undoubtedly common functions is not, in my opinion, that important.

What is important is this: the pace of solution of the question. The putsch and the confusion following it have in places given rise to a most dangerous idea: making the

borders of the republics really tangible in people's day-to-day lives. When any decisions on questions of sovereignty, jurisdictions, and so forth are adopted, the conversion of our internal borders, conditional since time immemorial, into unconditional borders at a stroke in the near future is impermissible. We have never studied territorial demarcation in earnest. Many of the republics' present borders were based precisely on their conditionality. Converting them rapidly into the present borders of states acceptable to all is impossible. We would note that as soon as the Serbs living in Croatia saw the danger of the appearance of a real border cutting them off from Serbia, blood was shed. I would prefer—if there has to be some separation—this to be done slowly, careful thought having been given to the avoidance of any shooting.

Such are the problems. How are they being discussed—in parliaments and the press and on the street? There have been wise and opportune words. But all too often they are interrupted by outbursts of the good old ideologization very familiar to us for over seven decades—the clichés are different, but the tone is the same. Just a month ago, 25-26 July, at the last CPSU Central Committee plenum, neo-Bolsheviks were furiously demanding of Gorbachev an oath of loyalty to the "communist perspective." Now it is continually being demanded of him just as menacingly from various platforms that he renounce the old idols. Is he not sick of it? I respect him for not having sworn the oath to the neo-Bolsheviks which they were demanding and would cease to respect him were he now to swear an "oath in reverse."

What is depressing is the fact that behind these demands are most often not some cunning political game even but an elementary ignorance of the subject with which a professional politician deals. At the time of the meeting in the Russian Supreme Soviet someone demanded that Gorbachev urgently expel socialism from the country. The irony of the situation is that this conversation took place on Rochdelskaya Street—the rear of the Russian White House looks out onto it. Not all Muscovites, perhaps, know why someone had the desire to name a street in our capital, which has not honored with attention either London or Paris, after the small town of Rochdale, which is in the county of Lancashire in northeast England. It is simply that the weavers of the Trekhgorka located on the same street once noticed what their comrades—also weavers, but not Soviet and far from Marxist—were doing. The first Righteous Rochdale Pioneers cooperative was founded in England in 1844. I recall this fact so that it might be seen more clearly that socialism exists irrespective of the wishes of governments. It is a set of ideas, interests and relationships shaped objectively. Governments may hinder or help the development of socialism, but can neither "impose" nor eliminate it.

And it is not over "isms" that our government should be racking its brains at the moment. Remember, Stalin,

having during collectivization smashed both the peasantry and agricultural production itself, reported the overfulfillment of the five-year plan in the countryside: He had overfulfilled the plan in terms of percentage collectivization. There was famine, but the plan for the building of socialism had been fulfilled. Will we now cast all aside and fulfill the plan for the "removal" of socialism? God save us from losing our minds.

### Yelena Bonner Criticizes Union Treaty

914B0370B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 91  
Union Edition p 3

[Article by Yelena Bonner: "We Are Not Defending Mikhail Sergeyevich, We Are Defending the Law"]

[Excerpts] Three days that shook the world and immediately thrust us into a new era—one can say this about them: We are proceeding in the right direction, but this is just the beginning of the path. [passage omitted]

Again what I say will probably run counter to the universal rejoicing and the feeling of confidence in the president of Russia and those four who were our leaders during these days that has grown among us during this time. I simply love them, but at the same time let me remind you that we are in a state of euphoria and therefore our immediate future—the Union treaty—frightens me very much. I would like for our discussion to follow this path. I have an absolutely negative feeling toward this document. Let me explain why. We have become accustomed to the word "renewed." What does renewed mean? I came home from the war and during almost all my student years I had three dresses, which I was constantly renewing. I shortened them, I lengthened them, I cut off the sleeves, I made a white collar and then a blue collar, and then something else, and each time I sewed on a button I had to darn underneath it. The renewed Union is this renewed dress.

We need conceptually new relations. Each of us wants a new state, to which we link our hopes for a new life. Why do I not like this treaty? Let us use these three days as an example. We have a Russian flag, we have proclaimed Russian sovereignty, and when it was necessary Russian sovereignty was defended by the bare hands and open hearts of our children. What the hell kind of sovereignty is that? These are the same empty words we have always used. A sovereign state cannot exist without its own army, without real power structures. We are living in very complicated times, and an army is a complicated thing. How are we to organize the future Union? I would like for both Boris Nikolayevich and Mikhail Sergeyevich to hear me. Although I have communicated with them, each time they have been unable to spare the time for a serious conversation with me. Andrey Dmitriyevich could not either. You will read about this in my second book, which will be published by Znamya. The structure of the future Union should be: 3, 6, 7, 9, or 15. I would like for the Union to be 15, but I understand that is unrealistic. But there should be no "plus one."

When states conclude among themselves an agreement that includes complete economic cooperation, it is very difficult because our careless leaders of past years have deprived some republics of one thing and others of another; a hungry monoculture has been created in Central Asia, and we still have to figure out what the hell we have created in Russia. But—as sovereign states, and not the center over them. But when they conclude the first economic treaty—for which the political basis can be only unconditional adherence to democratic principles of self-determination and protection of human rights; we cannot enter into contractual relations with anyone without this—they must determine the functions they will control jointly. In my opinion, these include the functions of defense of the common border, the functions of nuclear forces, and some of the transportation and communications functions. These are the functions having to do with the general direction of the international policy, but not all of them. The Sakharov committee, which operates on the territory of the RSFSR, should not have to go to Union ministry for visas. We applied to the RSFSR ministry and it was not able to take care of this, and it was done by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for which we thank them. But I do not want to thank them. I want my state, in which I live, to do this, and I live in Russia, since we have declared Russia to be a sovereign state.

Then the republics will determine the place in which this administrative apparatus will work. Perhaps it will be the building of the former CEMA or perhaps it will be some building in Kazan, or perhaps we will build our own Brasilia and mark out a special district. But there must not be two capitals in one city—and this is another lesson of the coup. One set of leaders could declare a curfew while the other set could declare there is none. One militia could decide to beat me one time and another time, on the contrary, it could decide to protect me. That is hocus pocus, it is delirium, it is not serious and, moreover, it portends a very frightening future. These are the main arguments for the Union treaty. But our legislators have begun to divide things up: This property goes to us, that property to you, this percentage of the tax goes to you, and this percentage of the tax to us. That is not what we began with. At the congress, Andrey Dmitriyevich, striving to preserve the Union, spoke about the idea that we should have 52 (I do not recall how many autonomous formations we had at the time) absolutely equal republics. That was rejected. Now we have what we have. We do not have a Union.

If now we were to create a slap-dash Union of nine plus one or something like nine plus one we would have not three victims but thousands and millions of victims. And it is a fable that there can be no single economic space that unites various states. Europe is a perfectly well-off example for us, but we do not want luxury as long as we can get by.

And so, my dear compatriots and my two dear presidents, think about this, it is very serious. Herein lies both the hope for our future and the possible disaster of our



future. I am old, it is hard for me to change my ways, and I have become accustomed to living in this large state, but we will not preserve it. We are too late. We will only cause bloodshed. The train has left. Our train left when they were shooting in Alma-Ata, and this did not disturb us. Our train left when they were shooting in Baku, and we thought that was not our affair. Our train left when they raped and shoved water pipes into the vaginas of women in Sumgait, and we were told it was a gang of criminals. It left in Ossetia. The criminals were hidden from us in these stages—and we got Vilnius and Riga. And quite recently? We were told the same thing as before: A gang of extremists are to blame for that. Now there has been shooting here, and we ourselves are to blame for this. I am not a procurator by nature. But crime must be punished, and all of the things I have been talking about are grave state crimes.

And the last question. When we create this management organ it makes no difference to me what we call this person whom we entrust to run it. Perhaps he will be called the president of the Union. And we will have time to conduct nationwide elections. I do not wish to guess whether it will be Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev or Ivanov, Petrov, or one of the young boys and girls whom we do not know but who enter serious, big-time politics every day. But just as this time we were not defending Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev personally—and he must understand that—we will defend not a person but our right to be a legitimate state. No junta, either past or future, of those we will experience and those from which we will have to defend ourselves, has the right to judge this or any other president. Only we have that right. When we fully understand this we will be citizens. [passage omitted]

Excuse me, I am probably being too serious, but I am saying what I think. I shall try to articulate one more thing. We have many brave people and we are getting more and more of them. There are very many brave state activists and activists in various parties. But willy-nilly the state figures, the deputies, the party leaders are becoming almost a little dependent on the party, on the faction, on their position, or something else. Things are good for me, I am a pensioner and depend only on myself. One of my friends, one of the young friends of my daughter and son, asked me: "We have read the book by Andrey Dmitriyevich and we see that he has learned a great deal from you, but what have you learned from him?" I could not answer right away because it seemed to me I had learned nothing from him. I mentioned something about Pushkin, about a deeper understanding of him, about literature, and some other things. And I said that I had learned tolerance. And during these days I have understood that the main thing I have learned from Sakharov is courage; not physical—I have always had enough of that—but I dare say intellectual, although I am not a great intellectual. I learned intellectual courage—to think things through to the end. If we think things through to the end, no version of this Union treaty—neither the one that existed in November, nor the one

published in March, nor the one in July, nor the new ones—is suitable. They are all new patches on an old dress. Boris Nikolayevich, Mikhail Sergeyevich, think about this! The republics must enter into completely new relations. Perhaps then, in this picture of our future I have sketched, we will elect Mikhail Sergeyevich president. I saw the light before Mikhail Sergeyevich did and got rid of my party card after 1968, but Mikhail Sergeyevich helped the thousands who came to the White House to see the light. This is a great service to history. Later we will think about who will be our president. But the structures which could satisfy the vanity and lust for power of any person, and not the aspirations of various peoples of our former Soviet Union, must be crushed.

We cannot settle accounts with one another. We cannot submit a bill to Lithuania for the 30 billion rubles' worth of some kind of industrial equipment there. Before this, when it was being Sovietized, how many Lithuanians were sent out of Lithuania to their death? Perhaps we can calculate how much one human life is worth? Perhaps we can figure out the cost of one Uzbek or Buryat or Yakut? I shall return once again to the words "order" and "Ordnung." My contemporaries, old men and women, who need order so much. Go through your family albums. Gather in the kitchen and make some tea and recall your aunts and uncles, sisters and brothers, country and city neighbors. Can you find in our country even one family that does not have some uncle or grandfather who died in the Yenisey region? One that was not affected by de-kulakization? One in which the mother's brother or sister did not die in the White or Red Army? One in which nobody was arrested in 1920, 1923, 1929, 1933, 1935, 1937, or 1940? If you find such a family, it definitely must have had somebody who died fighting for "an unknown hill"—a brother, a father, or a sister. Did you not lose anyone? Then somebody was sent to the Kolyma after a hard captivity. So in our family, in our country—our country is a family—there is not a household that has not had losses. I am sure that if you take the family of our president Mikhail Sergeyevich or the family of our other president or anyone else, each will have someone for whom tears were shed, if not by you then by your mother or grandmother. Remember that.

**Chairman of Constitutional Committee on Baltics, Laws**

*AU0609134891 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG  
in Hungarian 5 Sep 91 p 2*

["M.L.L."-signed interview with Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the Soviet Parliament's Constitutional Oversight Committee; place and date not given: "Alekseyev: Straighten Out the Laws"]

[Text] Sergey Alekseyev is always called to the speaker's podium when a new law is being passed or an old one declared null and void.



[NEPSZABADSAG] What influence could the international recognition of the Baltic countries have on the center?

[Alekseyev] It does not play a determining role. As in many other cases, we have fallen behind again. We should have done the same thing; we should have approved an adequate statement that would have proved our goodwill.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As the chief guardian of constitutionality, how do you visualize the fate of perestroika laws in this new situation?

[Alekseyev] They will have to be examined and straightened out individually. We will need modifications and changes.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are there many good laws among them?

[Alekseyev] There are dozens of very good laws. However, they were passed and implemented in a different legal medium and on the basis of a different constitution. We need to work, not because the laws are bad, but because the whole script of the laws needs to be harmonized and homogenized.

#### Deputies Concerned With Lack of Human Rights Mechanism

PM1009154191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 10 Sep 91 Single Edition p 1

[N. Garifullina report under the "Topics of the Day" rubric: "Open Up to the World"]

[Text] The events of recent days and weeks have been so swift and unexpected, and the changes so radical, that one would have to be blind and deaf not to notice and perceive the new realities. They are as follows: In the wake of those tragic August days, we are now living in a completely different country. However, something still prevents us from plunging wholeheartedly into the sweet waves of general euphoria. That "something" is a growing concern for the fate of our young, vulnerable democracy. I am reminded of the speech by USSR People's Deputy A.N. Krayko at the extraordinary USSR Supreme Soviet session:

"Unfortunately, the victory of democracy is already turning into the most vulgar, Bolshevik-style eradication of dissent: Journalists are being dismissed, new 'black lists' are being drawn up, and despicable 'informant' techniques are encouraged. Since the abolition of the state of emergency introduced by the 'eight,' there have been repeated violations of Union and Republic Constitutions. The coup without terror has been followed by terror without a coup. Not only those who participated in the plot are being persecuted, but also those who sympathized with them, and those who kept silent and did not declare their opposition to the conspirators immediately..."

The adoption of a Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms at the Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies—which effectively buried the old Union—inspires some optimism and hope. Every one of the Declaration's 31 articles aims to defend our freedoms, honor, and dignity. This is something which, undoubtedly, nobody would oppose. But the question arises: What kind of mechanism can implement this declaration while simultaneously ensuring the guaranteed rights of citizens who may be being hounded for political and other motives? On the last day of the congress, I turned to several USSR people's deputies with this question.

For example, the answer I received from Konstantin Dmitriyevich Lubchenko, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation, was not optimistic:

"Of course, it is an appeal more than a declaration. Unless the republics set up centralized law enforcement organs or some kind of international court of human rights, there can be no such mechanism."

Georgiy Khosroyevich Shakhnazarov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation, said: "This is a very serious question which worries me personally, because no real mechanism exists as of yet. I must tell you that there were many human rights violations in our republic, but there were even more in the other republics where the presence of local leaders, satraps, and so on, governing how they liked, compounded the general lawlessness. I know about this because I myself am from Azerbaijan: I grew up in Baku. My father was a lawyer, and when he failed to obtain justice in specific cases he would persist and send an appeal to the Supreme Court in Moscow, and very often the case would be amended there. But now it will no longer be possible to appeal to Moscow. All cases will be decided at local level, and consequently the level of political culture in each republic will define the level of civil rights. Therefore, in certain respects the situation in some republics may deteriorate, and we are already seeing examples of this. Such events are already going on in Georgia for example, in Uzbekistan, and in Azerbaijan. It is a special question. Right now we need to open up to the world as much as possible because it is precisely the world democratic space which forces us to take heed of the norms of international law, including human rights. Otherwise, it is possible that many leaders will fail to observe laws scrupulously: But if they know that they are being watched by such bodies as 'Amnesty International', trade union organizations, 'Greenpeace,' and so on, they will begin to think twice about ruining their democratic reputation."

Several other deputies expressed similar alarm (voiced, incidentally, from the platform at the Supreme Soviet session and the Congress), believing that during the transitional period it is simply imperative to promote an extensive human rights movement, and to create for this purpose special organizations and funds which will also

undertake to defend people's rights until such a time as there are reliable legal mechanisms and guarantees.

**Poll Held 3 Sep Gives Yeltsin 45.5 Percent, Gorbachev 19**

*PM0609153491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
6 Sep 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Unattributed report on public opinion poll carried out by the "TINNI-Sotsio" Center for Social and Economic Research: "Who's Who—From the Sociologists' Viewpoint"]

[Text] On 3 September 1991 the "TINNI-Sotsio" Center for Social and Economic Research (leader P. Korotin) carried out a public opinion poll for IZVESTIYA. A sample of 1,236 people representing the adult urban population of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Uzbekistan were polled.

The results of the poll, expressed as a percentage of those polled, are as follows:

1. How do you assess the 2 September joint statement by Gorbachev and the leaders of 10 republics?

—don't know about the statement: 33 percent;

—approve: 48 percent;

—disapprove: 8 percent;

—undecided: 11 percent.

2. Please name the political figure who enjoys the greatest popularity with you personally.

B. Yeltsin—45.5 percent; M. Gorbachev—19 percent; A. Sobchak—13 percent; V. Bakatin—3 percent; A. Yakovlev—3 percent; E. Shevardnadze—2 percent; N. Nazarbayev—2 percent; A. Rutskoy—2 percent.

**Poll Finds 44 Percent for Yeltsin, 17 Percent for Gorbachev**

*LD0509175991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service  
in English 2300 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[Text] The failure of the coup and the victory of democratic forces led by the Russian president Yeltsin has considerably increased his popularity. This was proved by a public opinion poll conducted after the abortive coup in Moscow and Leningrad.

If Yeltsin decided to run for Soviet presidency now, 44 percent of voters in the country's two biggest cities would vote for him. Mikhail Gorbachev would get only 17 percent of the votes. Many people give credit to him for his reforms in the years of perestroika, but hold him responsible for the coup that was conducted by his closest associates.

**Deputies Polled on Various Political Topics**

*PM0609105191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 4 Sep 91 Single Edition p 1*

[TASS report under the rubric: "Opinions of People's Deputies: Who the Leaders Should Be"]

[Text] The question of the USSR's future system may become a central, key issue for discussion at the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Specialists from the Institute for the Sociology of Parliamentarianism arrived at this conclusion as the result of a poll of 994 of the country's people's deputies. The research was carried out on behalf of the commission to organize the Congress, which is in its second day at the Kremlin.

Asked "What kind of a system do you see the USSR having?" 46 percent of those polled replied: "A federative one."

Some 27 percent see our country becoming a confederation.

And 15 percent imagine it becoming several autonomous states.

Indirect data from the poll allow us to assume that the people's deputies gravitate more toward their republics than toward the center. Some 60 percent of those questioned support to some extent or other the measures which the republic leaderships have been implementing since the events of 19-22 August, and 51 percent support those of the country's government.

An analysis of written replies showed that the political leaders' position in the country is assuming an ever more democratic orientation. Some 66 percent of those questioned consider B. Yeltsin to be the country's political leader today, and a little over 48 percent consider this to be A. Sobchak. Some 41.3 percent give preference to M. Gorbachev. Next on the list come N. Nazarbayev (more than 37 percent), I. Silayev (more than 22 percent), and E. Shevardnadze (more than 12 percent). R. Nishanov comes at the end of the list (exactly one percent).

Some 38 percent designated A. Sobchak as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Then after a fairly noticeable gap come K. Lubchenko, Yu. Kalmykov, and I. Laptev. One percent of those questioned see Ye. Primakov occupying this post.

More than 19 percent of those questioned proposed A. Yakovlev for the position of USSR vice president, and more than 10 percent proposed N. Nazarbayev. Less than five percent of the votes went to E. Shevardnadze and A. Akayev. And 1.7 percent named B. Yeltsin among the candidates for this position.

The following were proposed as candidates to the office of USSR prime minister: I. Silayev (more than 22 percent), V. Shcherbakov (more than 10 percent), G. Yavlinskiy (about eight percent), and N. Ryzhkov (1.6 percent).

The sociologists called the poll's results "outlines of accord." However, the spread of deputies' opinions is fairly wide, and the outlines of accord can be seen only very vaguely.

### Poll Surveys Attitudes on 'Freedom'

OW0709083791 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0800 GMT 7 Sep 91

[From the "Viewpoint" feature; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text]

### How Soviets View Freedom

The National Public Opinion Studies Center (VCIOM) constantly takes efforts to determine how public opinion stands on concepts central to a democratic society. The DATA NEWS AGENCY asked VCIOM sociologist Leonid Sedov for comments on the results of a survey named "Soviet Individual Within the System of Power Relations" (that polled 3,198 respondents nationwide).

Forty-one percent of the respondents said a Soviet citizen has too little freedom, 32 percent claimed that there was enough freedom, 13 percent said there was too much of it, and 14 percent did not know what to answer.

According to Sedov, opinion varies from one region to the next. While seven Balts and Georgians out of every ten say there is too little freedom and very few people claim there is too much, Central Asians are quite different: only 28 percent of the Turkmen and Tadjiks and 36 percent of the Uzbeks complained of restrictions on freedom, and 20 percent of the Tajiks say there is too much freedom and one out of three did not know what to answer. Interestingly, the Moldovans are not very freedom-minded either, judging by the poll, as only 20 percent of them say more freedom is needed, and 27 percent say there is too much of it. Sedov says that opinion on this issue depends on a respondent's mindset more than on the actual state of affairs. With the freest press and political life in this country, the Balts seek more freedom while Central Asians do not see their not-all-too-democratic lifestyle as much of a burden.

### Presidential Protection Service To Guard Gorbachev, Yeltsin

LD0709044291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2055 GMT 6 Sep 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The safety of top officials has become one of the most important topics in light of the August events. Perhaps one of the world's most unusual presidential protection services is now being created. It is going to guard two presidents. This special directorate of the USSR president's apparatus is going to be independent of the KGB and will ensure the functioning of both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's security services. [video

shows Gorbachev disembarking from limousine, being greeted by Rutskoy and Silayev, surrounded by armed militiamen]

### Reformer Fedorovskiy: Peacekeepers Could Be Needed in USSR

AU0909065291 Paris AFP in English 0542 GMT  
9 Sep 91

[Text] Paris, Sept 9 (AFP) — A special force of peacekeepers may be necessary in the Soviet Union to prevent interethnic conflicts, Vladimir Fedorovskiy, spokesman for the Movement for Democratic Reform, said in a radio interview here.

"We are greatly concerned with the prevention of conflicts within the Soviet Union," the pro-reform spokesman told RTL radio Sunday [8 September].

"We are considering the creation of a kind of blue helmet force within the union to prevent interethnic conflict. ... This would certainly require a reform of the Army," Fedorovskiy said.

Fedorovskiy, a former Soviet Embassy official in Paris, warned against the creation of a "witch-hunting climate" in the Soviet Union, saying that "all energies" would be needed to rebuild the country. It would be better therefore if the Communist Party were not banned by law, he said.

"Bans of any kind would mean a kind of neo-Stalinism," he said.

Despite the failure of last month's abortive coup d'etat, "the forces of evil are weakened but not eliminated," he warned.

Fedorovskiy also criticised what he called the wait-and-see attitude of foreign investors, saying it was "now or never that they have to seize the opportunities in the Soviet Union."

### Liberal Democrat Leader Advocates 'Dictatorial Discipline'

AU0609103691 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
2 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, by Szerdahelyi over the telephone from Moscow; date not given: "Whose Side Is Time on in Russia?"]

[Text] Strangely enough, the leaders of various extreme groups and small parties kept quiet during the attempted coup in Moscow. Why was that? This is what we tried to find out from Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

[Szerdahelyi] Mr. Zhirinovskiy, three rumors are circulating about you at the moment: You were detained after the coup, you are hiding in the countryside, and you have fled abroad....

[Zhirikovskiy] That is a nice list, but as you can hear, I am still in Moscow.

[Szerdahelyi] Nevertheless, we did not reach you in the previous hotel "headquarters" of your party, but in an apartment. Do you need to hide?

[Zhirikovskiy] No, not at all! Still, prudence is advisable at the moment.

[Szerdahelyi] What do you mean?

[Zhirikovskiy] There is enormous turmoil in Russia; nobody knows who might be detained, or what pretext or real reason might be used for a detention.

[Szerdahelyi] I personally think that the chaos was complete during the three days of the coup. Where were you during those events and how did you experience them?

[Zhirikovskiy] It may sound strange in 1991, but I do not think it would be advisable for me to give an account of everything in public.

[Szerdahelyi] So you do need to hide?

[Zhirikovskiy] Rubbish! I just don't want to create superfluous problems for me or my party. I have already heard people saying that they want to implicate us in this messy affair. Yet I can stress that our party had nothing to do with the coup!

[Szerdahelyi] You could still have an opinion on the coup.

[Zhirikovskiy] It was a foolish, hurried, and amateur attempt that only damaged our forces; it certainly did not benefit us.

[Szerdahelyi] What forces are you referring to?

[Zhirikovskiy] The forces that, to this very day, are fighting for the renewal and ascent of Russia. The coup did achieve one thing: The Communists discredited themselves once and for all, and the CPSU was banned!

[Szerdahelyi] Are you pleased about that?

[Zhirikovskiy] Wholeheartedly! Gorbachev's efforts are in vain, his fate seems to have been sealed. His desperate attempts to assemble a new leadership are an indication of this—nobody is prepared to cooperate with him.

[Szerdahelyi] Is your party becoming more active?

[Zhirikovskiy] We are going to wait a little longer, and then.... Here we come! Before the coup, I spent weeks visiting Russian towns, and I was surprised to discover how many people support the idea of a strong and autocratic Russia. Not so long ago, I was wondering whether we would be able to assemble a 1 million-strong party membership within a year, but now I am calm. Time is on our side.

[Szerdahelyi] So there will be a new form of dictatorship?

[Zhirikovskiy] You can call it a dictatorship if you like, it does not matter! The main point is that we will not allow a sell-out of this country, and we want to create internal order. At times, we will need dictatorial discipline to do this.

### **Official Says System Must Be Dismantled, Not Destroyed**

*AU0909125991 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG  
in Hungarian 7 Sep 91 p 2*

[Interview with Anatoliy Denisov, chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Supreme Soviet, by Laszlo M. Lengyel; in Moscow, date not given: "Without Explosion"]

[Text] Anatoliy Denisov is one of the most respected deputies in the Soviet parliament, in spite of the fact that he also had a function in the leading organs of the CPSU. According to both the democratic and radical press, Anatoliy Denisov is the wisest communist in the Soviet Union.

[Lengyel] How will the international recognition of the Baltic states affect the activity of the center, including the current congress. Will all this affect the future of the union?

[Denisov] In my view, all this will have a favorable effect, because this international recognition is improving the possibilities of coordination. The sometime destructive stress on separateness occurred mainly in order to make us recognize Baltic independence. Now that this independence has been recognized, the need to strengthen the appearances will not influence their attitude. Whether we like it or not, the identity of problems that we must solve connects all of us. We must solve these problems together. The Baltic states have already announced that they want to have economic cooperation with the other republics, and I think these states will also cooperate politically to a certain extent.

[Lengyel] Are there concrete concepts as regards the future union?

[Denisov] We think that we should preserve certain federal organs, even without any real power, at least symbolically. The republics represented in these organs could jointly decide on what tasks they are ready to delegate to the center.

[Lengyel] Russian democrats claim that the revolution has won in the center and in Russia only, and nothing has changed in the republics.

[Denisov] I think that the well known Russian chauvinism has again been set into motion here, this time among democrats, unfortunately. The democrats' complacency manifests itself in the fact that "they know what should be done, and the others do not know." It is the task of the central organs to coordinate the interests of the republics, namely the republics that exist today. We

should not force upon them interests that we think are theirs. We must understand that various people think differently.

[Lengyel] Will the Congress be able to continue to function in this new composition?

[Denisov] I think this is the last Congress. Our normal legislative body, the Supreme Soviet, will have to function in the transitional period. The Congress is unable to carry out systematic and detailed activity. The authority of the Congress should be transferred to the Supreme Soviet so that this body can function.

Everyone has had enough of revolutions. However, there is a constant revolutionary mood around. Also, the Congress can only function as a revolutionary body, namely it can only destroy something. However, today we must dismantle the old things, rather than destroy them, because explosions only lead to further explosions, and this time among the masses.

### Departyization of Inspectors General

914B0375A Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Inspectors General Are Departyizing"]

[Text] It has become known that the CPSU party organization in the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense, referred to colloquially as "the heavenly group," was disbanded several days ago.

Since Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev's suicide, "the heavenly group" numbers 55 people. In addition to 53 well-known military commanders, it includes two civilians—L.N. Zaykov, former member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee, as well as twice the Hero of Socialist Labor S.A. Afanasyev, former USSR minister of general machine building and subsequently USSR minister of heavy and transportation machine building, who was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee.

### Destruction of CPSU Documents Reported

914B0383A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 4

[Interview with R. Pikhoy, chairman of the Committee for Archive Affairs of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, by Aleksandr Nadzharov; place and date not given: "Secrets of Party Archives: What Historians Found in the Sealed Building of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] The beginning of this episode truly smacked of a detective story. A telephone call which propelled R. Pikhoy, chairman of the Committee for Archive Affairs of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, out of his office came in at 1430 on Friday, on the very day when the premises of the CPSU Central Committee were sealed by a decision of the Moscow Soviet coordinated with the USSR president. The caller announced that destruction

of documents on a mass scale was underway there. Stacks of papers were being removed literally by the carload.

Rudolf Germanovich said: "A private Niva carrying financial documents which was stopped by Moscow volunteer detachments [druzhinniki] at the doors of the Central Committee was the first thing I saw when I came to the site in response to the alarm."

[Nadzharov] Were those important papers?

[Pikhoy] Very. However, I would like to warn that we historians are not journalists, to say nothing of investigators. When an individual with fiery eyes rushes into our place demanding that we immediately hold accountable... You see, it is our business to skillfully preserve for history the documentary evidence of the past. Everything else is up to people of other professions.

[Nadzharov] However, the public should know the truth. What is to be done about this?

[Pikhoy] We should do what is accepted throughout the world. We will gladly make the materials available to the representatives of law enforcement organs and research scientists. In a word, we will proceed as the law dictates. Incidentally, this is the work principle for archivists the world over. For example, American legislation strictly protects the interests of an individual and his privacy.

[Nadzharov] However, is this really about personal secrets in our case? After all, we are talking about the archives of an elite of the party and state bureaucracy which ruled an enormous state for three quarters of a century.

[Pikhoy] This is precisely why it is so important to preserve these documents for history. I must say that we found the archives pertaining to the leading cadres of the party, uniform party cards, the international department, the secretariats, and the administration of affairs in exemplary condition. I must also say that the employees of these archives, many of whom are assisting us now, are top-notch specialists whom our committee has already invited to work for us. After all, archives are generally apolitical.

[Nadzharov] I have a question for you which has been repeatedly asked on the premises where you now work under different circumstances: Do you understand where you are?

[Pikhoy] Of course, I was excited when I entered here. After all, it was the first time that historians had been given access to the mysterious current archive of the CPSU Central Committee General Department, which is known inside our community. As they say, this is where all the secrets of the party court are. However, I did not experience any sacred trepidation. After all, we did not find until later that most of the documents were excellently preserved. At first, I saw carpeted corridors which were literally fouled up with torn and shredded papers. We could see that this building was abandoned in

a haste bordering on the indecent... Think about it: If you are involved in a worthy endeavor, why conceal this, why hustle, and tear up paper?

[Nadzharov] This means that there were things to hide.

[Pikhoy] Indeed. I found discarded analytical memos sent to the Communist Party of Russia Central Committee on the floor in a corridor. You know, in this case it was difficult to keep the traditional cool of a scientist. Respectable, "degreed" people with academic titles gave advice on how to fight political adversaries, wishing to please the main customer. For example, they played the long worn-out record about a "drunken" Yeltsin and referred to other abominations. Nobody was in a position to coerce them to do this. Therefore, I absolutely cannot attribute such actions to anything but servile dedication. I will only add that in general, this, shall we say, feature was characteristic of all materials of the RSFSR Communist Party.

[Nadzharov] Could you give us some specific examples?

[Pikhoy] I am looking at a certain Statement by Social and Political Forces and National-Patriotic Movements for a Single and Indivisible Russia. This document is dated 27 February of this year and is a forerunner of the notorious GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] statement and "Word to the People." It is written in the same pretentious style. In particular, it begins with the words: "The cup of our suffering and torment has overflowed!..."

[Nadzharov] Who was tormented the most?

[Pikhoy] Still the same people: Bondarev, Petrushenko, Starodubtsev... Endorsements by Yanayev's former Committee for Youth Organizations and a certain association "Young People for the Rebirth of Culture and the Motherland" are also found on the document.

[Nadzharov] We now know what these "patriots" dreamed of restoring, and we also know where their fiery appeals were put into words. However, what use is it, given that, as one of the greats said, the main lesson of history is that humanity learns no lessons from it?

[Pikhoy] Klyuchevskiy said just as justifiably: The lessons of history mean nothing only to those who do not know history. We should know how to preserve documents in order to really know history. Right now work is beginning on incorporating a tremendous and previously unknown stock of documents into our public life. A "Berlin Wall" of sorts has also come down here. This is remarkable because what kind of equality is it when some can look at archives and others cannot.

Democracy is when you cannot conceal anything.

#### **A. Nevzorov Shown To Have Had CPSU Apartment**

*PM0909155791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 1*

[Report from INTERFAX, RIA, TASS roundup: "Brief Line"]

[Text] Documents showing that Aleksandr Nevzorov received an apartment from the housing stock of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee] have been discovered among papers found by the prosecutor's office in the Smolnyy office of Obkom Second Secretary Belov.

#### **TV Claim of Ousting of CPSU Apartment Complex Guards Denied**

*PM1009131591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 91 Single Edition p 1*

[Untitled report by unnamed correspondent]

[Text] A news story carried on television alleged that, having fallen out with Moscow City Hall over the comfortable apartments of the former CPSU Central Committee, the Russian authorities ordered their militia to rid the premises of "alien" security guards.

Yesterday our correspondent checked this information. T. Karanvanskiy, military commandant of the former Central Committee complex, informed him that this is a lie. A simple changing of the guard had occurred.

#### **Gorbachev, Yeltsin Discuss Chernobyl's Consequences**

*LD0609105791 Moscow TASS in English 1029 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow September 6 TASS—Early Friday morning, the Soviet Central Television network beamed a live broadcast from St. George Hall of the Kremlin, with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russia's President Boris Yeltsin appearing jointly and answering questions from TV audiences in nine U.S. cities. ABC's mobile TV station was located at New York's Brighton Beach, an area inhabited mainly by Russian-speaking people.

This was the two leaders' first joint appearance before U.S. television audiences after the USSR people's deputies' congress that had ended on Thursday.

Asked about Chernobyl, Gorbachev said: "The problem of Chernobyl and its consequences turned out to be very complex. Many things that we did not expect cropped up."

A special programme is now being elaborated in the Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia. It is being united into an all-Union programme and is included in the Kremlin budget, Gorbachev said.

The prime problem, that of Chernobyl kids, has been singled out. It is a question of ruling out the stay of children in the Chernobyl zone. The second problem is the provision of food, he added.

The country's president assured that everything possible is being done to monitor the situation in this respect, and thanked all those who helped and continue to help Chernobyl victims, emphasising that all aid supplies coming from abroad in various form are channeled to children, in the first place.

However, as Gorbachev remarked bitterly, not everything is fine from the viewpoint of medical monitoring of children's health. "Nevertheless we take care of this and do everything possible for our rising generation", he said.

In response to a question about the possibility of a recurrence of a situation when the Soviet people and the world were told by no means everything about the Chernobyl accident, Gorbachev admitted that "not the whole truth was revealed". This is inadmissible, the president of the USSR stressed.

Yeltsin added that there had been not only the Chernobyl disaster but also that in Chelyabinsk in 1957 when a radioactive discharge occurred there. That the tragedy was concealed from the people is a crime, of course, he said.

"We are now taking measures to minimise the consequences, since it is impossible to eliminate them fully after the passage of more than 30 years," Yeltsin said.

### **Gorbachev Greets Free Enterprise Workers' Congress**

*LD1009211791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 10 Sep 91*

[Text] The second congress of the All-Union Confederation of Trade Unions of Workers of Cooperatives and other forms of free enterprise opened in Moscow today.

The congress received a greeting from USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The greeting expressed confidence that with the expansion of denationalization and the privatization of property, the role and the share of free enterprise in the country's economy in resolving social problems and improving the people's life will grow.

The congress delegates are to discuss the tasks of the trade union in stepping up the protection of the rights

and interests of workers of the non-state sector of the economy. They will adopt renewed rules of the confederation.

### **Moscow Businessmen Form Commission To Trace CPSU Money**

*LD0809190691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1530 GMT 8 Sep 91*

[Text] The Moscow convention of businessmen has set up a commission which is to trace CPSU money placed abroad. According to preliminary information, the party has up to \$100 billion abroad. This information also comes from the weekly KOMMERSANT.

### **Labor Collectives Appeal for CPSU Ban**

*914A1144A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 31 Aug 91 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "To Learn the Lesson. The Inter-Republic Union of Labor Collectives Issues an Appeal"]

[Text] The reactionary mutiny did not stand. The threat of restoring an undisguised dictatorship is no more, but it is necessary to draw conclusions from it in order to act more effectively and in a more coordinated manner in our daily pursuits and in extreme situations, says the appeal. Its authors called on labor collectives to demand that the CPSU be banned and dissolved, and that the KGB organs cease operations at enterprises, under the USSR Law on Public Associations.

To insist that Article 9 of the USSR Law on Procedures for Settling Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts) which declared political strikes to be illegal, be immediately repealed.

To recreate, as soon as possible, councils of labor collectives at enterprises, proceeding from RSFSR laws and Ukases [plural as published] No. 66 of the RSFSR President, dated 20 August 1991, "On Assuring the Economic Basis of RSFSR Sovereignty." To disband the councils of enterprises and to repeal enterprise charters functioning on the basis of Union laws.

The appeal signed by I. Akhmetov, co-chairman of the Inter-Republic Union of Labor Collectives, and members of the Council of Representatives V. Dmitrov, V. Zhurba, V. Zdeblovski, and G. Rakitskaya says:

"To form permanent structures at enterprises (strike committees, workers committees, and so on) for preparing and organizing mass manifestations under emergency circumstances. Create regional unions of labor collectives to coordinate your actions and join vigorously in the organization of the Second Congress of the Inter-Republic Union of Labor Collectives and the work of our union.

Contact address: 119021, Moscow, 3/5 Pugovishnikov Street, Apartment 29. Telephone in Moscow: 246-96-61.

### Interethnic Situation Contributed to Coup

91US0757A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 91  
Union Edition p 4

[Leonid Kapelyushnyy article: "The Putsch, Blood, and National Awareness"]

[Text] Many of the promises made by the junta to the people were attractive. Perhaps the most important was to put an end to the present civil war. For, say what you will, blood is being spilt—much blood—in Karabakh, the Baltics, Ossetia, and other places where combat actions have been reported. But did you think about how the State Committee for the State of Emergency could have brought the order it promised? With new ukases? Ultimatums? Talk and persuasion? Or, without further ado, would it have pacified the refractory groups with various kinds of special troops?

Regrettable though it may be, in each specific place, wherever the bloodshed takes place across the broad areas of undeclared war, it has as its basis interethnic dissension. And interethnic dissension is the growth of national self-awareness, national rebirth, and historical grievances. If we go further, we find that the blame for the entire process of democratization of society was born out of perestroika and M.S. Gorbachev personally. For it was he who gave the nationals the freedom to speak and act, was it not?

During the coup I happened to be in Siberia, and like millions of others I did not know the true scale of the putsch nor the truth about its development. On the one hand, incidentally, this was even a good thing. In this tragic situation each person acted on the dictates of his own conscience and convictions. The chairman of the Irkutsk Oblast Executive Committee, Yuriy Nozhikov, stated from the first moments that the State Committee for the State of Emergency was not being recognized by the executive committee, and it was decided not to publish the junta's instructions in the local press but to be subordinate only to Russia. I emphasize this—right from the first moments, while he still did not know that this tragic page would have a happy ending. And from the very first, most of the Siberians rushed to telephone all the Union republics to ascertain their attitudes toward the replacement of the president and the sharp turn toward "iron order." In the national republics that had found their sovereignty and independence thanks to Gorbachev's policy, the cabinets and the parliaments went into session, there were sharp clashes, and time was measured from the 0900 on 19 August mark when B. Yeltsin, I. Silayev, and R. Khasbulatov signed the appeal "To the Citizens of Russia."

The process of democratization in such an enormous country as ours is not the sum of democratic transformations in the oblasts, krays, and republics. It is a process. And if it slips, as, for example, in Chita or Rostov, then it slows the course for all of Russia. Gangrene cannot be confined to just "one particular finger."

National rebirth among all nations and peoples and priority of the national interest within the system of general state values constitute one of the most valuable gains of perestroika. But why, then, has this not strengthened our brotherhood into an alloy but rather weakened it? Why has it become embittered and led to bloody carnage? If we answer these bitter questions honestly we move ineluctably to a discussion of national egotism. It need not be specially cultivated; it is like the plague microbe—it never disappears. All it needs is for one republic to announce that it will not share its own national boiled sausage that it itself produces (for sausage read coal, oil, metal, gold, machine tools, and so forth), and a chain reaction starts across the country from the Pacific to the Baltic. They refused to share tracts of lands; the result—carnage. They failed to agree on borders; the result—fighting. They started with the revival of national anthems and flags and have advanced to customs and blockades and the narrow pedantry of cavemen.

Perhaps the most tragic delusion of the national democracies is that none of them have the patience to disentangle to terrible knot of problems and contradictions—economic, social, political, moral—together. The train has scarcely pulled out of the station of Dictatorship and started to pick up speed as it sets off for the as yet unseen station of Democracy, is still dark and cold inside, before in every car they start to suspect that their neighbors are warmer, more comfortable, have more light. And as they look out at the hairpin bends and the loops ahead on the track they are seized with a alluring desire to jump of and shorten the route.

And so we jump. And we break our legs.

Interethnic enmity is the nutrient medium for conservatives and the secret and open supporters of dictatorship and the Moloch of the military-industrial complex. It has been and will always be a means to frighten normal people. As an experienced puppeteer makes the puppets dance on the screen, so the shadowy antidemocratic structures struggling for power (or holding power) and the national leaders of the brown-shirt type skillfully play on the sacred, pure, and sincere feelings of the nationals. It is so obvious, so unbelievably simple, that it is difficult to believe.

Write down the black days of bloodshed in the country during the years of perestroika and compare them with events both at home and abroad. If you do this you will find a strange pattern—blood is shed when the train bound for the station of Democracy gathers speed. The signing of the new Union treaty set the signal to Go for a very long stage between stations, and their nerves could not stand it—they made themselves known. They came out from the cellar.

There in Siberia, during the first tense hours of the coup I waited eagerly and anxiously; who after Russia would reject having the junta wielding power over him? Reject



it decisively and without smooth, diplomatic murmuring of what was being said. Alas!...

In one republic that has been bombastically proud of its own loyalty to democracy, they announced that the coup in the USSR was "another state's problem." Some leaders openly supported the junta, others reasoned that we really should not have a state of emergency.... One clear thing was clear: The tandem of the Ministry of Defense and the Committee for State Security, together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, did not have enough tanks to move simultaneously to all the cities. But as soon as the "White House" in Moscow fell, the junta would move quickly to get "an oath of allegiance" from the rest. And as for that "other state," they introduced a state of emergency there without asking the permission of the legally elected authorities, and it is not difficult to imagine what would have happened if Russia had not stood firm.

We were condemned by history to live in a single empire until the advent of perestroika. Not that the empire would always exist, they always collapse sooner or later. We were waiting for the collapse of ours for so long that now, perhaps, we still do not really understand that as such the empire no longer exists. The walls have been brought down. What is left for us is to extricate ourselves together from the ruins. Extricate ourselves, not by pushing each other away, not by causing the collapse of

the bastions that have remained standing. As we move out of the danger zone it will be possible to resolve the main question, namely, whether to move forward together or separately...

The ideas of totalitarianism in different colors are often attractive and hold complete sway over the masses. The building of a national, sovereign state is undoubtedly a matter that is noble and pure and deserves the support of democracy. But there is one condition, namely, that henceforth national sovereignty is also established for the individual, the person. Then no blood will be spilled. No idea exists that is worth even one life. Everything can be resolved in a year, or five, or 10—where the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan will be, and between Georgia and Ossetia, and whether or not Lithuania will remain in the Union. But it will not be possible to bring the dead back from the grave...

We have all learned a terrible and bitter lesson from the junta. It cost us more blood. Now the crime against the person is free of the "national coloring" with which it was tinted in Tbilisi and Vilnius, even though events unfolded according to a very similar scenario. We will foster new reasons and pretexts for the hidden dictators to move into the attack if we do not sober up.

If we do not understand that we are all of one blood.

## TV Reports Interior Minister Meeting Counterparts

LD0609035591

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1847 GMT on 5 September carries an edition of the "According to the USSR Interior Ministry Reports" program. The program begins with a video report about the first working meeting of republican interior ministers under the chairmanship of USSR Interior Minister Barannikov, which was held "last week" to discuss the cooperation between them.

Barannikov said that in the aftermath of the coup attempt, "I think that we must overcome as soon as possible the contradictions that exist between the former center [corrects himself] I should not say between the former center and the republics—you are very well aware that there should be no talk at all about a center of the sort that existed previously, before those events, because the situation today has greatly altered. The political situation has altered today. Let me say frankly that democracy came to the fore during those three days." Barannikov adds that the task of combatting crime remains paramount. He cites data on rising crime levels, particularly involving firearms.

The presenter notes the topics discussed at the meeting and that models of weapons were demonstrated to the participants.

Clips are shown of speeches by the Kyrgyz, Latvian, acting Armenian, and acting Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic interior ministers commenting on the future role of the USSR Interior Ministry.

The presenter notes that in the future "the USSR Interior Ministry should not lead but should provide a professional service to its colleagues. A considerable proportion of the functions of the Union Interior Ministry should go to the republics. Independent of the political processes taking place in the country and in the republics, all the participants in the meeting demonstrated professional solidarity and the readiness to work together to combat crime, which recognizes no borders or nationalities."

## KGB Official on KGB Image, Future

AU0609142591 Vienna SALTO in German  
6 Sep 91 p 3

[Michael Wengraf report: "Behind the Walls of the KGB"]

[Text] Vladimir Fadeyevich Maslenikov is frowning. He is worried. "Unfortunately, the latest events have been a great setback. Our work has become much more complicated," he says. It is not difficult to believe him, because Comrade Maslenikov is deputy head of the Public Relations Department of the Soviet State Security Committee, in short, the KGB.

An intelligence service that cultivates its image—is this not rare? "Correct, absolutely correct! However, recently we have paid great attention to these things. Now, unfortunately, the prestige of the Committee has reached its absolute low point." One can see that the colonel feels a bit cheated of the fruits of his public relations work; at the moment the company is not prospering at all.

Only when he starts speaking about his department's next plans and projects does Maslenikov's face gain a bit of color. Surrounded by seven telephones—one of them the government line—he now looks imposing. It is even planned to publish a special KGB newspaper. No, no—it is not supposed to be a technical brochure. It is, much rather, intended also to publish belletristics—for instance literary descriptions of the lives of our scouts. Maslenikov also sees another trump card for his journal: "Of course our archives contain materials that would be interesting for any newspaper; you can believe me." Of course, we believe him.

## Most Did Routine Work

In addition the Public Relations Department wants to organize exhibitions, documentation volumes, news conferences, and meetings with people in schools, universities, and enterprises. A KGB Museum for selected visitors already exists. It opened its doors for SALTO. In short, the goal is, Maslenikov says, rubbing his hands, to make the KGB an open organization that is close to the people in various ways.

In certain ways the KGB has always lived up to these ideas. The Committee has always been a "popular" organization in the sense that people were passionately interested in its work. Of course, there are tangible reasons for the even greater interest at the moment. As the new chief, Vadim Bakatin, said in his first internal speech in the house in Dzerzhinskiy Square, part of the KGB leadership was involved in the coup.

However, Maslenikov assures us, the overwhelming majority of the employees reacted very calmly to the events. "Most worked on their actual tasks during these days," he says cryptically, and immediately adds: "That is, on combating drug trafficking and crime." Of course, they were shocked by the emotions—and the term emotion is too weak—of the crowds in Dzerzhinskiy Square. "We seriously considered negotiating with the people if the building were stormed."

This is probably a theory that was considered only as a precaution, because the KGB headquarters seems invincible. A fortress with all imaginable security measures. The windows are high up, slanted, and covered by bars. All entrances have locks and behind them there is one centimeter-thick bullet-proof glass. The strategic points can be defended easily. From the inside, this feared house seems rather sober, like all office buildings. The walls are covered with panelling, the floors of the corridors with carpets. The only remarkable thing is that the elevator has buttons only for the first and the third floors. All "colleagues" whom we see are excellently

dressed and do not seem restrained in any way because of us. "Misha, I put a 'strictly confidential' document on your desk," somebody shouts along the corridor. Misha is not disturbed. He slowly continues to shuffle toward the elevator, the door to his office remains open.

### Split Also Ran Through the KGB

Everything seems to run along a well-worn groove, one hardly feels any fear of existence. "As regards the KGB, I must say that, unfortunately no state can do without an intelligence service; we will be needed in the future, too," Vladimir Fadeyevich Maslenikov believes. Bakatin, too, explicitly stressed: "The security of the country must be guaranteed as in the past." In addition, the current number one strengthens his colleagues' backbones: "One should not submit to mourning and defeat now. No one must slander all of the KGB members and stage a witch hunt."

In fact, there were probably different attitudes in the KGB during the putsch. Examples of that are the Russian KGB department, which immediately joined Yeltsin, and the Alpha Group. The latter is a highly specialized antiterrorist unit, which was ordered to storm the Moscow "White House." They refused and thus perhaps ended the power struggle. The decision was made by individual department heads of the Alpha Group together with the crews. The upper-echelon leaders limited themselves so as not to exert any pressure to force them to obey the order. For such professionals it would hardly have been a problem to carry out the order successfully. However, they would have caused a blood-bath and perhaps initiated a civil war.

As regards the rest of the KGB team, it supported the coup rather cohesively, among whose architects there also was their "nachalnik" [boss] Kryuchkov. Nevertheless, the putschists completely misjudged the balance of power in the country. Showing a lack of knowledge on the part of the company? Colonel Maslenikov receives this question with obvious ill humor.

One cannot see this in such a simple way, he says, and places both arms on his extremely clean desk. "We must distinguish between the leadership's plan and what happened in reality." Certainly, many things did not happen synchronously. "However, the change in power also failed because the KGB members and their mental attitude have greatly changed over the past few years." However, he, Maslenikov, does not want to "wave fists after the brawl." A Russian proverb, which means talking big and bragging.

Better safe than sorry is what the political rulers think and do not trust alone in the ennobled mental attitude of the KGB officials. As a first measure the KGB was deprived of its troop contingents—including the Alpha Group—and control over them was given to the Defense Ministry and the president. The same goes for the border troops and various guard troops, who had to ensure the safety of state dignitaries. "There will certainly also be organizational redistributions and, closely linked with

that, personnel changes in the leadership," Vladimir Maslenikov announces, because Vadim Bakatin already said: "It is now clear that the former KGB will never again exist in its previous form."

The old KGB thus is a thing of the past. It is history, which makes the deputy head of the Public Relations Department come back to one of his pet projects: "We are cooperating with foreign film and television companies. An Italian company has already declared its readiness to make a movie about the history of the KGB. The action is to start in the mid-1920's and reach up to the present," Colonel Vladimir Fadeyevich Maslenikov says with tangible self-satisfaction.

### The Troops Are Now Gone

Some imitation James Bond film perhaps? "No, no!" He is thinking of something completely different: "A belletristic, literary view of real events."

### 'Overzealous' Fraud Squad Raids Scored

PM1009154391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Sep 91 Union Edition p 3

[S. Taranov article: "Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department Major Still More Frightening Than General Pugo"]

[Text] Real investigators work without sleep or rest. At 2100 hours 30 August, when all the employees at the "Nadezhda" state commercial firm (22, Kiev Street, Moscow) had gone home, a group of staffers from the Moscow Oblast Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department and the Oktyabrskaya Rayon Internal Affairs Administration headed by Major Stashevskiy began storming the office.

Inside behind a heavy door two militiamen from 75th Precinct were on duty. They had no intention of welcoming their unexpected colleagues, believing that without a prosecutor's search warrant it would not be very proper to examine other people's property in the absence of any of the "Nadezhda" leaders. However, this unexpected opposition only served to motivate the attackers. Somebody ran for the cop posted in the 75th Precinct along with the defenders of the office. His arguments did not work. Threats were then made that...grenades would be used to blow the door. Finally, around 10 o'clock, the door was opened. The defenders were put up against the wall and disarmed.

The "mafia" fighters worked until 0200. They smashed open doors, safes, and cupboards. Valuable documents were thrown on the floor, presses were thrown out into the corridor. And all this in order to find 12 deeds, invoices, and a contract relating to a single deal (and "Nadezhda" does dozens of deals a day). The papers were confiscated without copies being left for the firm and with no mention of the confiscation in the inspection protocol (it is now indeed called an "inspection"). Following this resolute investigative action the office

found itself missing a fax machine, photocopier, four Japanese telephones, and a Sanyo TV set. There are no grounds for alleging that this expensive equipment was purloined by Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department officers. But it is also true that the imported office equipment was in place until 2100 hours 30 August.

The losses from the subsequent inactivity (the firm is now virtually at a standstill, and its general director fled, thinking that he would be arrested first and asked questions later) run into hundreds of thousands.

At midday the same day Maj. Stashevskiy's search team sealed the premises along with that of one of the "Nadezhda" partners—the "Viktoriya" nongovernmental charitable foundation (8/10 Dobryninskiy Lane, Moscow). Admittedly, nothing was found or confiscated there. But no search warrant was produced and no protocol drawn up...

Another "Nadezhda" partner—the "Fantaziya" branch of the "Serveko" Soviet-Swiss enterprise—was also visited by the law enforcement officers. But they left empty-handed. The branch director stated that Stashevskiy's group should be shot for its overzealous investigations.

But the excesses continue.

This is the case throughout the country, wherever the relationship between business and the guardians of the law is determined merely by the persistent idiocy of endless checks, inspections, and searches. And, after all, each time the investigators cite...the law. The very law: "On the Soviet Militia" which was cherished by Boris Pugo.

Few people know that back on 5 July 1991 the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, having examined at its own initiative the question of the correlation between the Union Constitution and international acts of the law "On the Soviet Militia," admitted that the powers granted to the militia in monitoring entrepreneurial activity **do not fully** correspond to constitutional provisions. In other words, they are unconstitutional. But the most important point is that the aforesaid absurdities of the law on the militia "**become null and void from the moment this conclusion is adopted**"—that is, as of 5 July 1991.

Two months have passed. But the militia is still on its high horse, smashing things up as if no conclusion had been reached. Most probably because the recently deceased putschist of internal affairs Pugo was not inclined to amend a law which might have been specially created for state of emergency conditions. Let us recall that on the very first day of the coup—19 August—most commercial enterprises' accounts were frozen and goods depots sealed. That is another reason why businesses big and small came to the White House barricades without a second thought.

Today everyone is fighting alone, as usual. But they should not get used to it. After all, it was not some time in the past but February of this year that 35 computers were stolen from the "Viktoriya" Foundation. The tough investigator suspected that the foundation had stolen them from itself, and in the name of the law impounded (for a whole month) the remaining 30 machines. The foundation suffered a loss of 2 million; the theft, of course, has still not been investigated. Merely a four-line apology has been received from the Oktyabrskiy Rayon senior assistant prosecutor.

And that is the end of the matter. Keep working, citizen businessmen. Until the next raid.

### **Murder, Suicide Statistics in USSR**

*OW0509143691 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1300 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to data obtained from the press center of the RSFSR Interior Ministry, 93,000 people died a tragic death in the USSR last year.

The experts say murder and suicide rates have always been high in this country, and significantly above the figures shown by the highly industrialized countries.

In the 1970s the number of murders and suicides in the USSR showed a tendency to slowly decline. After 1980 it went steeply up again.

In the first half of this year alone, 16,000 Soviet people were murdered, and twice as many committed suicide. There were several times more men than women among these people.

In men's group, 90 percent of murders and 80 percent of suicides are committed by pre-pensioners. There are slightly over 50 percent of pensioners among women. Murder and suicide rates vary from region to region, with the RSFSR, Kyrgyzstan and Estonia showing the highest forcible death rates (26-27 per 100,000). The lowest indicators are in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics—3-6 per 100,000.

### **Market Economy Seen as Incentive for Narcotics Mafia**

*91US0748A Moscow KRASNATYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 13 Aug 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by V. Ostrovskiy: "Will the Drug Traffic's Base of Operations Be Cut Back?"]

[Text] Among the letters to the editors are several requesting coverage of the struggle to combat the international drug traffic. We invite the attention of those concerned to the following article by international correspondent V.I. Ostrovskiy who has been studying this problem.

In the mid-1960's, according to the files of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics [and Dangerous Drugs], there were approximately 58,000 known drug addicts in the United States, and unofficial estimates put them at a few hundred thousand. The number today is believed to be about 10 million. This increase is not only dangerous; it is disastrous for the nation, particularly in view of increasing ties between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations.

A realization of this fact has reached the White House. George Bush has announced a national strategy for the war on drugs. Substantial changes have been made in anti-drug laws in effect since 1970, as a result of which fines have risen, on the average, tenfold. Strengthening criminal penalties, however, for the procurement, manufacture, or sale of illicit drugs (20 years in prison, fines up to \$250,000, or both) have done little to change the clandestine drug traffic.

A considerable amount of research abroad has demonstrated by now that the measures taken by government law enforcement agencies affect drug abusers but have little impact on the pushers and distributors. The bosses of the drug business, who are rarely drug abusers themselves, remain for the most part beyond the reach of criminal sanctions. American lawmakers nevertheless have opted to introduce new repressive measures. In 1986 a law was passed to curb the abuse of addictive drugs with sentences increased to life in prison, and with fines increased to \$4 million in the case of individuals and \$10 million in the case of corporate bodies. A noteworthy detail: Vehicles seized during enforcement operations (cars and airplanes for the most part) are normally taken over by the organizations leading the war against the drug overlords.

The drug problem also has Western Europe in its grip. According to the Reuter news agency, the "white death" last year killed 1,000 persons in Germany, 965 in Italy, 400 in England and Wales, and 318 in France. Moreover, the death rate of narcotic addicts is rising year by year; for the narcotics entering the drug market "are of the highest quality and purity—without adulterants." This information comes from the police in Bonn.

The drug business is acquiring a progressively international character, and measures taken by each country to combat it separately cannot uproot this criminal enterprise in its entirety. Only concerted efforts by the world community can exert a perceptible impact on a type of criminal enterprise that recognizes no national boundaries. That is why the United Nations adopted the International Convention to Combat the Illegal Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Drugs in 1988. The law is designed to add international legal safeguards for curbing the illegal drug traffic; to ensure mandatory penalties for criminals; to provide for the seizure of illegal assets; and to promote international cooperation in this area between law enforcement agencies of the various countries.

Our country signed this convention in January 1989 and ratified it early last year. The terms of the convention are consistent with international law. To comply fully with its provisions, however, it was necessary for the USSR Supreme Soviet to incorporate a number of revisions and amendments into our legal statutes. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs estimates that as of last fall 1.5 million people in the Soviet Union either used or had tried illicit drugs, and that 67.2 percent of this number were citizens under 30 years of age. Experts estimate the gross turnover of the illegal traffic in marijuana or "grass" [zelye] to be R3 billion annually.

Last fall when the Paris charter for the new Europe was signed, participating member states of the European Common Market pledged themselves to joint efforts to curb the flow of illicit drugs. This declaration is of importance not only in and of itself. Its text, which is of the utmost importance for our future, provides the sole legal grounds available to our continent in combating the "white death." Similar provisions form an essential part of the economic accord signed by the Group of Seven recently in London. "We are combining our efforts to curb the flow of cocaine," the participants at the London conference announced, "and we intend to focus increased attention on the distribution of heroin, which continues to be the principal potent drug of abuse in Europe and Asia." They consider it essential simultaneously to interdict the passage of heroin into Europe and to step up cooperative efforts to halt the production of heroin in Asia.

The heads of the seven powers also called attention to the fact that the political transformations that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe, and the consequent opening of frontiers in the region, have served to facilitate the illegal distribution of drugs. At the same time, however, broader opportunities have been created for organizing joint efforts by the countries of Europe to combat this evil. The Group of Seven called upon all countries to take part in an international campaign against the laundering of "dirty" money and to cooperate with the efforts of a special working group dealing with financial matters. The document provides for a series of measures to coordinate efforts of the international community to counter this type of criminal activity.

In a recent conversation with Colonel S. M. Volokhov, one of the leaders of the USSR KGB Department for Anti-Smuggling Operations, discussing the economic declaration of the Group of Seven and the implementation of comparable efforts in the Soviet Union to combat illicit drugs, I learned that our state security organs are in complete accord with the substance of this part of the declaration. Our law enforcement agencies undoubtedly support the proposals contained in this section of the declaration. It is heartening because it assures businesslike cooperation in the broadest sense of the word between Soviet law enforcement agencies and counterpart organizations in other countries. I am reminded of a

comment reported as long as a year ago in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE that American intelligence services were interested in maintaining close coordination with their USSR counterparts in joint efforts against international drug trafficking, terrorism, and other dangerous crimes. This makes sense.

The drug mafia are trying to clear a corridor through our country for the transit of narcotics from Southeast Asia into Europe. In just the last six months organs of the KGB, working jointly with customs authorities, broke up 25 attempts by smugglers to carry narcotics across the border on airplanes as well as on trains. During this same period they seized 11,144,000 Soviet rubles, 3.5 million rubles' worth of foreign exchange currency, and gold worth another 6.5 million rubles. They also foiled an attempt to bring into the country pearls worth about R6 million. At the same time, they broke up the operations of several dozen criminal gangs, including some engaged in manufacturing drugs. These operations were carried out in close coordination with law enforcement agencies in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the FRG.

Soviet citizens who work in state security agencies, customs services, and border operations are well aware that so long as the ruble is not convertible, international traffickers will not be overly interested in bringing narcotics into our territory. Here, a single gram is much cheaper than it is in the United States or Western Europe. But the transition to the market system of economic management and the conversion of the soviet ruble into convertible currency is going to transform the domestic clandestine drug market into a tempting proving ground for international drug cartels. It is extremely important for us to be armed and ready at this stage. This means that from now on, no matter what ruses the emissaries of the drug trade may contrive, we must not allow illicit drugs to cross the Soviet border either for import or export.

#### **Growth of Narcobusiness in Russia Outlined**

91US0748B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 7

[Article by Viktor Romanchin under the rubric: "Operation Poppy: It Will Be More Dreadful Here Than in Colombia"]

[Text] Now from the Northern Caucasus to the Far East as the opium and cannabis crop begins to ripen, the dealers of the drug business are converging on these regions. Immense forces are arrayed against those who collect and prepare the drugs for market. The bulletins from the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs sound like combat communiques. Raids by MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] forces and militia, helicopter sorties, roadblocks, internecine disputes over spheres of influence, bursts of automatic weapons, and murders—all this is going on not in far-off Colombia but here in Russia.

"According to available information," says Major General of Militia Yu. Ostakhov, who heads a detachment of the service for combating drug abuse within the RSFSR MVD Criminal Division, "as of today about five tons of plants containing narcotics have already been removed from circulation and several hundred criminal cases have been instituted. Meanwhile, drug abuse is inundating the republic. And it is becoming increasingly difficult to combat."

Today in Russia, wild-growing cannabis alone occupies more than a hundred thousand hectares. There are not enough militia forces to keep such a vast area under control. Because of interethnic conflicts, the number of MVD military personnel assigned to Operation Poppy has been reduced. Yet the battle goes on. Right now in Krasnodar Kray alone there are 704 members of the militia on active duty together with 509 representatives of local soviets and agronomists, more than 90 vehicles and military helicopters, and 23 sniffer dogs. There is even a satellite in space to detect illicit crops of opium and cannabis. On the other hand...

"Even the most repressive measures cannot intimidate those who cultivate the illicit crops," says Yu. Ostakhov. "There is too much profit. It is estimated that for every ruble invested, one can make a profit of a 1,000 percent."

During the period of large-scale harvesting, the primary mission is to try to destroy as much of the poppy and cannabis crop as possible. For the most part, however, the militia is equipped with no more than scythes and tractors. How, for example, are 40,000 hectares to be cut down in Buratiya and Tuva alone? Burn them and plow them under?

Nor is science able to help. Unfortunately, so far, scientists have been unable to devise an effective means of destroying the crops that contain psychoactive substances.

An analysis of the information received from the militia attests to the fact that there has been a significant increase over the past year in the number of illegal opium poppy and cannabis crops found in remote sites as well as in local garden plots. During the first two months of Operation Poppy, a total of 644 cases of illegal narcotic plantings were detected in five regions of the republic alone. These regions are as follows: Dagestan, Krasnodar Kray, and Rostov, Belgorod, and Orlov oblasts.

The geographical area for the cultivation and sale of narcotics is growing. The Internal Affairs Administration of the Magadan Oblast Executive Committee arrested a local criminal ring that had gone into the Chuyskiy Valley. There they produced several dozen kilos of marijuana, and subsequently smuggled it successfully into Magadan.

The drug dealers have begun to arm themselves. The same internal affairs agency in Magadan arrested a

certain Sitnikov for the sale of narcotics. When he was searched, not only five kilos of marijuana were seized but 35 RGD-5 combat grenades. Sitnikov had sold drugs to the servicemen here for the emergency in exchange for grenades. The search of Sitnikov led in turn to the seizure of a 12 mm machinegun and revolver in Izhevsk.

Another source of concern is the connection between drug abuse and other forms of crime. Thirty-eight percent of all drug abusers have prior criminal convictions. More than 30 percent of all property crimes are committed for the purpose of obtaining drugs.

An extremely dangerous prospect lies in store for us. With the passage of legislation to permit unrestricted movement back and forth across our borders, the drugs

produced here will pour rapidly out of the country. But an influx of new drugs—including heroin, "crack," and a variety of synthetic drugs—will be headed in this direction. The entire drug epidemic that afflicts the United States, Latin America, and other countries will descend upon Russia. It will be more dreadful for us than it is in Colombia; for it is obvious, at least for the time being, that we are losing the war on drug abuse. It is of the utmost importance, experts insist, that we set up as soon as possible the kind of program to combat drug abuse that we have talked about for so long. We need a branch of the republic government to coordinate the efforts of all the ministries and departments concerned and to exercise careful control over the implementation of this program. And, finally, we need to improve our laws.

**Post-Coup Investigation Encompasses Media**

*PM0909081991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
5 Sep 91 Union Edition p 8*

[V. Rudnev report under the rubric: "Three Days of the Putsch. IZVESTIYA's Investigation": "The State Committee for the State of Emergency Affair: There Are Many Suspects, Including the Mass Media"]

[Text] The editorial office has learned that in addition to targeted investigation operations—the interrogation of specific people and the confiscation of certain documents—the Russian prosecutor's office is planning an extensive operation to find and remove all documents containing, according to the directive, "instructions on the implementation of Decrees of G.I. Yanayev, acting president of the USSR, and resolutions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE)."

All Russian prosecutors will be involved in this operation. It is interesting that the prosecutors of the republics, krais, and oblasts have been instructed to pass all documents received from the USSR Prosecutor's Office to the investigation group.

On the basis of this instruction a search has already been conducted at the editorial office of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY TELEFONIST. Chief Editor Lyudmila Daynichenko tells us what happened:

"Two young investigators came to see us from the rayon prosecutor's office and presented the search warrant signed and sealed by the rayon prosecutor. It was clear that they themselves did not like having to do this job. They said that it was not on their initiative, the instructions to search came from above. People were called in to witness the search and in their presence the men took a couple of issues of the newspaper and left. I am extremely angry at what happened. The Russian general prosecutor says he is opposed to witch-hunts and then what does he do? I sent a protest about the search, which I consider absolutely unlawful, to the Union of Journalists. I appealed to the journalists.

"We have still not received any information on the course of the investigation from the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office. We have been told to wait until the next press conference, which is scheduled for 6 September."

Lukyanov's counsel, the lawyer Genrikh Padva, told the editorial office that his client still has not been charged. Lukyanov has been arrested as a suspect, which is allowed by law. In his counsel's opinion, however, the investigators chose incorrect grounds for Lukyanov's detention. Genrikh Padva has sent Russian General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov a petition for Lukyanov's immediate release.

**Journalist Comments on Coup Effect on Moscow Radio**

*LD1009123391 Hilversum Radio Netherlands  
in English 1150 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[By "Media Network" presenter Jonathan Marks]

[Text] In the aftermath of the failed coup in the Soviet Union, political developments there are continuing to grab the headlines; but with each passing day we are also gaining greater insight into the events that lead up to the coup and what actually transpired in the USSR during those three fateful days in August.

The Soviet Union's domestic media has been particularly active in examining the coup and its consequences but what's been the effect of this new-found glasnost on Radio Moscow. We contacted a journalist at Radio Moscow's North American service, Peter Neyev, and asked him about reports that the coup leaders had tried to jam foreign broadcasts. Were these reports true?

[Neyev] The reception of foreign radio stations was quite weak at this time. Some journalists and friends of mine said that they were sure there was some jamming though the new chairman of the state radio and television company, Yegor Yakovlev, said recently that there was no actual jamming at the state radio and television company. Yegor Yakovlev—he's a democrat, a very well known and famous person and his arguments are that the jamming equipment is... [changes thought] the decision to dismantle this equipment, to stop the jamming, was taken about two years ago and now the equipment is dismantled. That's his words.

[Marks] Some of those transmitters have been used to rebroadcast the programs of the republican stations in the Moscow area. It seems quite clear though that during the coup the conspirators made no attempt to restart the blanket jamming used in the Soviet Union in the pre-glasnost days. For the Soviet media the failed coup has opened up new possibilities. Peter Neyev says the appointment of Yegor Yakovlev, the former editor-in-chief of the MOSCOW NEWS weekly, as chairman of Soviet state television and radio company Gosteleradio has already had major repercussions on domestic programming.

[Neyev] It's really the fact that programming in the Soviet Union and the domestic programs became very interesting, very upbeat. There are actually people who were ousted during Kravchenko, the former chairman of the federal radio company, democratic journalists, they are really back on the television now and they are producing their own programs, very radical, very interesting programs. For example, the famous program Vzgl'yad—or Outlook—which was actually destroyed by Kravchenko some months ago, this program is back on the television.

[Marks] The new glasnost has also been felt in the national television news broadcast at 1900 hours UTC.



The newscast is being totally revamped as part of Mr Yakovlev's efforts to introduce honesty and freedom in the state media. The affects of this shakeup though don't seemed to have trickled down yet to Radio Moscow.

[Neyev] It looks like nothing really changes at Radio Moscow. During the days of the coup, the leadership of Radio Moscow and all departments of Radio Moscow, they really broadcast all documents and all things. Now Vladimir Andreyev, the deputy chairman of the state federal radio company and the head of Radio Moscow, he stays at his position. Some other chiefs, deputy chairmen of state federal radio company were dismissed and there are new people there already. Vladimir Andreyev, he remains at his post. Really I don't see any changes there. We've not had any meetings of Radio Moscow employees like they did have at the television and the radio broadcasting of the Soviet Union. The censorship is lifted now at Moscow radio, but people, journalists and chiefs, the people remain the same. That's the problem, the problem of mentality, you know. They can't in three days.

[Marks] Well, if they aren't able to change their mentalities quickly, they may soon find themselves out of a job. Soviet politicians and parliamentarians are now busy discussing the future makeup of the Union, but where does this leave the USSR's external broadcaster.

[Neyev] There were rumors that Radio Moscow will be taken by Yeltsin but the Supreme Soviet of the USSR until it exists [as heard], I think that Radio Moscow will stay as it is now. If there were a kind of confederation of republics, in this case we won't have any large-scale international broadcasting we are having now and I think it will be broadcasting of Russia.

[Marks] Well, as they say, time will tell. That was Peter Neyev of Radio Moscow's North American service.

#### **Y. Yakovlev: No More Room for Lies on TV**

*PM0909151691 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian  
8-9 Sep 91 p 4*

[Interview with State Television Director Yegor Yakovlev by Fiammetta Cucurnia; date, place not given]

[Text] Moscow—"State television must survive and cannot be broken up into so many national companies. Now that all the linchpins of ideology have disappeared and the Union is in danger of falling apart, radio and television are among the few instruments still capable of keeping it together. This is what all the leaders of the former Soviet republics are asking—especially those who now feel less strong and protected, compared to Russia."

It is with this belief that Yegor Yakovlev—former editor of perestroika's weekly, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI—accepted Mikhail Gorbachev's and Boris Yeltsin's invitation, leaving the printed page in order to take control of television, the great highway into which all the roads of a vast, disintegrating country converge.

"My aim," Yegor Yakovlev said, "is to transform television during the transitional stage to make it independent from politicians and presidents, from the economic viewpoint, too."

[Cucurnia] Mr. Yakovlev, the first thing that you did when you came to television was to abolish the old newsreel, VREMYA, even though you had no new news program to offer the public. Can you tell us why?

[Yakovlev] Of all our television broadcasts VREMYA was the most discredited, the one that had spread the most lies, that had committed the greatest sins against the nation—in connection with the Tbilisi massacre, the battle in the Baltic, and the whole of Russia. Closing down VREMYA was my way of telling the country that there is no more room for lies in television. But this is just the political aspect. Actually there is also a strictly professional aspect. Radio and television operated as absolute monopolies and could therefore decide in private what to broadcast, without taking account of society's needs. My aim now is to make the public the sole real reference point for our work.

[Cucurnia] How will the competition among journalists and viewers to choose the new USSR's television newsreel work?

[Yakovlev] The news competition is only the first step because in fact I want to introduce a number of "auctions" to transform all the programs. At my first editorial meeting I said: "As of today you are entirely free not to obey any crazy orders, no matter where from, and not to be cowardly." Of course I realize that it was all too easy to write the newsreel according to telephone calls from the Kremlin, without any reference to the country itself. And I realize that many journalists were frightened by this revolution. But I want to give everyone a chance, irrespective of what they have done hitherto. I have already asked the national newspapers to cooperate with our initiative, to gather opinions and suggestions from the public and to join the jury. This week we have broadcast news programs written by the youngest group, headed by Tanya Mitkova. This evening it will again be the turn of the team from the old VREMYA program, who have had time to prepare and to show what they can do.

[Cucurnia] So far your television "coup" has only affected the news. Are changes planned in other sectors, too?

[Yakovlev] In the future, certainly. But I think that, first, it is necessary to reform the news aspect. There will be many news programs during the day, and then in the evening we intend to offer a commentary on the day's events by such prominent figures as Mayor of Moscow Popov, former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, or former Gorbachev aide Aleksandr Yakovlev.

[Cucurnia] This week Soviet television has already organized two world broadcast interviews with Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin in association

with the American networks, CNN and ABC. Is this the start of a new television policy?

[Yakovlev] It is. I want to extend as far as possible cooperation with Western television companies, both in connection with interviews and in the production of various programs. For instance, we are already seeking a partner for a series of programs titled: "The arrival of a new state on the world political map." But for all this to be possible it is necessary to create right away a new structure that will guarantee freedom and objectivity of information. The August coup showed that journalists in our country have such limited access to information that it is very easy to mislead them. So we will establish a "council of guarantors" comprising 10 people well known and respected throughout the country that will, by virtue of their name and position, take on the task of protecting the objectivity of radio and television. Basically, it will be a supreme court of information, which will have the final word if a lack of objectivity is suspected.

[Cucurnia] As far as films, sport, music, and soaps are concerned, do you intend to buy them in the West, thus starting a certain standardization of the market? Or will "Dallas" long remain the only serial to cross the USSR's borders?

[Yakovlev] I believe that we will have to wait a while yet for such projects. We lack money. I am not even sure of the size of the budget of this vast entirely state-subsidized television mechanism, which employs over 20,000 people. First, I would like to organize a series of programs on post-capitalist societies. This, because the vast majority of Soviet citizens have been taught the Marxist concepts of capitalism as a horned devil. I want people to really understand what life is like in the West, without idealizations, but with a certain degree of objectivity, explaining what social guarantees exist in your countries, how people become millionaires, or how accumulated capital is invested. I hope that colleagues abroad will help us.

[Cucurnia] So will there be no private channels?

[Yakovlev] As things stand, this is impossible. Moscow and St. Petersburg will have their own independent channel. Russia has already asked for channel two and half of channel four, which used to be for schools programs. The Union—whatever form it may take—is left with one and a half channels. That is too little to consider subdivisions. The priority is to launch economic and commercial activity, as a source of finance, and then political activity. This, because we cannot talk in terms of independence and objectivity as long as the state subsidizes all television activity.

#### **Politizdat Seeks Registration, Renamed 'Epokha'**

*PM1009143591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Sep 91 Union Edition p 3*

[Vl. Arsenyev report: "No More Politizdat. Now It Is 'Epokha'"]

[Text] One of the country's oldest publishing houses—the Political Publishing House [Politizdat]—has come to the end of its 73-year history. The labor collective has decided to start its new life with a new name—"Epokha."

But there are difficulties. Following the RSFSR president's well-known decree, which suspended the activity of institutions under the jurisdiction of the CPSU Central Committee, all the former Politizdat's accounts were frozen. By the time the decree was published the labor collective had already rejected its founder and announced the creation of an independent state publishing house. But even this fact did not help it to easily and painlessly enter its new life. The statutes and documents necessary for registering the new publishing house have been with the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and the Mass Media since 26 August. So far without progress.

What next? As Deputy Chief Editor Aleksandr Soskin put it, the publishing house is not stopping work and hopes that the former Politizdat workers' initiative will be approved by the Russian ministry. He is probably right to believe that the existing stable links—not with the CPSU Central Committee (as far as I can tell, nobody here is sad about that split) but with paper-making combines and a circle of writers including eminent journalists and translators—should not be broken at one fell swoop.

We would recall that in the past few years the Politizdat has published several very noteworthy and valuable books. One of these—"The Twilight of the Gods," including works by Nietzsche, Freud, and Fromm—was the publishing event of the year. Works by N. Berdyayev were also published, as were the books of F. Kafka, including "Letters to Milena" and the novel "Amerika" previously unpublished in this country. Currently in production are the collection "Russian Ideas," an anthology of Russian emigre poetry, L. Tolstoy's "Reading Circle," and the highly popular "Economics" textbook of the market economy by McConnell and Brue of the United States. L. Abalkin's book "Wasted Opportunity. Eighteen Months in Government" [Neispolzovanny shans. Poltora Goda v Pravitelstve] is being prepared for publication.

Moods among the publishing house's workers differ. Some are disappointed about the assumption that party book publishers and small printing houses will possibly be sold to individuals. Nonetheless, yet another general meeting has been held at which Aleksandr Polyakov, director of the former Politizdat, was elected leader of "Epokha." His powers will be confirmed by the ministry. The publishing house's bank account was unfrozen 4 September. Life, it seems, goes on.

**USSR Union of Journalists Renamed, Discusses  
Coup Attempt***LD0709013891 Moscow TASS in English 2138 GMT  
6 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow September 7 TASS—From now on the Association of Workers of the Media in the USSR will bear the name of the Confederation of Journalists' Unions. This decision was taken at the plenum of the Council of the USSR Union of Journalists held in Moscow on Friday. The new name clearly indicates the confederal principle of the structure of the union endorsed at the previous congress of journalists.

Lessons of the putsch were the main question discussed at the plenum. The union's leaders stated their principled attitude to that matter in those alarming days. At the same time the confederation's council firmly stated that it does not claim the role of a judge and declares against hasty conclusions, against launching "witch-hunts" and banning publications on the basis of their affiliation with definite parties. Proposals to create special commissions in primary journalist organisations to investigate the attitudes of concrete journalists have been resolutely turned down.

The participants in the plenum believe that it is now important to be concerned that the media should not become "a hostage to the situation" again. For this purpose it is necessary above all to achieve economic independence. One of the speakers noted that "there is no freedom without funds."

It has been decided to found a commercial bank of the confederation, to create its broker's office at the market of paper and printing services. Insurance funds of journalists joint-stock society will also be founded.

Under the plenum's decision the union of journalists has become a co-sponsor of the Moscow independent broadcasting corporation and the Soviet-American radio station "Nezavisimost" (Independence). The information-sociological service has been set up. Another novelty is the opening of the servicing and commercial center "the journalist."

The plenum of the Council of the Confederation of Journalists' Unions adopted an address of the plenum to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and members of the State Council. The message specifically contains the demand "to ensure the very existence of the press," speaks of its right to have its share in enterprises of the printing industry."

The participants in the plenum would not put up with losing its leader, Eduard Sagalayev, appointed one of the chiefs of the state television and radio company. It was decreed that he will combine both of his posts.

**KOMMUNIST Journal Renamed  
SVOBODNAYA MYSL***LD0609182791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Text] The journal KOMMUNIST, which has been the CPSU's main theoretical and political publication for almost the whole history of the party has been given a new name and status. Opening the latest issue, the journalists of the editorial collective report that it has taken the decision to found the journal SVOBODNAYA MYSL [Free Thought], that is, make it an open tribune for the country's democratic left forces.

**SOVETSKAYA KULTURA Changes Name to  
KULTURA***LD0709094891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak  
Network in Russian 0500 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] It is Saturday, and another issue of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has come out. Mayak is looking at some of its material. Let me tell you, however, that the next issue will be called just KULTURA. According to the editorial board, the name has been changed in accordance with the wishes of the newspaper's numerous contributors and friends. However, the reference number and subscription price remain the same.

**IZVESTIYA Editorial Collegium Elected***PM0909144991*

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 5 Sep 1991 carries in its Union Edition on page 1 an unattributed report entitled: "IZVESTIYA Staff Elect Editorial Collegium" and on page 8 the list of editorial collegium members. The page 1 report reads in full as follows:

"On 3 September there was a meeting of the IZVESTIYA editorial office collective where the editorial collegium was formed.

"On the basis of the existing regulations, the chief editor used his right to appoint and include in the editorial collegium his deputies and executive secretary. According to the rules, the size of this 'team' must not exceed half of the total membership of the editorial collegium. The remaining members of the editorial collegium were elected by secret ballot by a simple majority. The director of the IZVESTIYA publishing house is an ex-officio member of the editorial collegium.

"Henceforth the IZVESTIYA editorial collegium's decisions are to be taken by open ballot by a simple majority. In the event of disagreement between the chief editor and the editorial collegium, the decision of the editorial collegium shall be binding on the chief editor if it is adopted by a majority of not less than three-quarters of the number of editorial collegium members present.

"(The editorial collegium list is published on the back page)."

The report on page 8, boxed off from the rest of the page, reads in full as follows:

"Founder: IZVESTIYA Journalists' Collective

"Chief Editor: I. Golembiovskiy.

"Editorial Collegium:

"N. Bondarchuk (deputy chief editor), V. Gavrichkin, E. Gonzalyez, S. Dardykin, A. Druzenko (first deputy chief editor), Yu. Yefremov (publishing house director), V. Zakharko (executive secretary), A. Illesh, L. Korneshov (deputy chief editor, chief editor of the SOYUZ supplement), O. Latsis, Yu. Makarov, D. Mamleyev (first deputy chief editor), V. Nadein (deputy chief editor), Yu. Orlik, A. Plutnik, and I. Serkov (deputy chief editor and chief editor of the NEDELYA supplement)."

### Weekly GLASNOST Publishes Again

PM0909121591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Sep 91  
Single Edition p 3

[Report by V. Kozhemyako: "GLASNOST Publishes"]

[Text] As is well known the weekly GLASNOST was banned twice—first by the putschists and then by the Russian president. Naturally, its more than 350,000 readers, and they were not alone, wondered when the newspaper would begin to publish again. Here is what Yuriy Izyumov, chief editor of GLASNOST, has announced:

"Our newspaper, like other CPSU publications, has been obliged to change its founder. It has become the editorial office labor collective. The registration certificate issued by the USSR Ministry of Information and the Press states: The weekly sets the task of responding promptly to working people's questions and publishing topical sociopolitical information."

And so the next issue of the renewed GLASNOST is published 7 September.

### MOSCOW NEWS Chief Editor Interviewed on Paper's Policy

LD0809213591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak  
Network in Russian 1330 GMT 8 Sep 91

[Interview with Leonid Karpinskiy, editor-in-chief of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Leonid Vyacheslavovich, I think that the present position of newspapers is connected in many ways with the position of Yegor Yakovlev, its former editor-in-chief. Will the newspaper, its position, its structure, change now?

[Karpinskiy] We will continue in many ways the policy which has been laid down. But at the same time, the idea has matured in the collective that they should work on its development in a serious way.

But to begin formally, in the first place, it will be published in 24 typed pages. That would seem to be an indicator purely of volume but this is imposed by the new demands and content. But in the first place, to my great joy, we will be given the opportunity not to mutilate authors' texts, the texts of serious authors who have begun the investigation of a problem.

We are thinking about improving the so-called information block. Information should be both broader and more diverse. We are a political weekly but to limit ourselves to politics alone, if politics is interpreted narrowly as what is happening in the Kremlin, then I do not think that we will limit ourselves to those politics. Nevertheless, sooner or later we will begin to lead a normal life, on the basis of the market and democratic processes. Information about normal life should be much broader so that every reader is able to find in the newspaper what corresponds to his interests.

As for the material side of the matter, of no minor importance, the Russian publication will cost 38 rubles [R] for the year. If the subscribers want to know the cost of one issue, then by subscription the reader will pay 73 kopecks and if purchased at retail outlets the newspaper will cost 80 kopecks.

[Correspondent] In the past, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI was, in many ways, the voice of the opposition. Perhaps one of the secrets of its popularity lies in this. What stance will the newspaper take now?

[Karpinskiy] You know, you have asked me a difficult question, since, as we all think, democracy has won, or has begun to win. Our opposition used to consist in us grumbling, criticizing, waxing indignant over the braking effect on the democratic processes by totalitarian structures. It seems that the boys will break them down now. The authorities of Russia, for instance, are a democratic leadership. Of course, our opposition nature will be preserved, in the sense that we do not intend to swallow everything which the bosses do and to sing their praises. And we wholeheartedly wish the leadership of Russia and of other republics success. But, alas unfortunately, in this leadership, too, shortcomings and omissions will undoubtedly be found. To put it briefly, we need to adopt a new opposition point of view, a more constructive, more businesslike one on the platform of general accord with the aims of democracy.

[Correspondent] Will you give the representatives of those who hold opposite political views an opportunity to speak out on the pages of the newspaper?

[Karpinskiy] Once again, you are asking a question which is being discussed in the editorial office. Naturally, pluralism of opinions is a good thing, but again,

within the framework of the limits of a general democratic point of view. For instance, I do not think that we should give the floor to ideologues such as Bondarev and (Prokhanov), who, in their writings and hysterical speeches paved the way for the putsch. That is not pluralism—that is a rapaciousness which jeopardizes positions of principle.

[Correspondent] Much of the mass media is now striving to be independent, to call themselves independent of the authorities. The words independent newspaper appear on your first page. How do you understand independence in this context?

[Karpinskiy] Well, you know, there is no such thing as absolute freedom. We are independent of the dictatorship of any levels of authority. But, for instance, we depend very much on the council of our founders, that is, an assembly of people with very great authority who, of course, by their views and purposes influence, in some way, the policy and course of the newspaper but who also help it very much.

[Correspondent] Who are your founders?

[Karpinskiy] There are many of them—political figures, scholars, philosophers. Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev was chairman of the council—he will remain a member of the council. Among the cofounders are people such as Academician (Petrushev); the philosopher Tsybko, well-known for his criticism of Marxist doctrine; the publicist (Klyankin), editor of DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA; Sobchak, Stankevich—such names—Starovoytova, (Nuikin), (Ternichenko), Academician Bogomolov, an economist and director of an institute—there are too many to list them all.

[Correspondent] Who finances you?

[Karpinskiy] We have been run on a self-financing basis since the divorce with the Novosti Press Agency which no longer exists. We had some reserves. But again this is a leading question. We operate in conditions of strict competition. There are many newspapers and old ones, too. And of course, we are thinking about that. And therefore, we hope very much that our faithful readers will not leave us.

### **MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA Becomes Independent**

*PM0609103191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 6 Sep 91 Single Edition p 1*

[TASS report under general heading "News in Brief"]

[Text] By a decision of the council of founders MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA has been declared an independent public medical publication. USSR People's Deputy Professor G.A. Komarov has become its chief editor.

### **Central TV's Lazutkin Addresses Press Conference**

*PM0909090991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 4*

[Natalya Bobrova report: "Our Professional Honor Has Been Wounded..."]

[Text] This was stated at a recent meeting with journalists by Valentin Lazutkin, who has kept his post as first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting even under its new chairman—Yegor Yakovlev. He has continued his professional activity largely thanks to the support of journalists at Central Television, who would not accept his decision to resign.

It is known that the stand by Central Television's leadership at the time of the putsch elicited a far from unambiguous assessment in the press. For, being the authorities' official monopoly mouthpiece, it was Central Television, as well as several major newspapers, that reflected most fully the criminals' position. But it is hard to say whether this was the television journalists' fault or their misfortune. One thing is clear: Only naive people could have expected special heroism in certain organizational forms (strikes, for example) from the "fledglings of Kravchenko's nest." Wiser people immediately tuned to the BBC, Radio Liberty, and Ekho Moskvy, which provided information efficiently and promptly from the scenes of events—unlike the television screen, which at once turned gray on 19 August.

Of course, we realize that it is hard to work under the barrel of a submachine gun (and Central Television was surrounded, with soldiers patrolling the floors), but there was Sergey Medvedev's 19 August reportage on "Vremya" from the White House, which has stuck in many people's memory! And it was right after that that many Muscovites set out to defend their legitimate government. This reportage happened, Valentin Lazutkin said, largely thanks to some purely technical ruses—thus, the text of Yeltsin's decree was given out by the correspondent himself in his own words. The response from "Yanayev's men" was a squall of calls and threats, including ones from Pugo and Prokofyev. But it was too late, and the situation, moreover, was changing rapidly. This was why the news finally appeared on the screen—true, under the "TSN" [Television News Service] logo. And tribute must be paid to the courage of certain Central Television reporters who operated cameras for days on end in the square outside the Russian parliament.

"Kravchenko said: Unless we obey, other people who have mastered the profession not in our ranks will sit at the control panels."

"We are not whitewashing ourselves, we simply do not want to be blackened."

"We did not support the junta and did everything possible to break the news blockade."

The nervous voices of the participants in this strange news conference, which resembled partly a showdown, partly a communal kitchen symposium, partly a comrades' court, confirmed to the journalists that their colleagues at Central Television are sincerely worried. There is now a question mark over their reputation in many ways.

"Our civic, professional honor has been wounded, and this is why we have met," Valentin Lazutkin said.

### Kravchenko Interview

LD0709221491 Moscow Central Television First  
Program Network in Russian 1853 GMT 26 Aug 91

[Interview with Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko, former head of the the USSR Television and Radio company by presenter Aleksandr Lyubimov; in Kravchenko's apartment, date not given—recorded, from the "Vzglyad" program]

[Text] [Co-presenter Aleksandr Politkovskiy] You are now to see an interview with a man whose name was on everyone's lips whenever television was being discussed. You will recall how ATV [Authors' Television] was switched to the Second Program, "Vzglyad" was closed down, "Television News Service" was broken up. And Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko promised us a live meeting on the air. Unfortunately that meeting did not come about—at that time, I mean, although we were always ready for it. Now he is the ex-head of the All-Union Television and Radio Company, and I would warn you, viewers, against seeing the interview coming up now as some kind of reprisal against a political opponent—that would be quite simply to misunderstand the intention.

[Kravchenko] I was awoken at night by a telephone call, I was out of town at the time. [Lyubimov] This was the night of the 18th-19th? [Kravchenko] Yes, the night when this all happened. I was awoken by the telephone. My mother-in-law was staying with us, and it was she who woke me. It was Comrade Manayenkov summoning me to the party Central Committee. I asked whether it couldn't wait till the morning: What was the big problem? All the more so since I had had some tough working days. No, he replied, this had to be at once. It was very important, something that couldn't wait. He said a car would come for me. A car was called. It was a security services car from the former Ninth Service. So I went to the meeting with Manayenkov. There I learned ... It was announced to me that at 0400 a state of emergency was to be introduced in a number of areas. There were some documents lying there. I was told that at around 0600—or rather at 0500—I was to receive a package of documents which had to be broadcast without fail.

[Lyubimov] And at what time was this meeting with Manayenkov, and where?

[Kravchenko] It was in his office, at about 0100. I'm pretty sure that was the time, 0100.

[Lyubimov] But Luchinskiy and Shenin were not there?

[Kravchenko] Luchinskiy was not there. In fact I had had no contact at all with Luchinskiy over those days. Anyway, there was to be a meeting at Shenin's office at 0500. It was he, in fact, who handed the documents to me, a whole package of them. First in the series—there was a running order for TASS—was the statement by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov. For some reason or other it was a handwritten version, and to this day I do not understand the riddle of that—whether it was something they had decided to tack on to the committee's documents, because this after all was not a committee document.

[Lyubimov] But it was in his handwriting?

[Kravchenko] Yes, his handwriting, and his signature. We know that. Or whether maybe they had decided to drag him into the affair in this way—well, of course, Anatoliy Ivanovich himself would be better placed to answer that question, because the statement had been signed the day before.

[Lyubimov] Suppose you had then got into the car with this package of documents from the junta, told the driver to take you out of town, stopped at a dacha belonging to some friend or other who was not a member of the nomenklatura, and set fire to the lot?

[Kravchenko] Sasha, I told you right at the start that the car that came at me that night was from the former Ninth Directorate. And there was a man in it who never left my side. I was pretty disturbed, I make no secret of that, so during the night I stopped off here at this apartment where we are now. After all, we had been staying at the dacha, and I called in here for my razor. I felt pretty uneasy inside, I can tell you. So I came and got my razor, just as in earlier times people used to take dry disouits with them. So that's how it was, and outside the door over there—the one you came through just now—there was a comrade waiting for me to come out. It was not a question of whether or not I would have the guts to make a run for it. I could have locked the doors and barricaded myself in here. But it wouldn't have made any difference, because if those documents had not come out within a certain period of time via TASS they would have come out via some other channels a little later. They would have appeared, without us, without me, without Shishkin, they would have come out just the same by one channel or another. Anyone in his senses could understand in—it was no longer a matter of one individual or another.

[Lyubimov] Well, on the 20th you arrived in the Kremlin toward 2000.

[Kravchenko] Yes, I was invited there to the session, for one point of the agenda, as it was came to light, of the agenda, which was connected with my persistent demands that the question of television and radio be examined. After all, a resolution had been issued suspending a number of newspapers, and, well, we were not just...not just suspending them. And we were working practically like a violinist with a single violin, were working on the First Program alone—because the second could not have been regarded seriously as a program—it duplicated the first. And there were two programs on the radio. Ah, yes, there was also the educational television First Program.

And, on the whole, they met me half way. I was a bit cunning, I admit, I was a bit cunning when I said, you understand, things can't remain like that any longer. Everything must be defined precisely. And it was important to me, in the first place, that this be defined, defined on the basis of such a strange concept. I did not want to be slandered later, no matter how things ended. I did not want it to be said that there had been no trace of Kravchenko. So, I consider the fact that a document appeared in which there were three television programs and four radio programs as my personal victory—although I do not think that the people who took the decision then, in actual fact, appreciated the essence of what I was saying then.

[Lyubimov] Was the topic of storming the White House discussed at that session?

[Kravchenko] It was discussed. At that session, before our point was examined, Yanayev spoke. He read a statement. He said: I would like to immediately give the "Vremya" program a report, and I have invited Kravchenko here—he is sitting here. He said: Little time is left until 2100. The session had begun about two hours before that. His report was to the effect that under no circumstances would an attack on the building of the Russian government be tolerated. But things were silent as the grave there.

[Lyubimov] What did Kryuchkov do then?

[Kravchenko] Kryuchkov, and then Yazov, in turn, and, in my opinion, Pugo, too, made the rejoinder that we had been declared state criminals and we should be prepared to be stormed ourselves. So, why should we give guarantees? Yanayev again made the rejoinder: Well, is thought being given to our taking the White House, or something like that? I always rejected it.

[Lyubimov] Did the personal protests of the central apparatus help? After all, you could have cut it off, blown it up, locked it away, and gone off.

[Kravchenko] On the whole, there was a choice, but we avoided it somewhat. All the same, I am a pragmatical person, am I not? There is always a choice. It was either me, Lazutkin, and others, or someone with a gun. We discussed that in our circle. We could have made a dramatic statement. On 19 August, if we had not been so

mislead by those versions, we could have done that collectively and left. But it is hard to say where we would have gone, under arrest. After all is said and done, it is not a matter of that. It was discussed in our narrow circle from the point of view of what would be best. All the same, we are professionals in whom there is trust, to a lesser or greater degree, and we will make professional decisions. There will either be control of everything on the airwaves—nothing need be done with the apparatus for that, for official material and resolutions of the committee have to be broadcast—or not. After all, there is no doing without television and radio. Therefore, the state of emergency was introduced immediately at our place [laughs], at Gosteleradio, on all floors. Therefore, that pragmatism was very relative. Perhaps my pragmatism was formed definitely when I realized that different versions were being told and that we were being duped and that this was now the last chance to take some kind of desperate stance, no matter what the cost.

[Lyubimov] Leonid Petrovich, according to my observations, over the last few days you were among the majority of leaders of sectors of industry who behaved cautiously; that is, leaders who did not adopt an active stance of opposition, but tried, without exposing themselves, not to cooperate with the junta. In actual fact, that is a very unsteady and complex position. I realize that you are speaking about the highest state interests and that I do not have the right to doubt you, as I have nothing to do with such work. Nevertheless, all the noble issues aside, you got into a situation in which, like Gorbachev, you remain afloat in any situation.

[Kravchenko] Sasha, since I was appointed chairman of Gosteleradio last November, and up until today, I have been in such a situation. It is true that I am the former chairman of that company, of Gosteleradio, since Yeltsin's decree. Since that time I have not had a single calm or happy day. I do not want to reproach Mikhail Sergeyevich with anything today, but I have to say that I returned to something that I really love—television—and two notions struggle in my soul. The first is that I was doing what I loved and the second is going there at such a time.

[Politkovskiy] You know, I have been listening to the interview given by Leonid Petrovich. I would not like to comment on it. Obviously, it is naturally you, television viewers, who should draw the conclusions. But I thought, what an internal tragedy it is when a person lives fundamentally at odds with his conscience. That is very difficult; that is very hard. We propose to show the interview in full soon. It is, of course, not very short. I think that you will learn many interesting details from it, not just about the coup or about the events of those days, but also about the life of the television and about the person of Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko himself.

We also propose that the "Vzglyad" program go out on the airwaves once again fully on Friday. The future of our television will be discussed, as will how journalists



behaved during these difficult days, journalism in general, and journalistic etiquette. Naturally, the question that interests all of us is what television should be like in the future.

We intend to invite very interesting and well-known television people who, in their time, were removed from the airwaves, to speak about our future. With that we will end the short special edition today. We now end today's special edition of "Vzglyad".

### **Popov Takes Role as Central TV Political Observer**

*LD0609091391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[From the "Television News Service" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Now I want to reveal to you something which is probably not a secret: Gavriil Khari-tonovich Popov has agreed to become a political observer for Central Television. Does this mean that you shall leave your job as a mayor, your main job?

[Popov] My main job will remain the main job. My participation in the political life of the country will be exactly in accordance with the proposition which I received from you. I only hope it will not take too much of my time.

### **Television's 'Partner' Program Returns to Screen**

*PM1009142591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Ye. Fedorov report: "'Partner' on Screen Again"]

[Text] Popular journalists, favorite programs, and hard-hitting topics are returning to our television screens. In the wake of "Vzglyad" and "Before and After Midnight," this Friday saw the reappearance of the "Partner" program, famous for its economic forecasts and accurate targeting of knotty problems, which had been consistently successful primarily among entrepreneurs and economists.

"Our program fell victim primarily to unscrupulous competition," "Partner" presenter N. Baranskiy said.

### **Contender for Vremya TV News Slot Analyzed**

*PM0909134391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Sep 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Vl. Arsenyev report under the "TV and Us" rubric: "Who Will Replace Vremya?"]

[Text] Our television has never offered a more fascinating competition than the one organized at 2100 hours Moscow time on 2 September. During two weeks we viewers will have to decide for ourselves which of the creative groups is worthy to take the place of the former Vremya program.

I am certainly not alone in having felt some sympathy for Tatyana Mitkova. For the second time in recent days she has had to open the transmission, presiding over the ruins of a program on which she had never previously appeared. Mitkovaya's element is TSN [Television News Service], which is different and distinct in character from the strict official tenor of Vremya and which more accurately captures the rhythm of the times. We also saw TSN. The program ran not for the usual 15 minutes, but for 35, ending with the familiar roundup of the day's sports events and the weather forecast. It is possible that those who expected stunning changes will have been disappointed. But I would be in no rush to deny the first of the two competing teams originality, inventiveness, and the ability to come up with unexpected twists. I think we will see all this often over the week. Already on 2 September the move toward a new form of news broadcasting was promising.

First, the reporting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, where an attempt was made to show the distinctiveness of the moment through symbolic figures, was quite different from before. We saw A. Yakovlev, G. Popov, and Yu. Afanasyev—the victors as they are now called—in the hall. Second the commentaries of S. Alekseyev and A. Sobchak were kept as short as possible, not more than 90 seconds—either against the backdrop of the entrance hall of the Palace of Congress or in the studio. Third, for the first time the main news program publicized the results of poll ratings, without worrying about the extent to which they would please Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

There were other innovations too. It is worth noting, I think, those distinctive features of the program which it seems are conducive to the main thing—the establishment of one's own position, independent of anyone's diktat (recommendations, instructions, or advice). It is not obligatory to declare it, this position; it is perhaps not even necessary to do this at all. You can understand the kind of journalist someone is and the views he shares by the material and subject matter which he presents.

And another thing is also important, in my view. An experiment is an experiment, but is already clear that Central Television is beginning to seek journalists who are not ciphers, tokens, instruments for transmitting information handed down from above, but people with a lively and creative spirit and personality. This has happened before. But then obedience was more prized, which indeed destroyed even many perfectly talented people.

Yes, let us hope that this observation will not prove yet another illusion for us.

### **Paper Refutes Story on Missing Journalist**

*91UF1082A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 3*

[Commentary by Yevgeniy Kubichev, editor of the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA department for the international labor movement, under the rubric "RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Commentary," preceded by



reprint of N. Nikolayev article from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 30, Aug 91: "A Man Has Disappeared—And Now There Is Silence"]

[Text] Let us now look and see what N. Nikolayev is trying to tell us. The point is that a professional journalist cannot write like that—he is simply not able to pile up such a large quantity of mistakes, absurdities, fact juggling, and insinuations.

First. Any journalism student knows that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is far from being the "organ of the CPSU Central Committee"—the organ of the CPSU Central Committee is the newspaper PRAVDA.

Second. M. Butkov coordinated with the editors a trip to Sweden, not Denmark, and this is also confirmed by his wife.

Third. N. Nikolayev has doubts that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA can maintain a foreign correspondents' point abroad. But any professional journalist knows that all newspapers are now engaging in commercial activity and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is no exception. The hard currency from just one column of advertising would be enough to maintain a correspondents' bureau abroad for a year.

Fourth. A professional journalist could not but know that Norway's national monetary unit is the krona and not the dollar, in which N. Nikolayev, when counting the money in someone else's pocket, determines the cost of maintaining our bureau in Oslo, for which he uses absurd figures to begin with.

Fifth. The ARGUMENTY I FAKTY author makes a quite unprofessional judgment of the journalist's output when he asserts that M. Butkov "did not write very much" in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA—"only three or four articles during the year." He should be speaking not about a year but about four months. A professional would know that one noteworthy, in-depth article a month is within the norm for a special correspondent abroad. Moreover, any journalist has various articles

which he has written and sent to the editorial office but which were not published for various reasons.

Sixth. The "excessive activity" about which N. Nikolayev writes disapprovingly is a necessary quality of a journalist and not just a journalist abroad.

Seventh. The ARGUMENTY I FAKTY author forgot about the first commandment of a professional journalist—not to deceive the reader by passing conjecture off as fact. In his note, directly or indirectly, three times he gives the impression that he had spoken with journalists from RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA. There were no such conversations—that is why he gives no names. Nor does he give the names of the foreign journalists and special correspondents of Soviet publications in Norway, although he takes the liberty of ascribing various opinions to them.

On the basis of all this we draw the conclusion that the article in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY was not written by a professional journalist. It is more likely that he was some kind of professional agent, but we do not know from which office. And it is quite clear that he had set certain tasks for himself: to cast a dense shadow of compromising evidence over the party press, the poor M. Butkov, and in general all journalists of central publications working abroad, since N. Nikolayev knows from somewhere that the newspapers cannot support them.

Moreover, journalism is a highly moral profession. A professional is organically unable to write the cruel phrase: "It is difficult to say where he is now (M. Butkov—Ye.K.) and whether he is alive or not." How would it be for his wife, children, or parents to read this "whether he is alive"?

And the last thing. We do not know where, how, or through which channels N. Nikolayev intends to conduct his investigation. But a couple of days ago Mikhail Botyan, deputy editor of the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA department of the international labor movement, went to Norway. His passage has already been booked. He will not accept any orders for investigations from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

### USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Sees Continuing Chernobyl Cover-Up by 'Nuclear Lobby'

91WN0651A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 24, Jun 91 p 3

[Article by Alla Yaroshinskaya, USSR Supreme Soviet People's Deputy and Chernobyl Commission Member, under the rubric: "The Nuclear Lobbies—Both at Home and Abroad—Have Succeeded in Embroidering the Lie Concerning the Catastrophe: Do the Chernobyl Babies Smoke?: Subjective Observations From the First International Congress in Memory of A.D. Sakharov"]

[Text] The congress took place in Moscow from 21 to 25 May of this year under the banner "Peace, Progress, and Human Rights" (So A.D. Sakharov's Nobel lecture was entitled). It was dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the great physicist-humanist's birth. Two problems were posed for discussion at the congress: "The Soviet Union and the Countries of Eastern Europe En Route From Totalitarianism to Democracy" and "The Chernobyl Catastrophe's Global Consequences and Nuclear Power Production's Future."

The announced subject of Chernobyl at the congress naturally attracted the attention of specialists and, in particular, of the millions of people living in the stricken zones even today. All awaited, with great hope, the results of discussions illuminated by the name of Academician Sakharov, which is associated, above all, with uncompromisingness and pristine honesty. After all, five years have already passed since the explosion, and we still do not know the whole truth about Chernobyl. Our children continue to live in radioactive fumes. Their Chernobyl genes reach into the future. True, it was rather astounding that only three Soviet scientists received official invitations as experts on this subject. The remaining 13 were from other countries. However, it was assumed that this peculiarity—after all, who should know the Chernobyl problems better than we ourselves?—would be offset by the Western experts' competence and independence of judgment, and by truly Sakharovian approaches to the problem. This was particularly important because a UN [OON] meeting in Vienna, at which experts from the MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] were reporting on the results of their work in the Chernobyl catastrophe zones, was taking place at the very same time, and they in Russia [the Russian Republic], the Ukraine, and Belorussia were by no means in agreement with all findings of that work.

The report of Doctor Richard Wilson, a Harvard University professor, at the congress's very first plenary session on the subject of Chernobyl produced a shock among those in attendance and those who had at least a little information. Having stated at the outset that "We only received the information from the Ukraine four months after the explosion" and that "Legasov, saying 'I have not lied, but neither have I told the whole truth,' did not give us all of the information," and after advising

that Western scientists, having learned the details about Chernobyl only in 1988, "were greatly shocked" that "complete information had not been made public even in 1990" and that "the veil of secrecy is producing distrust"—having said all this, Professor Wilson nevertheless then had the audacity to make witty comparisons of the Chernobyl catastrophe's consequences with the effects of smoking ("20 rems are equivalent to the smoking of 20,000 cigarettes"), and recommended that all of us "be in the fresh air more often." He further assured us that "the fires in Kuwait are worse than the Chernobyl accident in their consequences," and also compared the radiation catastrophe to the flooding in Bangladesh.

In addition to this, the professor demonstrated a Geiger counter from the congress's speaker's platform, remarking in the process, "We were at the plant in Chernobyl. The counter still clicks; residual radioactivity has remained," which profoundly amazed those present. (True, after a recess, the professor took the floor to respond, and explained that, as he put it, there was no radiation in the counter, or in the hall either—that was an interpreter's error.)

Complaints of Western scientists that they do not have sufficient information, that there were taken as the basis for their addresses, not their own findings, but the findings of others, including Soviet scientists, and that information about Chernobyl is still shrouded by secrecy, constantly resounded from the congress's speaker's platform. Other scientists—the USSR Supreme Soviet's experts, who have been engaged exclusively with the Chernobyl problems for several years, and who have the most extensive information in the country and the world about the various aspects of the explosion's consequences—sat in the hall and listened to these complaints. The situation, let us speak frankly, is paradoxical.

Wilson's report continued to be hotly discussed in the congress's unofficial conversations during the recesses between its sessions. Neither Academician Yuriy Ryzhov, nor Professor Anatoliy Nazarov, nor writer Ales Adamovich—nobody—knew how it happened that not one of those who have complete and reliable information on the catastrophe's consequences was allowed even close to the congress's speaker's platform. During a recess, I expressed my alarm to Yelena Georgiyevna Bonner: If what the Western scientists have alleged from the speaker's platform about Chernobyl's consequences is taken as the basis for definitive recommendations, Sakharov's name will be tarnished. After all, Richard Wilson almost as much as said what we have been hearing here at home (I live in stricken Zhitomir Oblast) from official medicine and from Academician Ilin and his team. Not so long ago, however, after five years under the weight of the obvious facts, even the academician himself was compelled to admit, in preparliamentary hearings at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology, that 1.6 million children, who daily suffer the effects of small radiation doses on themselves, are today

in such condition "as causes alarm." Bonner, however, dubiously it seemed to me, answered: "Well, we have to believe somebody!" Yes, we do. The people and physicians in the zone believe their own eyes and their own research results first of all, and not stories about the global consequences of the catastrophe's comparison with the effect of smoking (Do those 1.6 million children also smoke?), even when the stories are overseas ones.

No, I am not against Western scientists' expressing their own viewpoints; on the contrary, I am wholeheartedly for it. However, I am also for our finally beginning to respect ourselves first of all. Why, in such a huge country, and being informed of what is actually happening in the contaminated areas (Six months ago, thanks specifically to Yelena Bonner, and in her apartment, a special interview of me about this was done by Rosalyn Carter, wife of the former American President.), did the congress's organizers not find a Soviet scientist independent of official medicine, who could make a report on the catastrophe at Chernobyl competently and with integrity on the basis of his own findings? We have such people, thank God, and their names are well-known: A.G. Nazarov, Ye.B. Burlakova, V.A. Shevchenko, D.M. Grodzinskiy, Ye.F. Konoplya....

What happened with the Chernobyl evaluations does not entirely surprise me: Lobbying in this direction has long been conducted, both here and abroad. Something else surprised me: The same sort of attempt was made at the Sakharov Congress. This, in particular, was the most unexpected and offensive thing of all.

Soviet nuclear lobbies have been rather successful in embroidering the lie about Chernobyl, beginning with the official version of the reasons for the explosion presented to the IAEA in the name of the USSR Government. In reports at the meeting of IAEA experts from 25 to 29 August 1986 and at the international conference on nuclear power production's safety indicators from 28 September to 2 October 1987, "an extremely unlikely combination of operating-rule and -procedure violations committed by the power unit's personnel" was termed our government's official version of the reasons for the accident. A period was placed here. True, this was for export. Here it is for domestic use: In a report of the Atomic Energy Institute imeni Kurchatov, which was officially formulated after the report for the IAEA, it is pointed out that "an extremely unlikely combination of operating-rule and -procedure violations committed by the power unit's personnel, during which defects in the design of SU3's [power unit 3's] reactor and rods manifested themselves, was the accident's primary cause." The differentiated words are absent in the official version for the IAEA. In fact, it was known about the type RBMK-1000 reactor's design defects long before the accident. A. Yadrikhinskiy, a specialist from the Kursk AES [nuclear electric power station] had warned about this in his letter to higher authorities, and later, almost immediately after the explosion, several more scientists gave warning of it. An interagency council, chaired by

Academician Aleksandrov, whose brainchild the Chernobyl reactor is, prepared the official version. So, could it have been otherwise: Aleksandrov against Aleksandrov?

Today, when I hear about the international standing commission on Chernobyl, I think of MGU [Moscow State University] Professor A. Mishchenko, who said at one of the press conferences: "The government turns to foreign scientists when Soviet scientists are not in agreement with government plans. It then looks for more subservient consultants, and finds them abroad." The first such "first aid" came to us in 1989: Professor (Pellerin) from France, (Benninson) from Argentina, and (White) from Canada. They are VOZ [World Health Organization (WHO)] representatives. This was the Soviet Government's reaction to criticism of itself about the consequences of the explosion at Chernobyl at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The eminent guests were supposed to dispel all doubts that members of the parliament had sown.

The foreign specialists' trip to Ukrainian and Belorussian radiation localities then gave rise to a new stream of lies on local press pages. Aleksandr Lyutsko, a Belorussian University Physics Department docent, told his Western colleagues—in a limited circle—about this trip at a meeting of a congress section on the Chernobyl problems. (By the way, neither he nor the other USSR VS [Supreme Soviet] experts, with the exception of Professor Ye.B. Burlakova, were officially invited to this section. They entered it at their own risk, although the organizers had announced on the microphone at the plenary session that they were not to enter without invitations.) About 45 persons were gathered in a small room. "(Pellerin) and (Benninson) measured nothing in Belorussia themselves," said Lyutsko; "however, they made reassuring announcements." The Soviet experts won a unique victory at this meeting of the congress in a limited circle. The foreign scientists' turn to be surprised had come. They heard exposures of official medicine spokesman Academician Ilin's false reports in the West that 5.4 million persons in the Soviet Union supposedly were subjected to iodine prophylaxis immediately after the accident. "That is disinformation," remarked Lyutsko, "there was practically no timely iodine prophylaxis in Belorussia, and in the places where there was, it was conducted only on the fifth and seventh day. This action was, in fact, not only useless, but even harmful."

For the first time, the honorable professors from the West also learned the truth about the catastrophe's magnitude, about the number subjected to radiation, and about the effect of the small doses on human health.

"In the military's documents, the doses are recorded as 3, 5, and 7 rem. Senior officers 'assigned' these doses to them. These data have gotten into the All-Union Registry. This is a crime, not only against people, but also against science. Everything has been falsified.

"Military personnel and tens of thousands of prisoners are not in the statistics."

The experts also heard an evaluation of their colleagues from the IAEA's activity: "This commission's report is based on the Soviet side's official data for the most part. The commission worked for two months in all, and, after all, so much material has accumulated during the five years. In Belorussia, the commission visited a total of two cities, whereas almost 80 percent of the territory there is stricken."

Professor Richard Wilson, in opening the section's meeting, apologized to Professor Burlakova for his having "reached her on the telephone only yesterday evening." After all, according to the program, it was suggested that his address at the plenary session (where he demonstrated the Geiger counter) was supposed to be the quintessence of her scientific research also. As became known, however, the honorable professor nevertheless found the time to meet and exchange opinions about Chernobyl with Oleg Pavlovskiy, Academician Ilin's closest associate, whose agency created the "veil of secrecy" of which the professor so complained in his public speech. Strange, is it not?

Oleg Pavlovskiy, who runs the USSR Ministry of Health Biophysics Institute's Laboratory, attended and addressed the Sakharov Congress meeting of experts as a living embodiment of official, lying Soviet medicine despite the USSR Procuracy's [Prosecutorial Agency's] finally having proposed a criminal case on the facts of the information's concealment. All things considered, however, this did not bother the congress's organizers. It probably was extremely important to Pavlovskiy, as well as to his boss, to make the criminal hushing up of data about the accident's consequences respectable through the prestige of the Sakharov Congress's Western experts.

Despite all the drama of the independent Soviet experts' status at the congress, they nevertheless succeeded in

overcoming the "dividing line" which they found themselves behind at somebody's demand. They managed to convince their Western colleagues that nursing children living in the zone of severe radiation are not ill because they have been smoking since early infancy, and that the flooding in Bangladesh—this is something other than the explosion at Chernobyl, and the same goes for the fires in Kuwait. At the discussion's end, amazed by the torrent of facts unknown to him but staggering the imagination, a doctor from Japan, (Tosiuki Kumatori), said: "I never expected to hear a discussion of this kind, and I am unprepared...."

Official Soviet medicine force-feeds foreign experts with only those facts that are favorable to it. How else, pray tell, is it to exonerate itself before the coming generations for its criminal deceit? Every time foreign experts come to us, they are firmly shielded from everything real by familiar figures: Ilin, Guskov, Romanenko....

Something similar was also supposed to happen at the congress despite the official team's being in Vienna. Perhaps, for the first time, the system failed. The congress accepted recommendations on the subject of Chernobyl without the usual Ilinist variations, the recommendations of uninvited experts! The work is not finished. It will be continued. The report of Docent Lyutsko and Professor Burlakova has "traveled" to various countries. The world has received information that used to be carefully shielded from foreign eyes in the Soviet Union.

In thinking about this vexatious incident in regard to Chernobyl at the congress, I understand that international political repercussions were far more important to the congress's organizers, and that the congress was aimed at widespread Western interest. This, unquestionably, is important in order to attract the international community's attention to the various problems in the Soviet Union. However, I suggest that this should not be done at all costs, especially when we are talking about the tragedy of the Chernobyl children.

**Gorbachev Issues Decree on Culture Ministry***PM0909151791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Sep 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Report from "IZVESTIYA, TASS, AFP, AP, REUTERS" roundup]

[Text] A decree from USSR President M. Gorbachev has tasked the USSR Ministry of Culture with coordinating interpublic cultural ties on the basis of the elaboration and implementation of joint comprehensive programs.

A council of the culture ministers of the republic [singular as published] will be set up under the USSR Ministry of Culture. It is planned to allocate budget appropriations to the USSR Ministry of Culture's Culture and Arts Development Fund. The USSR president has appointed Nikolay Nikolayevich Gubenko USSR minister of culture.

**Komsomol CC Secretariat Urges Internal Reform***914B0350A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 27 Aug 91 p 1*

["Appeal of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Komsomol to Members"]

[Text] The Central Committee Bureau of the Komsomol approved a decision yesterday to call a plenary meeting of the Komsomol Central Committee on September 4, 1991 in the city of Moscow. The plenum will look into questions concerning the future of the organization, as well as calling and convening an extraordinary congress of the Komsomol.

In connection with the forthcoming plenum, the Central Committee Secretariat of the Komsomol approved the following Appeal to Members of the Komsomol:

Our country has gone through some frightening days. Yes, during the days of the coup we made our own choice and took one more step toward freedom and democracy. We can look honestly into the eyes of our children. But today we have to think about what direction to take now. Remember: After its 21st Congress, the Komsomol slowly but surely began to cast away a part of its old totalitarian communist, ideological heritage. The course toward the de-ideologization of the Komsomol, the social protection of youth, and a broad ideological and political pluralism was not always accepted or understood by everyone, even within the Komsomol. But this was the only chance to make the Komsomol work both politically and economically for the benefit of youth, calmly, without outcries, and to make society face the most difficult problems of our generation.

Having stopped being a "reserve pool and a helper," and having declared its organizational and political independence, the Komsomol could not change its name at the 21st Congress, even though a majority of the republic organizations who are today in the Komsomol, are not communist, either in name or in content.

During the last several days, our country has taken on a completely new look. This will unalterably lead to basic changes of all political institutions. A gradual reform of the Komsomol is no longer possible. What we are faced with is not simply a rejuvenation or a reform, but the establishment of a completely new organization or organizations built on the foundations of the Komsomol. While making these cardinal changes, however, we cannot destroy the system of youth tourism or publishers for young people, or social services for youth, labor exchanges, or youth centers which differ in the variety of their orientation, all of which just barely are beginning to stand on their feet. And there are many other things that we somehow have been able to do in recent years that should not be destroyed. These achievements belong to all the youth and are instruments for the social protection of youth.

Yes, democracy is now irreversible. This road, however, will also be difficult for the youth, for there will be no reforms that bypass the young people. The young generation will have better lives if they do not focus on worrying about positions of influence, but become masters of their own destinies. We shall have to fight for a better future for our youth. Special organizations will be needed for this. We must restructure the organization into a number of units that could occupy the political niche of expressing and protecting the specific interests of the young generation.

What are we proposing?

First, we should reach the conclusion that the political role of the Komsomol, in its present form, has ended, and we should issue an appeal with a proposal for the self-determination of every Komsomol organization and member. Concomitantly, in a truly legal and democratic society, all the rights to have freedom of thought and freedom of ideological choice should be fully observed.

Second, in respecting the state of independence declared by a number of the republics, we want to emphasize that the component parts of the present Komsomol should strictly obey the laws of their respective republics. It follows from this that the Komsomol no longer exists as a unified federation. It is necessary to start work without delay on forming a different type of mutual relationships based on agreements among youth organizations of the sovereign states.

Third, it will fall on us to determine the future of this organization. Taking into consideration the priorities and orientation of the Komsomol which were identified recently, we would like to ask Komsomol members to express their opinions about the possibilities of organizing the following kinds of units, based on the Komsomol:

- A youth wing of the movement for democratic reforms;
- A youth organization of the leftist forces bloc;
- An independent political party
- a party of democratic youth; and
- A depoliticized and de-ideologized organization for the social protection of youth.

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